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3Abstract
This thesis analyzes the market for executive and non-executive directors of firms
with particular emphasis on the role of human capital such as industry expertise.
The first chapter analyzes how the human capital of CEOs affects corporate decision
making and ultimately corporate performance. Analyzing diversifying mergers and
acquisitions, it shows that CEO characteristics matter for the bidders’ performance
in takeovers. When the bidding CEO has experience in the target’s industry, the
abnormal announcement returns are between two and three times higher than those
generated by a CEO who is new to that industry. We provide evidence that this
performance is mainly driven by an experienced CEO’s ability to capture a larger
fraction of the surplus. Industry experts redistribute surplus in favor of their share-
holders by negotiating better deals and by paying a lower premium. We also find
that industry expert CEOs select low surplus deals on average. We argue that this
evidence is consistent with industry experts having superior negotiation ability.
The second chapter analyzes the determinants of the board structure (including
human capital, such as industry expertise) in banks. We show that country charac-
teristics explain most of the cross-sectional variation in bank board independence.
In contrast, country characteristics have little explanatory power for the fraction
of outside bank directors with experience in the banking industry. Exploiting the
time-series dimension of the sample, we show that changes in bank characteristics
are not robustly associated with changes in board independence, while changes in
board experience are positively related to changes in bank size and negatively re-
lated to changes in performance. The evidence suggests that country-specific laws
and regulations affect the composition of boards of banks mainly through require-
ments for director independence.
The third chapter analyzes the careers of top executive directors. Using a sam-
ple of board members of the largest US companies, I provide exhaustive descriptive
statistics on several dimensions of their careers. For instance, I am analyzing the
career paths of CEOs with respect to their industry experience and their promotion
within and between firms. Investigating CEO turnovers in detail, I report several
new findings that raise potential questions for future research. Moreover, it also
analyzes how changes in the market environment such as shocks to certain indus-
tries affect their career progression. I show that individuals whose industries are
performing badly are less likely to be promoted to a CEO position. These findings
suggest that luck is not only affecting CEO pay but also who is promoted to a CEO
position at first. A promising route for future research might be a more rigorous
4analysis of the within-firm dynamics of executive careers.
Fu¨r meine Eltern, Brigitte und Rolf Metzger
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Preface
This thesis comprises three independent chapters, spanning the range of my interests.
The first chapter deals with the industry-specific expertise of CEOs and how it
affects corporate decision making and ultimately corporate performance. Analyzing
diversifying mergers and acquisitions from 1990 to 2007, it shows that CEO charac-
teristics matter for the bidders’ performance in takeovers. When the bidding CEO
has experience in the target’s industry, it finds that the abnormal announcement
returns are between two and three times higher than those generated by a CEO who
is new to that industry. In dollar terms, this corresponds to a difference of more
than $100 million on average. It provides evidence that this performance is mainly
driven by an experienced CEO’s ability to capture a larger fraction of the surplus.
Industry experts redistribute surplus in favor of their shareholders by negotiating
better deals and by paying a lower premium. It also finds that industry expert
CEOs select low surplus deals on average. This evidence is consistent with industry
experts having superior negotiation ability.
The second chapter investigates the human capital of non-executive directors of
banks around the world. It shows that country characteristics explain most of the
cross-sectional variation in bank board independence. In contrast, country charac-
teristics have little explanatory power for the fraction of outside bank directors with
experience in the banking industry. Exploiting the time-series dimension of the sam-
ple, it shows that changes in bank characteristics are not robustly associated with
changes in board independence, while changes in board experience are positively re-
lated to changes in bank size and negatively related to changes in performance. The
evidence suggests that country-specific laws and regulations affect the composition
of boards of banks mainly through requirements for director independence.
The third chapter provides an empirical analysis of careers of executives in gen-
eral (and CEOs in particular). Using a sample of board members of the largest US
companies, I provide exhaustive descriptive statistics on several dimensions of their
careers. For instance, I am analyzing the career paths of CEOs with respect to their
industry experience and their promotion within and between firms. Investigating
CEO turnovers in detail, I report several new findings that raise potential questions
for future research. Moreover, I am making a first attempt to estimate a causal effect
of the economic environment on the careers of executives. I show that exogenous
shocks (such as industry performance) affect the careers of executives. I find that
individuals whose industries are performing badly are less likely to be promoted to
a CEO position. My finding suggests that luck is not only affecting CEO pay (see
PREFACE 15
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)) but also who is promoted to a CEO position at
first.
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1 How do CEOs matter? The Ef-
fect of Industry Expertise on Ac-
quisition Returns.1
1.1 Introduction
Many studies show that chief executive officers (CEOs) have an impact on corpo-
rate policies and corporate value.2 However, we still know very little about how
CEOs create value. This paper provides new evidence of how CEOs influence firm
performance. Our evidence comes from corporate takeovers. Employing a novel
dataset on the career paths of CEOs, we first establish that, in takeovers, CEOs
with previous work experience in the industry of the target outperform CEOs who
are new to the target industry. We find that the bidders’ abnormal announcement
returns are between two to three times larger if the CEOs come from the indus-
try of the target. Second, analyzing the mechanism, we differentiate between the
CEOs’ ability to create higher surplus and their ability to capture a larger fraction
of the surplus for their shareholders in the bargaining and price setting process. We
provide evidence that CEOs with experience in the target industry perform better
mainly because they negotiate better acquisition prices. We also show that industry
experts engage in low surplus acquisitions on average. This finding is consistent with
CEOs rationally anticipating that they will secure a larger fraction of the surplus
during negotiations with the target company.
Scholars in the business strategy literature have attached great importance distin-
guishing between value creation and value capture (see for instance, Porter 1980 and
Brandenburger 2002). We borrow this terminology and apply it to CEO activity.
CEOs can create value by fostering innovation, providing training to employees or
optimizing processes. They can also capture value through negotiation. For exam-
ple, CEOs could negotiate with suppliers for better prices on input goods3, with
1The work in this chapter was carried out jointly with equal share by Claudia Custodio and
me.
2For instance, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that CEOs have different styles regarding cor-
porate policies. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2009) use manager-specific heterogeneity for explaining
variation in executive pay. Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) as well as Bennedsen, Perez-
Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2007) show that CEOs matter for corporate performance. Malmendier
and Tate (2008), Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2009) as well as Malmendier, Tate, and Yan
(2010) show that CEO characteristics and experience are related to corporate decisions and per-
formance.
3Hennessy and Livdan (2009) examine optimal leverage in a customer-supplier setting.
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labor4 for lower wages or with the (local) government for subsidies.5 Such actions
do not necessarily create value overall but change its distribution in favor of the
shareholders. Hence, both sets of activities might increase shareholder value. We
provide evidence that value capture is an important component of shareholder value.
Theoretical research has stressed the importance of bargaining and negotiation for
economic outcomes (Williamson 1971, Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983). However,
we have little evidence on the extent to which top decision makers such as CEOs
can affect the bargaining outcomes. Our contribution is to show that experience in
the target industry increases the CEO’s ability to capture value when bargaining
with the target firm. Other things being equal, having a higher bargaining ability
allows a CEO to secure a larger fraction of the surplus. Here, we measure bargaining
ability directly by analyzing how surplus is split and what price is paid.
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) provide a suitable setting for our study. First,
takeovers typically represent the largest investments that companies will undertake.
The market for corporate control is also significant from an economic point of view:
U.S. firms spent more than $3.4 trillion on over 12,000 transactions over the last two
decades6, which is about 6.6 percent of US stock market capitalization.7 Second,
many empirical studies document that mergers create surplus. Most of this surplus
seems to be captured by the target shareholders. Indeed, the announcement returns
to the bidding shareholders are usually around zero on average or even slightly neg-
ative.8 We find a significant amount of CEO-specific variation in merger outcomes.9
This finding suggests that the bargaining abilities of CEOs vary and that they have
an effect on M&A outcomes.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we establish that industry-specific ex-
perience allows CEOs to perform better in diversifying mergers and acquisitions.
Second, we develop a theoretical model of two mechanisms - value creation and
value capture - that could explain our findings. We show that our findings are con-
sistent with the value capture mechanism by testing the model’s predictions directly,
using offer premium data and proxies for the value that is created by the acquisition.
Third, we show that CEO experience is particularly valuable in situations of high
informational asymmetries. For identification, we exploit variation in the industry-
4Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2010) analyze labor bargaining power on firms’ choice of debt.
5Spiegel and Spulber (1994) analyze the price, investment strategy, and capital structure of
regulated firms where firms use debt and equity strategically.
6See Malmendier and Tate (2008).
7According to Wilshire Associates, the total U.S. market cap is approximately $15.35 trillion
(May 23, 2007).
8Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) as well as Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) provide
excellent summaries of the empirical findings.
9This is consistent with Ahern (2010) who shows that there is variation in merger outcomes
which is related to customer-supplier relationships.
1 HOW DO CEOS MATTER? 18
specific experience of the bidding CEOs. Over their lifetime, most CEOs work in
different industries. This industry-specific experience may have an impact on how
well they perform in M&As. For instance, industry experts might be better at run-
ning the combined companies, or at negotiating with the target. The variation in
industry-specific experience helps us in three ways. First, industry experience might
affect both value creation and value capture. Second, since we observe the complete
past experience profile of CEOs, we can differentiate between general cross-industry
and industry-specific effects. Third, industry experience also varies within CEOs.
This variation allows us to control for unobserved CEO heterogeneity, ruling out
many alternative explanations.
First, we start by establishing a novel empirical finding: CEOs with prior work
experience in the industry of the target perform significantly better in diversifying
M&As. Using U.S. data on 4,844 announcements of acquisitions from 1990 to 2007,
we find that the stock market reacts more favorably to diversifying mergers when
the bidding CEO has prior work experience in the target industry. After controlling
for firm and deal characteristics, as well as for time and industry fixed effects, we
find that three-day abnormal announcement returns to the bidder are 1.3 percent-
age points higher for CEOs with top management experience in the target industry.
Given an average abnormal return of 0.5 percentage points for diversifying acqui-
sitions and an average market value of about $8,000M, this effect is large in both
relative and absolute dollar terms. There is indirect evidence that industry exper-
tise might be important when buying (or investing into) a company. Professional
expert networks such as GLG Research or innosquared match industry experts and
corporate clients for mergers and acquisititions. These experts are used to do ”more
objective diligence of specific acquisition targets. The expert network can quickly
and confidentially assess the assumptions behind management teams’ presentations
and investment bankers’ offering memoranda.”10 Moreover, Kaplan and Stromberg
(2009, p.132) discuss the role on industry experts in provate equity. They argue
that ”in addition to hiring dealmakers with financial engineering skills, private eq-
uity firms now often hire professionals with operating backgrounds and an industry
focus. For example, Lou Gerstner, the former chief executive officer of RJR and IBM
is affiliated with Carlyle, while Jack Welch, the former chief executive officer of GE,
is affiliated with Clayton Dubilier.” Bottazi et al. (2008) also stress the importance
of industry experience in the context of venture capital.
A key concern might be that the measure of industry experience is correlated
with omitted CEO heterogeneity that biases our findings. To address this concern
we exploit the fact that a fraction of the CEOs in our sample engage in multiple
acquisitions with (at least) one acquisition in an industry in which they have prior
10See http://www.glgresearch.com/ or http://www.innosquared.com/
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work experience and (at least) one in an industry that is unknown to them. This
allows us to include CEO fixed effects that help us identify the causal effect of indus-
try experience on acquisition performance. We are also concerned about endogenous
CEO-firm matching as CEOs and firms are not randomly assigned to each other.
Exploiting merger waves and analyzing the timing of the acquisitions, we provide
evidence that endogenous matching is not driving our results.
Second, we develop a simple theoretical model of takeovers. The purpose of the
model is to derive testable predictions that allow us to get insights into the mech-
anism through which industry-experience operates. We model a simple two-stage
game where, in the first stage, a company gets a random draw of potential targets
and decides to whom to make an offer. The surplus is split in the second stage. This
framework allows us to model the effect of CEOs’ industry experience on company
value through two different channels. On the one hand, industry experience might
increase the value that is created in a merger. CEOs with experience may be better
at integrating assets or at running the merged company. They may also be better
at identifying high-surplus targets in the pre-merger stage. On the other hand, in-
dustry experience might be advantageous in the bargaining process. For instance,
industry insiders might possess information that allows them to estimate the true
value of the target more accurately. Moreover, coming from the same industry might
also be helpful for assessing the targets’ outside options and hence strengthening the
bidding CEOs’ bargaining positions. Additionally, corporate culture is likely to be
different in different industries (for example, in mining vs. in advertising) and that
is why industry-specific experience may also affect negotiating styles. The model’s
predictions on outcome variables for the two competing mechanisms allow us to dis-
tinguish them empirically. Moreover, the model illustrates that the two mechanisms
have different implications for the welfare. Beyond the direct effect of industry ex-
perience on value creation or capture, there is also an indirect effect that has an
impact on the composition of acquisitions observed in the economy.11 We refer to
this as the ”selection effect”. Using the model’s predictions, we show that industry
experience helps CEOs negotiating better terms. Specifically, industry insiders pay
a lower price for the target and get a larger fraction of the surplus. We directly show
that industry experts pay a significantly lower premium for the target shareholders’
shares - both when measured as offer price premiums as well as final price premiums.
We also find that the relative dollar gains of the target are lower if the bidding CEO
comes from the target industry. When we look at the value created by the acquisi-
tion, we do not find evidence that industry experts perform better. Instead, we find
a weak negative effect. We use combined abnormal announcement returns to bidders
11Note that the ability of creating a higher surplus would change the composition of mergers as
well. However, it does not necessarily change the realized surplus of an average deal.
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and targets as a proxy for synergies. As abnormal returns reflect the expectations
of the market, we also look at an ex-post measure of profitability: return-on-assets
(ROA). In line with results on the combined announcement returns, we do not find
that experienced CEOs perform better in terms of profitability as we find a negative
effect. These findings suggest that industry experts do better when negotiating with
the target, allowing them to secure a greater fraction of the surplus or to pay less.
Moreover, bargaining also explains the – at first sight – counter-intuitive finding of
a negative effect of industry experience on surplus creation. Having a stronger posi-
tion in the bargaining stage directly affects the sharing rule of the surplus between
bidder and target. In addition, it indirectly affects the composition of deals that are
announced, and are therefore in our sample. In other words, the negative effect is
likely not causal but due to selection. CEOs who anticipate securing a larger frac-
tion of the surplus are willing to engage in acquisitions with a lower total surplus at
first. Indeed, the returns to bidding shareholders increase -other things being equal-
both in the surplus and in the fraction they can secure. CEOs therefore substitute
higher surplus with higher bargaining power. The selection effect also shows that
bargaining ability impacts the allocation of resources, like corporate control, within
the economy.
Third, in the last part of our analysis, we aim to provide further evidence for
the bargaining channel by identifying situations or environments in which indus-
try experience is likely to affect the bargaining power of CEOs. As suggested, one
potential explanation for industry experience increasing bargaining ability is infor-
mation based. Being an industry insider might help to better estimate the true value
of the takeover which might strengthen the bargaining position of the bidder. Fol-
lowing this intuition, we expect the value of being an industry insider to be higher
in scenarios with greater informational asymmetries. We, first compare public and
private targets. Private companies face less obligations to disclose information and
consequently, information asymmetries are arguably higher between such companies
and potential buyers. Exploiting the variation of interaction between CEO industry
experience and the public status of the target, we find that experienced CEOs are
able to generate about 2.9 percentage point higher abnormal returns if the target is
a private company. This evidence supports our interpretation of experienced CEOs
being better at bargaining. Moreover, we exploit heterogeneity across target indus-
tries. Using different proxies for informational asymmetries at the industry level
such as R&D intensive industries and industries with a high level of intangibles, we
confirm our prior findings. Experience is particularly valuable in settings of high
information asymmetries (1.7 percentage points to 1.9 percentage points higher).
The main contributions of this paper are threefold. First, analyzing M&As, we
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investigate what CEOs do and how they add to shareholder value. We show that
CEOs, and in particular CEO industry experience, matter for M&As. Moreover,
we show that the industry experience helps bidding CEOs to capture value in the
bargaining and price setting process. Our findings suggest that value capture is
an important dimension of CEO activity. This finding has wider implications as
the existing literature on CEOs either explicitly or implicitly assumes that CEOs
create value (e.g. Gabaix and Landier 2008, Edmans and Gabaix 2011). We also
contribute to the literature on CEO characteristics (e.g. Malmendier and Tate 2008,
Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen 2009, and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2010) by
showing that CEOs differ in their ability to bargain and that this ability might
depend on the CEO’s history. Second, we add to the literature on mergers and
acquisitions by highlighting the importance of the bargaining process in general and
CEOs’ bargaining ability in particular. Third, our results are complementary to
results in empirical industrial organization literature on bargaining (e.g. Ho 2009
and Grennan 2010). Using a different and non-structural approach, we confirm the
finding that parties differ in their bargaining abilities.
Our study is related to three strands of literature. First, we contribute to the
literature on what CEOs do and how they generate shareholder value. Second,
our findings are closely related to empirical research on the performance of M&As.
Third, we contribute to the empirical literature that analyzes bargaining power.
First, it is now well established that CEOs matter and that they affect corporate
performance (for example, Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Adams, Almeida, and Fer-
reira 2005, Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon 2007, Malmendier and Tate
2008, and Graham et al. 2009). However, we still do not know much about how
CEOs generate shareholder value. There are two strands of literature that attempt
to shed some light on this: (i) Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, and Sadun (2010), analyzing
the time diaries of Italian top executives, measure how much time CEOs devote to
internal and external activities and how these activities are related to firm and CEO
characteristics. While we do not analyze individual tasks of CEOs, we look at the
activities of CEOs on an aggregate level. We differentiate between value capture
and value creation, and show that capturing value when bargaining with different
parties is an important dimension of CEO activity. This finding has also implica-
tions for the theoretical work that usually explicitly (or implicitly) assumes that
CEOs generate value. (ii) We relate to a rising field that analyzes CEO character-
istics and corporate performance. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) as well as Graham,
Li, and Qiu (2009) show that CEOs have different styles. Malmendier and Tate
relate overconfidence of CEOs to corporate performance in a series of papers (2005,
2008). Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2011) analyze more than 30 different char-
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acteristics of CEO candidates in LBO and VC transactions. Ang, de Jong, and Van
der Poel (2008) as well as Huang (2010) show that CEOs are more likely to divest
divisions they are less familiar with. Xuan (2009) analyzing the career paths across
companies’ divisions and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) looking at Depression
experience or military experience, show that past experience affects corporate deci-
sions. Our findings are complementary. We show that industry-specific experience
in general, and bargaining power in particular are important determinants for cor-
porate performance and corporate decision making. Our findings also speak to the
current debate on general vs. specialist CEOs. Lazear (2002, 2004), Murphy and
Zabojnik (2007), and Frydman (2007) document an increased importance of general
skills. Cremers and Grinstein (2011), however, show that managerial talent pools
are industry-specific, suggesting that industry-specific experience is important to
firms. Industry-specific bargaining ability can be interpreted as one dimension of
industry-specific skills. Our results are consistent with both views. We show that in-
dustry experience affects corporate performance. However, we do not find evidence
that industry experience creates higher value in acquisitions; it directly affects how
the surplus is split between the bidder and the target.
A broader implication of our analysis is that CEO skills and characteristics affect
the way resources like corporate control, are allocated in the economy. We show that
CEO bargaining power affects the set of acquisitions that are implemented in the
economy. Our findings suggest that selection itself is of interest, and that the way in
which selection affects outcomes is important, even beyond interpreting correlations.
This interpretation is consistent with results in related studies that document simi-
lar effects for other CEO characteristics - though not explicitly stated. For instance,
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that CEOs differ in their taste for diversifying ac-
quisitions, and Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that overconfident CEOs engage
in more acquisitions.
Second, we contribute to the empirical research on M&As. Our findings provide
new insights into the determinants of acquisition success.12 (i) We show that CEOs
in general, and their bargaining abilities in particular, are key drivers of the suc-
cess of M&As. This is consistent with Malmendier and Tate (2008) who provide
evidence that overconfident CEOs do worse acquisitions. Aktas, de Bodt, Bollaert,
and Roll (2010) also show that narcissism has an impact on many dimensions of
the takeover process, such as performance, or who is initiating an acquisition. Yim
(2009) shows that young CEOs are more likely to announce acquisitions and per-
form worse. This might be due to lower quality of the acquisitions, also reflected
in a lower likelihood of closing the deals. Our results might also provide a different
12See Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) as well as Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2010) for
summaries of the literature.
1 HOW DO CEOS MATTER? 23
explanation for Yim’s findings as on average young CEOs are less experienced than
older ones. Our paper is also complementary to Ishii and Xuan (2010) who look at
social ties between acquirers and targets. They find that if the boards of the bidder
and the target are connected, decision making is poorer and lower shareholder value
is created. In contrast, we find a positive effect of industry-specific experience. This
suggests that we do not proxy for board connections with our measure. However,
we are generally sympathetic to the idea that being connected or knowing the right
people is an important dimension of a CEOs’ human capital. (ii) We show that the
stage at which prices are determined and negotiation is carried out, is important
for the performance of an acquisition. This is consistent with recent research on
merger bidding by Betton, Eckbo, Thorburn (2009) as well as Aktas, de Bodt, and
Roll (2010) who highlight the importance of the negotiation process. Pan, Baker,
and Wurgler (2009) stress the existence of anchor points (a 52-week high) for the
valuation of the target, emphasizing the importance of the price setting mechanism.
Moreover, Ahern (2010) shows that there is significant variation in the division of
takeover gains and that customer-supplier relations partly explain this division in
vertical mergers. Our findings are consistent and complementary as first, we also
find variation in the division of the gains and second, we show that this division is
related to the bargaining ability of the bidding CEO.
Third, our study is related to a body of research mainly in empirical industrial
organization that uses structural models in order to analyze how surplus is split and
how prices are negotiated. Our question is most similar to Ho (2009) who shows that
some types of hospitals are able to capture higher mark-ups when bargaining with
health insurers. Grennan (2010) estimates bargaining abilities in the context of the
medical devices industry. Our results are consistent with their findings in the sense
that they also document that parties differ in their bargaining abilities. Our study
is complementary from a methodological point of view. Ho and Grennan both use
structural models for first estimating the surplus to share and then the bargaining
abilities. We use a direct measure for the surplus created in the process of bargaining.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents sum-
mary statistics. Section 3 establishes the importance of CEO industry experience
for the success of acquisitions. Section 4 examines the mechanism that allows expe-
rienced CEOs to perform better. Section 5 identifies environments in which industry
experience is particularly important. We interpret our findings in Section 6. Section
7 concludes.
1 HOW DO CEOS MATTER? 24
1.2 Data and Key Variables
We are interested in identifying the effect of CEOs’ industry experience on different
outcome measures of M&As. Our key explanatory variable is therefore the industry
experience profile of the bidding CEOs in relation to the industry of the target. Our
dependent variables are either market measures for merger performance (abnormal
announcement returns), real measures for the profitability, or the premium paid to
the target.
1.2.1 CEO Data
We construct a manager-firm matched panel that allows us to observe a CEOs’
employment history. Our initial sample is the Executive Compensation database
(COMPUSTAT ExecuComp) with over 2500 companies. The universe of firms covers
the S&P 1500 from 1992 onwards, including companies that were once part of that
index. For each firm-year, ExecuComp reports the identity of up to 9 executives and
their positions, allowing us to identify the current CEO. We are interested in the
employment history of this CEO. As ExecuComp keeps track of S&P 1500 companies
and the highest paid executives only, we supplement the data with information from
the BoardEx database. This database collects information on job history (including
company roles and positions), age, and other activities (for instance social activities)
of top executives and non-executives in the US and Europe, which allows us to track
the complete work history of CEOs.
We merge the two datasets by CEO name, company, position/role and year, and
construct a CEO-firm-year panel. Due to different spellings and abbreviations, we
manually validate the entire panel. To construct measures of experience, we are
interested in characteristics of the previous positions of the CEOs. These character-
istics include the firms’ industries, the role, and the exact period of each position.
To identify the firms’ industries, we match the list of CEOs’ past companies with
different data sources that file information on their lines of business. We obtain
information on quoted firms from COMPUSTAT and information on private firms
from ICARUS.13
We construct our key explanatory variable of interest, the industry experience of
a CEO, as follows: for a given deal, we identify the industries of the bidder and the
target, as well as the identity of the CEO. In our analysis, we want to ensure that
we separate the experience of the CEO and the business expertise of his company;
13Sometimes company names are spelled differently in the datasets or the company in the
BoardEx database refers to a subsidiary or a financial shell of the company. A simple exam-
ple is ’Microsoft Corp’ and ’Microsoft Inc’. Therefore, we 1) use a string matching algorithm, and
2) manually verify every single match afterwards. Companies that we could not match by this
routine are manually researched using COMPUSTAT, ICARUS, and online data resources (such
as www.manta.com and www.alacra.com). Overall, we verified more than 100k potential matches.
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that is, we want to make sure that an acquisition is really diversifying. Therefore,
we use a very broad classification (Fama-French 12) in order to define a diversifying
acquisition. We then compare the CEO’s previous industry experience with the in-
dustry of the target. We set a dummy variable ExpTA (”experience in the target
industry”) equal to 1 if the CEO has worked in at least one company in that indus-
try. As the provision of segment level data varies across data sources, we restrict
our analysis of the past positions to the primary industry of the company.14 Note
that this approach is conservative as, by using this broad classification, we might
only add noise to our measure when classifying unrelated experience as relevant. We
refine this broad measure of experience by taking the previous roles of the CEO into
account. We define a measure of top management experience that is equal to 1 if
the CEO worked in at least one company in the target’s industry as a top manager.
Top management positions/roles include CEO, CFO, COO, Chairman, President,
Division CEO, Division CFO, Division Chairman, Division COO, Division Presi-
dent, Head of Division, Regional CEO, Regional CFO, and Regional President. We
expect top experience to matter more, as non-top level experience might also include
positions that are unrelated to a firm’s line of business (for example, being a web
programmer in the automotive industry), or positions that do not allow the worker
to obtain industry-specific skills or knowledge.
1.2.2 M&A Data
The M&A data come from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database. The
initial sample contains all completed M&As in the US stock market over 1990 - 2008.
A deal has to meet the following criteria to be included in our final sample:
• (Shares Acquired) We only include transactions in which the control is trans-
ferred. Specifically, the share of the acquirer in the target firm has to be below
50 percent before the transaction and above 50 percent after it. Alternatively,
the acquirer has to buy 50 percent of the shares outstanding during the merger
process.
• (Absolute Transactions Size) Following Harford (2005) the transaction value
of the merger has to be at least US$50M.
• (Region) Both the acquirer and the target firm are US corporations. Moreover,
the acquirer is listed on the US stock exchanges. We exclude international
(Item MATYPE IMA) and overseas mergers.
14For roles that were in consulting, we do not assign a particular industry as industry experience
is likely to vary across projects. As a robustness check we drop these CEOs from our sample as
well as define a ”consultant” dummy as a control.
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• (Price and Accounting Data) The stock price and accounting data must be
available in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and in COM-
PUSTAT in the year before the merger.
We classify a merger to be diversifying using a dummy variable if the acquirer
and target differ in their Fama-French 12-Industries (FF12) classification. Using
this broad classification ensures that industries of the two companies in diversifying
mergers are unrelated.
1.2.3 Outcome Data
Our main measure of performance is the abnormal announcement returns to the bid-
ders’ shareholders. We use the Fama-French 3-factor model as the return-generating
process to estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). We estimate the model
over a 255-day estimation window ending twenty-one days prior to the announce-
ment date, using the CRSP value-weighted index as our market proxy. In most
specifications we report the CARs to the acquiring firm’s stock over a symmetric
three-day window around the announcements. Moreover, we also analyze a longer
event window (eleven days) considering potential information leakage. We obtain
data on the offer price premium as well as on the final agreed price premium from
SDC. The offer price premium is defined as the ratio of the price that is initially
offered to the stock price of the target one day (or one week) before the announce-
ment. We define the final price premiums accordingly. Note that the premiums
are only available for publicly listed targets. Officer (2007) estimates premiums for
unlisted targets by building portfolios of comparable acquisitions of publicly traded
targets. As we are interested in the idiosyncratic component of the premium (the
effect of the bidding CEO’s experience), we cannot apply this method here.
The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (EBIT/assets) is
used as a measure of operating performance (ROA). Since the ROA may be affected
by industry-wide factors, it is industry-adjusted by subtracting the median value of
the same measure for all firms in the same primary Fama-French 12 industry as the
bidding firm. We then estimate an AR(1) model using the post-merger industry-
adjusted three-year average ROA as the left-hand-side variable, with the pre-merger
corresponding measure as the right-hand-side variable. The AR(1) model takes
the possibility into account that pre-merger operating performance may predict
post-merger operating performance. The residual from the above regression is our
measure of the abnormal change in ROA (∆ROA).
1 HOW DO CEOS MATTER? 27
1.2.4 Control Variables
We supplement the data with various financial items from the COMPUSTAT database.15
Following Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), a transaction is defined to be a ”stock
deal” with a dummy variable if the acquirer pays a positive fraction of the trans-
action value with its stocks. If the transaction is fully paid in cash we set the ”all
cash” dummy equal to 1. Public target, private target and subsidiary target are
dummies that classify the public status of the target company. In order to include
an intercept we choose subsidiary targets as our base category in the regression
analysis. We measure the relative size of acquirer and the target as the ratio of the
deal value to the market capitalization of the acquirer.16 Finally, we measure the
age (in years) of CEOs at the announcement of the merger as well as their tenure
in the current company (in years).
1.2.5 Summary Statistics
After combining the CEO-company panel with the deal sample, we obtain a final
data sample of 4,844 M&As between 1990 and 2007. The takeovers are conducted
by 1,854 different CEOs. Table 1 shows summary statistics. Panel A summarizes
CEO statistics. We observe that most CEOs undertake multiple acquisitions. The
average number of deals per CEO is 2.61, with a median of 2. We will later exploit
this fact in order to exclude some alternative explanations by estimating CEO fixed
effecs. The key variable in our analysis is industry experience. In our sample, the
average CEO has worked for 2.61 different companies in a top management position
before joining his current company (the bidder), on average. Analyzing the industry
experience of CEOs, we find that a CEO worked in 1.67 different industries (using
the Fama-French 12 classification) on average. The very large majority of CEOs in
our sample is male (more than 99 percent) - that is why we take the liberty of using
”he” when referring to a CEO. The average age is 62 years (as of 2008) and the
average tenure 13.8 years within the company.
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for implemented deals. The fraction of
diversifying mergers remains quite stable over the years (about 75 percent non-
diversifying and 25 percent diversifying). Panel C shows that out of all diversifying
acquisitions, about 16.5 percent are conducted by CEOs who have previously worked
in the industry of the target.17 We observe most of the companies buying other
companies multiple times (panel D).
Panel E presents summary statistics on deal specific characteristics. In most
cases the relative size of the target is less than 9 percent of the acquirer’s size
15See data appendix for the definition of all variables.
16A large fraction of the targets is private and data on market value are not available.
17Considering all positions (not only top-management positions), about 35 percent of the CEOs
have worked in the industry of the target before joining the acquiring company.
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measured as market capitalization (on average about 24 percent). The fraction of
the target’s public status (public, private, and subsidiary) is about even for these
categories. About 40 percent of the bids are considered to be stock deals, that is,
payments where some equity was used to pay off the target. About one third (30
percent) of the deals were exclusively paid in cash.
More detailed information on financial information on the buyer is provided in
table 18 in the appendix.
1.3 CEO Industry Experience and Merger Performance
1.3.1 Identification Strategy
In our analysis, we compare diversifying acquisitions where the CEO has prior ex-
perience in the industry of the target with diversifying acquisitions where a CEO
is new to the industry of the target. We exploit variations in the industry-specific
experience of bidding CEOs. Most CEOs in our sample work in more than one
industry over their careers. A CEO’s industry-specific experience may impact his
performance in M&As. For instance, industry experts might be better at running
the combined companies, or negotiating with the target. We will discuss potential
channels in detail in Section 1.4. The variation in industry-specific experience helps
us in three ways. First, industry experience might affect both value creation and
value capture in the merger process. Second, as we observe the full past experi-
ence profile of the CEOs, we can differentiate between general cross-industry effects
and industry-specific effects. Third, industry experience also varies within CEOs.
This allows us to control for unobserved CEO heterogeneity and to rule out many
alternative explanations.
As we only observe mergers that are announced, the estimated effect of CEO
industry experience on merger performance could be due to selection. This means,
that CEOs with experience might choose only ”good” targets for instance. Indeed,
industry experience not only has a direct but also an indirect effect on the outcome of
the acquisitions. These two effects are part of our analysis and explicitly integrated
in our framework. In our analysis, we show that industry experience affects the
composition of deals that are implemented.
Research studying the effect of CEOs on corporate decisions suffers from selec-
tion concerns. Rather than matched randomly with companies, CEOs are chosen
by the board of directors. Industry experience might be a criterion for the ap-
pointment of a particular CEO. In the case of acquisitions, one concern is that a
firm with acquisition opportunities in a particular industry might hire a CEO with
expertise in that industry. In that case, endogenous matching could potentially ex-
plain our results or at least bias the findings. However, we provide several pieces
of evidence supporting the view that endogenous matching is not driving our results.
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1.3.2 Baseline Results. Do Industry Experts Perform Better?
Analyzing diversifying acquisitions by CEOs with and without top-level experience
shows that experienced CEOs perform better on average (0.012 vs. 0.004) though
the CARs are only weakly statistically different from each other (at the 10% level).
Most of the control variables are not statistically distinguishable for the two groups.
Exceptions are the performance measure, stock payment, the relative deal size, and
the tenure of the CEO. Bidders with CEOs that are experienced in the target’s
industry tend to have a lower profitability (0.291 vs. 0.359). They tend to use more
stock payment (36.9% vs. 29.2%) and the targets are relatively larger (33.1% vs.
19.0%). In addition, the CEOs’ tenures in their current positions are shorter (5.85
years vs. 14.84 years).
We start our multivariate analysis by investigating whether industry experience
helps CEOs perform better when diversifying. Specifically, we compare the average
abnormal returns of diversifying acquisitions for CEOs with prior work experience
in the industry of the target with the average abnormal returns of otherwise similar
acquisitions where the CEO has no experience in the target industry. In order to
assess the effect of CEOs’ industry experience, we estimate the following regression
equation:
CARijk = α1 + α2ExpTAik ∗ divjk + α3divjk + α4Xjk + α5Yjk + α6Zijk + εijk, (1)
CARijk stands for the three-day cumulative abnormal returns
18 of the merger be-
tween bidder j and target k conducted by CEO i. The dummy div is equal to 1
if the transaction is diversifying and ExpTA is the measure of experience in the
target’s industry defined above. Note that by construction ExpTa is only defined
for diversifying mergers. Therefore, we only include ExpTa for diversifying mergers
in our regression equation by interacting it with the dummy for diversifying acqui-
sitions. This also means that we cannot include the main effect of experience in our
regression as it is perfectly collinear to the constant, the diversification dummy, and
ExpTA.
The coefficient of interest is the interaction term α2 between diversifying mergers
and experience. If industry-specific experience in the target’s industry is beneficial
for diversifying mergers, we expect the coefficient to be positive.
We retain non-diversifying acquisitions in our analysis as they help us estimate
18In table 16 in the appendix, we conduct a robustness check by using a larger event window of
eleven days.
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the coefficients of the control variables.19 The variables Xjk, Yjk, Zijk used in cross
sectional merger analyses are deal, company, and CEO-related controls respectively.
The set of controls Xjk includes the relative size of the acquirer and the target,
method of payment, as well as the public status of the target. Firm specific charac-
teristics Yjk control for the size of the acquirer, Tobin’s Q, free cash flow, leverage,
and profitability. Since experience is correlated with age, we control for age, age
squared, tenure, and tenure squared in the set of variables Zijk as in the empirical
literature on wages. Harford (2005) shows that mergers occur in waves and they are
clustered within industries. Therefore, we include year, industry, and year-industry
dummies in all of our specifications. Finally, we account for cross-sectional correla-
tion of stock returns by allowing for clustering at the level of the announcement date.
In column (1) of table 2, we estimate the model without any controls. The dif-
ference between acquisitions with and without top-management experience in the
target industry is 0.7 percentage points.20 In column (2) we include only year-
industry dummies but no further controls. Having a CEO with top management
experience in the target’s industry is associated with 1.2 percentage points higher
abnormal returns on average compared to a CEO without experience in the target’s
industry. The coefficient on the experience-diversifying interacted term is significant
at a 10% level. The coefficient on diversifying is small and not different from zero.
In column (3) we repeat this exercise by including bidder, deal, and CEO controls.
The effect of experience is slightly higher (1.3 percentage points) and significant at
a 5% level. Given an average abnormal return of 0.5 percentage points for diversi-
fying acquisitions and an average market value of about $8,000M, this effect is large
both in relative and in absolute terms. The controls in the cross-sectional analysis
have expected signs but most of them are not significantly different from zero (con-
firming earlier studies). The three consistently significant controls are the type of
payment, size, leverage, and having a publicly listed target. Paying with equity and
being large are, on average, viewed less favorably by the market. These results are
consistent with previous empirical studies.21
1.3.3 Identification Concern I: CEO Unobserved Heterogeneity
In our analysis, we are interested in the causal effect of industry experience on merger
performance. Ideally, we would like to compare outcomes for the same CEO, once
19In table 17 in the appendix, we conduct a robustness check by using a sub-sample of only
diversifying acquisitions. In section A.3, we also estimate the models for specialized firms and
conglomerates separately in order to address misclassification concerns.
20The coefficient is of similar size as an unreported univariate comparison of only diversifying
acquisitions with a difference of 0.8 percentage points.
21Shleifer and Vishny (2003) build a model where overvalued bidders lock in real assets which
is empirically tested by Ang and Chen (2006). Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) find that
small companies outperform large ones in mergers.
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with and once without experience in the target industry. Our closest counterfactual
is to observe the same CEO undertaking two acquisitions: one acquisition without
experience in the target industry, and one with experience. This allows us to include
CEO fixed effects controlling for some unobserved CEO heterogeneity and hence, to
rule out many alternatives. A key concern might be that the measure of industry
experience is correlated with omitted CEO characteristics that bias our findings.
For instance, only CEOs who are less talented might buy companies in industries
in which they never worked before. Moreover, having industry experience in the
target industry when diversifying means that the CEO has worked in at least one
other sector before. Hence, we might capture the effect of general skills. By this we
understand skills that are transferable across different industries, but not specific to
the industry of the target. Both alternative hypotheses would imply that we might
just capture a spurious effect in our analysis or estimate a biased effect.
CEO Fixed Effects An advantage of our setting is that we are able to observe
within-CEO variation. This means, we observe CEOs acquiring multiple firms, some
in industries in which they have prior work experience in, and others from industries
that are unknown to them. This allows us to include manager fixed effects that help
identify the causal effect of industry experience on acquisition performance. Indeed,
the fixed effects control for unobserved but fixed heterogeneity across CEOs such as
general ability, generic managerial skills or the talent for diversifying acquisitions.
In order to absorb unobserved CEO characteristics that might be correlated with
experience we estimate a model where CEO-specific effects fi measure unobserved
CEO heterogeneity:
CARijk = α1 + α2ExpTAik ∗ divjk + α3divjk + α4Xjk + α5Yjk + α6Zijk + fi + εijk, (2)
Note that the CEO related variables in Zijk, namely, age at the day of the announce-
ment and tenure in the current firm, are time-varying and therefore not dropped
in this estimation. We restrict our sample to CEOs who conducted at least two
diversifying acquisitions. Further, we require that the CEOs have experience in the
target industry in one of the acquisitions, but not in the other. Applying these filters
narrows the sample to 470 acquisitions conducted by 213 different CEOs. Table 3
column(1) presents the results of our regression analysis.
The effect of having top-level experience is positive (3.1 percentage points) and
significant at a 5% level. These results are not driven by unobserved CEO character-
istics correlated with industry-experience itself, and provide further confidence for
a causal interpretation of our findings. Absorbing unobserved CEO heterogeneity
helps exclude various competing explanations that might bias our estimated effect
of industry experience. These alternative explanations include CEO ability, general
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management skills, and the ability to run diversifying companies as discussed in the
motivation for this fixed effect specification. Moreover, it also addresses the concern
that CEOs with experience in the industry of the target have a higher general tal-
ent for diversifying acquisitions or better financial experience that allows them to
perform better. Running the fixed effects regression is the closest substitute for an
experimental setting and therefore, it is the test that gives us the highest confidence.
A drawback of this test is that it restricts the sample size as it allows us to run the
test only on a subsample.
However, in the following paragraphs we aim to exclude some of the competing
explanations exploiting the complete sample. We test for general management skills
(across industries and firms).
General Cross-Industry Skills The positive effect of experience in the target
industry may merely be capturing the effect of having work experience in multiple
industries. Being experienced in the target industry in a diversifying merger neces-
sarily means that the CEO has worked in at least two different industries including
the current one. Skills beneficial for successfully diversifying might be therefore
related to general cross-industry skills and not necessarily to the industry of the
target. In order to discriminate between the benefits of experience related to the
target industry and general experience in different industries, we estimate two al-
ternative models. First, we analyze whether experience in any other industry has a
similar positive impact on abnormal returns for acquiring shareholders. Second, we
include experience in any other industry to our original regression as a further con-
trol (equation 2) and check whether the effects of experience in the target’s industry
persist. Table 3 presents the results.
Column (2) shows the sole effect of having top-level experience in multiple indus-
tries when undergoing a diversifying merger. The effect is small in absolute terms
and it is statistically not distinguishable from zero. This means that work experi-
ence in industries unrelated to the target industry does not explain our results. In
column (3) we add the variable top experience in the target industry as a further
control. The effect of having experience in the target industry on the acquisition
performance is still large and consistent with the previous results. The average
abnormal return of a CEO with experience in the target’s industry compared to a
CEO who is generally experienced in different industries is 1.6 percentage points.
The effect is significant at a 5% level. Overall, these results suggest that it is expe-
rience in the particular industry of the target that matters for the performance and
not more general cross-industry experience.
We repeat this analysis by considering experience in other companies instead of
other industries. Column (4) presents the results of the model using experience in
any other company, irrespective of the industry. We find no evidence that working
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for other companies in the past generates abnormal returns for the acquirer. Column
(5) shows the results for top experience in the target’s industry as a further control.
Similarly to our main specification, industry experience increases cumulative ab-
normal returns around the merger announcement by approximately 1.3 percentage
points. The coefficients are precisely estimated (at a 5% level) and are similar to
the effects when controlling for general industry experience.
1.3.4 Identification Concern II: Endogenous CEO-company Matching
CEOs and companies are not matched randomly. Instead, CEOs are chosen by the
board of directors. Industry experience might be a criterion for the appointment
of a particular CEO. A concern is that endogenous matching could potentially ex-
plain our results or at least bias the findings. In the following, we provide several
pieces of evidence supporting the view that endogenous matching is not driving our
findings. The main arguments can be summarized as follows: First, we exploit the
fact that mergers occur in waves clustered by industry. We use merger waves as
quasi-exogenous events triggering acquisitions (see table 4). Second, under the se-
lection hypothesis one would expect the transaction to occur shortly following the
CEO’s appointment. We do not find that the likelihood of a CEO with experience
in the target industry doing an acquisition is higher for more recently hired CEOs
(see table 5). We also find no evidence that recently hired CEOs outperform CEOs
who have been in a company for longer (see table 6).
Merger Waves as Exogenous Shocks Previous research by Mitchell and Mul-
herin (1996) and Harford (2005) shows that mergers and acquisitions occur in waves,
and within a wave they cluster strongly by industry. These waves might be trig-
gered for instance, by technological innovation or supply shocks. Assuming that
these shocks and the need to acquire are less likely to be foreseen by the board
of directors when appointing a new CEO, we build a subsample of mergers where
the bidder comes from an industry that is hit by a merger wave at the date of the
announcement. We define an acquisition being part of a merger wave if the an-
nouncement date of the merger is between 6 months before and 6 months after the
date of a merger wave and the industry of the bidder corresponds to the affected
industry (as identified by Harford (2005)). We further exclude waves that are due
to deregulation as these waves are likely to be expected by the firms. By applying
this definition we identify 677 mergers that are involved in a merger wave. Table 4
presents the results. Experience of the CEOs is positive and significant (at a 10%
level) for top-level experience within and outside merger waves supporting the view
that it is not selection that is driving our results. Moreover, the effect s is stronger
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within a wave (2.4 vs. 1.1 percentage points) suggesting that experience is more
valuable in unexpected situations.
Timing and Acquisitions with Experience If a company hires an experienced
CEO to conduct an acquisition, we would expect an announcement about the intent
to acquire shortly after the appointment. We therefore estimate the probability of
making a diversified acquisition and having an experienced CEO as a function of
CEO tenure. The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO
has previous experience in the target’s industry. Our covariates consist of a set
of dummy variables for different years of the CEO’s tenure. If companies appoint
experienced CEOs in order to execute an acquisition for them we would expect to
observe higher coefficients on the dummies for recent hires. We use OLS as well
as probit estimation. Column (1) and (2) of table 5 present the results using OLS
and probit respectively. There is no monotonic relationship between the probability
of observing an experienced acquisition and the appointment of the experienced
CEO. These findings support the view that industry-experience in connection with
acquisitions considerations play a minor role when appointing a CEO.
Timing and Returns As a further robustness check we analyze returns directly.
If selection is driving the results we would expect the positive abnormal returns
to be generated by recently appointed CEOs. We therefore interact the experience
measure with dummies reflecting the relative year of the appointment. Table 6 shows
that there is no monotonic relationship between the appointment of experienced
CEOs and abnormal returns. When precisely estimated, the returns are positive
and at similar levels (between 2.7 and 3.9 percentage points for CEOs appointed
3, 6, or 8 years before the acquisition). The coefficients on other years are not
statistically different from zero. Overall, the findings suggest that selection cannot
explain the positive returns of experienced CEOs, reinforcing the view that industry
experience is generating them.
1.3.5 Alternative Specifications
We also test alternative specifications of industry experience. The main findings
can be summarized as follows. First, the effect of industry experience on merger
performance is larger for experience that is more closely related to the industry of
the target (in terms of industry classification, see table 7). Second, top-management
experience is more important than low-ranked experience (see table 8). Third,
experience that was acquired more recently is more beneficial (see table 9). Fourth,
the effect CEOs’ experience is higher in firms that are more specialized, suggesting
that the CEO experience is more valuable if it is more ”exclusive” (see table 15).
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Relatedness of the Industry In our baseline setting, we use the same level of
industry classification (Fama French 12) to define diversifying acquisitions and in-
dustry experience of the bidding CEOs. While we would like to have a very broad
measure to classify a diversifying takeover, we actually want to have a precise mea-
sure for experience. However, using the broad classification on experience delivers
a fraction about 16 percent of the deals where the CEOs are experienced. The nar-
rower we are when defining experience, the smaller the number of observations of
acquisitions conducted by industry expert CEOs. Consequently, we do not observe
enough variation anymore. We therefore define a weighted measure of experience as
follows:
ExpTA(weigthed) =

4, for CEO has experience in the same FF48 industry
3, for CEO has experience in the same FF30 industry
2, for CEO has experience in the same FF17 industry
1, for CEO has experience in the same FF12 industry
0, for CEO has no experience in the target industry
(3)
The results of the corresponding regression are reported in table 7. In line with our
previous results, the coefficient is positive (0.8%) and significant. The magnitudes
are similar to our previous findings and suggest an effect of 0.8-3.2 percentage points
depending on the narrowness of experience.
Relevance of the Position Managers might have better opportunities to accu-
mulate industry-specific skills and knowledge in high level positions compared to
low-ranked positions. A possible explanation is better access to information and
involvement in strategic tasks. In table 8 we analyze broader measures of experi-
ence. In specification (1) we consider all previous positions in the target industry,
irrespective of the level. As expected, in that specification, the effect is smaller (1.0
percentage points), though still significant. Moreover, we run a placebo test where
we analyze the impact of experience that is likely to be unrelated with the industry
in the firm. Examples are low-ranked jobs like office workers or interns as well as
non-business positions (for example, web programmer working for a car maker). Ex-
perience that is unrelated to the business, or carries a lower level of decision-making
power or less information access does not help to perform better when acquiring
a new segment. The effect is 0.4 percentage points and not distinguishable from
zero. However, we might also capture only a time effect as most of the low-ranked
experience probably comes from the early stage of the career (see our alternative
measure of experience that accounts for the recentness of the experience). In this
setting we are notable to differentiate these two effects.
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Recent Experience and Tenure As industries adapt to technology or changes
in the market, it is interesting to analyze how the value of experience changes with
the recentness of experience. Therefore, we look at two alternative measures of expe-
rience that incorporate a time component. We consider an experience to be ’recent’
if it was gained in the last 10 years before the merger was announced, and to be ’old’
otherwise. Second, we refine this measure by sub-classifying the recent experience
into experience gained within the last 5 years and experience gained between 6 and
10 years before the announcement of the acquisition. Table 9 reports the results.
Columns (1) and (2) show the effect of top-level experience for the two alterna-
tive measures. The results suggest that experience diminishes over time and only
rather recently gained experience helps to perform better when diversifying. The
first specification shows very strong and statistically significant effects of having
experience (2.0 percentage points) in the 10 years before the acquisition. The coeffi-
cient of old experience is small and not distinguishable from zero. The finer measure
of recentness in specification (2) yields similar results. Recent experience matters
more; the impact peaks for experience gained between 5 and 10 years before the
acquisition. However, the two coefficients on recent experience are not statistically
distinguishable from each other. In column (3) we are interested in whether having
more experience (in terms of tenure) matters. We split the experience dummy by
tenure, distinguishing between tenure of less than 5 years and more than 5 years.
The estimated coefficient are exactly of the same magnitude (1.3 percentage points)
suggesting that there is no linear effect in tenure.
1.4 Value Capture or Value Creation?
1.4.1 Potential Channels
When buying a company, relevant industry experience of a CEO may add value in
different ways.
1. Target selection: In the selection process of a potential target, an experienced
CEO might have a superior overview of the market environment including
competitors, customers, and suppliers. Moreover, industry-specific knowledge
of financial statements, being important inputs to the decision making process,
might be important.
2. Negotiation: The access to information, the processing of those, or other ad-
vantages of being an industry expert might be valuable when negotiating with
the target. Since one party has an informational advantage in an acquisition,
the informed party (the target) has an incentive to cheat the uninformed party
(the acquirer) into believing that the available surplus is smaller than it really
1 HOW DO CEOS MATTER? 37
is. Here, the level of experience might affect the bargaining power of both
parties.
3. Integration: Experience might be beneficial in the post-deal stage when in-
tegrating and running the two companies. This is particularly true if the
organizational design and the operations are specific to each of the industries.
Knowledge of both industries could facilitate coordination of the two orga-
nizational designs. Moreover, experience in the target’s industry might be
beneficial for running the company in case management is partly industry-
specific.
We formalize these mechanisms through which industry-specific experience po-
tentially operates. We differentiate between two main channels: value creation and
value capture. We aim to derive testable hypotheses that allow us to discriminate
between the different mechanisms of how industry experts add value for their share-
holders. We employ a simple two-stage game theoretic framework that captures the
main steps of the acquisition process: the choice of the target and the bargaining
between bidder and target. We nest the two channels through which experience
might operate within our model. We show that these channels lead to different pre-
dictions for the effect of industry experience on announcement returns to different
shareholders (bidder and bidder-target combined), and the size of the premium paid.
In our regression analysis, we look at the impact of CEO industry experience on
the performance of acquisitions. We compare the returns (that go to different share-
holders) of acquisitions where the CEOs has experience in the target industry with
those of acquisitions where the CEO is new to the target industry. In other words,
we look at the difference between the averages of acquisitions with and without CEO
experience in the target industry. In the analysis, using the analytical framework,
we aim to reproduce the regression setting. Therefore, we define the differences in
the returns between industry expert CEOs and CEOs that are new to the target
industry to the acquiring (AC) shareholders ∆AC , to the target (TA) shareholders
∆TA, and to both acquiring plus target shareholders (AC+TA) as ∆AC+TA.
Theorem 1 Consider that industry experience is operating through V and β, i.e.
V and β are increasing functions of ExpTA.
1. ∆AC is positive and increasing in the value creation ability V and in the value
capturing ability β of an industry expert CEO.
2. ∆TA is increasing ( decreasing) in the value creation ability V (value capturing
ability β) of an industry expert CEO.
3. ∆AC+TA is increasing ( decreasing) in the value creation ability (value captur-
ing ability β) of an industry expert CEO.
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Intuition First, both value creation and value capture ability are beneficial for the
bidding company. However, depending on the draws from the two groups, it might
be still beneficial to go for a company that does not come from the set of expertise
of the CEO. This means that we observe both, acquisitions with and without CEO
experience in the target industry.
Second, both value capture and value creation have non-negative effects for the
acquiring shareholders. This is trivially given as in both cases the bidding CEO is
maximizing shareholder value of the acquirer.
Third, the negative effect of experience on the average surplus is non-causal but
due to the selection of a different set of deals. Having a stronger position in the
bargaining stage directly affects the sharing rule of the surplus between bidder and
target, but it also indirectly affects the composition of deals that are announced,
and which are therefore in our sample. CEOs who anticipate securing a higher
fraction of the surplus are willing to engage in acquisitions with a lower total surplus.
Indeed, the returns to bidding shareholders increase -other things equal- both in the
surplus and in the fraction they can secure. The CEOs therefore substitute higher
surplus with higher bargaining power. Value creation also leads to a different set
of implemented acquisitions. However, as the CEO adds value, there is no negative
net-effect.
1.4.2 Premiums Paid to the Target and Relative Gains
About one third of the targets in our sample are publicly listed companies, allowing
us to analyze the mechanism by looking directly at the premium paid. The offer
premium is defined as the premium of the offer price over the share price of the
target one day or one week before the announcement. In most cases the final price
corresponds to the offer price but in some cases the price has to be adjusted. We
therefore also look at the final price premium which is the premium of the final paid
price.22
Table 10 shows the results. The effect of experience on the premiums is negative.
In all of our four specifications we observe a significant negative effect of experience
on the premium between 7.4 percent and 9.7 percent. This effect is large as the
average premiums are between 34 percent and 39 percent. This means that a CEO
with industry experience is paying a lower premium compared to a CEO who is
new to the industry. This finding is consistent with allowing industry experts to
extract a larger fraction of the surplus. Part of this effect might be also attributed
to experienced CEOs undergoing lower value acquisitions on average.
Last, we analyze directly the relative gain of the target versus the acquirer for
22Note that Officer (2007) proxies for the premium/discount for unlisted targets by approxi-
mating it with the premium of otherwise similar public transactions. However, we cannot use his
method as we are interested in the idiosyncratic part of the return or premium.
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each dollar of the market value. We would like to compare the percentages of the
total dollar returns of an experienced CEO with a CEO who is new to the industry.
As announcement returns can be negative, we follow Ahern (2010) and construct the
measure as follows. We calculate the difference in dollar gains between the target
and the bidder, normalized by the sum of the acquirer’s and target’s market cap
50 trading days before the announcement date. Column (3) shows that the target’s
relative gains relative to the acquirer decrease with the industry experience of the
bidding CEO. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that experienced CEOs
bargain better and secure a larger fraction of the surplus for their shareholders than
CEOs who are new to the target industry.
1.4.3 Combined Announcement Returns
For publicly listed targets, we can analyze the effect of experience on the returns
of both the acquirer and the target. We collect prices and data on the market
capitalization of the target from CRSP. We obtain the announcement return (CAR)
on the combined companies by calculating the market-cap weighted average of the
individual announcement returns of acquirer and target. The combined CAR can
be interpreted as a measure for the surplus created by the acquisition - or in other
words, for the perceived synergies by the market. As before, we regress the CARs of
the combined company on the experience of the CEO with further controls. Table
11 presents the results. The dummy on whether an acquisition is diversifying for the
combined company in column (1) is large and negative (-2.2 percentage points). This
supports the view that diversifying mergers and acquisitions create fewer surpluses
on average. Interestingly, we do not find evidence that experienced CEOs are better
at creating surplus. The effect of industry experience on the combined return is large
and negative but not precisely estimated. In line with the model, our interpretation
of this coefficient is as follows. Being stronger in the bargaining stage has not
only a direct but also an indirect effect on merger performance. While it directly
affects the sharing rule of the surplus between bidder and target, it also affects the
composition of deals that are announced, and which are therefore in our sample. A
CEO who anticipates securing a higher fraction of the surplus is willing to engage in
acquisitions with a lower total surplus. Indeed, the returns to bidding shareholders
increase both in the surplus and in the fraction they can secure. The CEOs therefore
substitute higher surplus with higher bargaining power. As we are restricting our
sample to public targets only, we want to ensure first that our sample is comparable
to the full sample. Column (2) shows that the returns to the acquirer are very
similar if the CEO has top-management experience (2.0 percentage points).
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1.4.4 Accounting Performance
As announcement returns only reflect expectations of the market we also look at an
ex-post measure of performance. The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to
total assets (EBIT/assets) is used as a measure of operating performance (ROA).
Since the ROA may be affected by industry-wide factors, it is industry-adjusted by
subtracting the median value of the same measure for all firms in the same primary
Fama-French F12 industry as the bidding firm. We then estimate an AR(1) model
using the post-merger industry-adjusted three-year average ROA as the left-hand-
side variable, with the pre-merger corresponding measure as the right-hand-side
variable. The AR(1) model takes into account the possibility that pre-merger op-
erating performance may predict post-merger operating performance. The residual
from the above regression is our measure of the abnormal change in ROA (∆ROA).
As reported in table 11 in column (3) we find the effect of experience on the prof-
itability to be (weakly) negative. The negative coefficient is of a similar magnitude
as the coefficient on the combined returns though not significant again.
1.4.5 Interpretation
The analytical framework shows that returns to both bidder and bidder plus target
are increasing in the value creation ability. However, this is no longer true for the
value capturing ability. While the returns to the bidder are increasing in β, the
combined returns are decreasing in the bargaining power. We conclude that the
existence of value capturing is necessary for explaining our findings.
In general, the effects of value capture and value creation are not mutually ex-
clusive. It is possible that experienced CEOs increase surplus and, at the same
time, negotiate better terms. However, by analyzing the combined return to bidder
and target, as well as accounting performance, we do not find evidence that experi-
enced CEOs are better at creating surplus. Instead, the average effects are negative.
Moreover, we find that experienced CEOs pay a smaller premium.
Bargaining also provides a rationale for the - at first sight - counter-intuitive
finding of the negative effect of industry experience on the proxies for the surplus
creation. Anticipating securing a higher fraction of the surplus makes an experienced
CEO to engage in acquisitions with a lower total surplus at first.
Overall, our results suggest that experienced CEOs bargain better, as they secure
a higher fraction of the surplus for their shareholders. We cannot exclude that
experienced CEOs do also create more value. However, we find that there must
be a bargaining effect and that this effect is relatively large compared to the value
creation effect.
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1.5 Heterogenous Effects
In this section, we would like to provide further supportive evidence for the bar-
gaining channel. We do so by identifying situations or environments where industry
experience is more likely to affect the bargaining power of CEOs but less their abil-
ity to create value. Exploiting heterogeneity along that dimension we then analyze
whether industry experience is indeed more valuable in these situations. As already
suggested, one potential reason why industry experience increases bargaining abil-
ity is based on information. Being an industry insider helps to better estimate the
true value of the takeover. Following this intuition, we expect the value of being an
industry insider to be higher in scenarios where informational asymmetries would
be high otherwise. First, we compare public and private targets. Private companies
have to disclose less information, and information asymmetries are arguably higher
between these companies and potential buyers. We exploit the variation of the in-
teraction between CEO industry experience and target public status. Second, we
exploit heterogeneity across targets’ industries. We use different proxies for infor-
mational asymmetries at the industry level (R&D intense industries and industries
with a high level of intangibles). Moreover, we also analze whether the value of ex-
perience depends on the way the target is sold. We differentiate between bilaterial
negotiations and auctions.
1.5.1 Public Status
One source of information asymmetries is the public status of the target. We differ-
entiate between three different types of targets: publicly listed companies, private
companies, and subsidiaries. Private companies have to disclose less, and informa-
tion asymmetries are arguably higher between these companies and potential buyers.
If industry-specific experience is valuable for bargaining, we expect experience to be
relatively more important in environments with high informational asymmetries.
This is supported by our findings in table 12. Column (1) shows that experienced
CEOs are able to generate 2.9 percentage points higher abnormal returns compared
to non-experienced managers if the target is a private company. The effect of expe-
rience is positive but smaller and less precisely estimated for public and subsidiary
targets, suggesting that the advantage of experience is smaller (or even nonexistent)
when information is easily accessible and available.
1.5.2 R&D Intensive Industries and Intangibles
We employ additional proxies for information asymmetries between the target and
potential buyers. In the columns (2) and (3) of table 12 we split the industries of
the target along high vs. low R&D and high vs. low intangibles industries. These
dimensions have been frequently used in the literature to proxy for informational
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asymmetries.23 We calculate average R&D expenditures and intangibles across in-
dustries over the full horizon (1990-2007) of our sample and split the industries along
the median in high and low R&D / intangible industries. Confirming the results
from our previous analysis (public status of the target), experienced CEOs are able
to generate large and positive CARs if the target is from an industry with arguably
higher informational asymmetries. The effect is about 1.9 percentage points and 1.7
percentage points for high R&D and high intangibles industry targets.
1.5.3 Auction vs. Bargaining
As measured by the number of bidders that publicly attempt to acquire a target,
the takeover arena appears noncompetitive. Boone and Mulherin (2007), however,
provide novel data on the pre-public, private takeover process that indicates that half
of the targets are auctioned among multiple bidders, while the remainder negotiate
with a single bidder. We expect CEOs’ bargaining skills to matter more in one-to-
one negotiations with the target company. In auctions, where the idendity of the
competitors is unknown, it is unclear if a CEO is able to benefit from his expertise
as bidding a lower price (i.e. less overpaying) is likely to decrease the probability
to win the auction. We employ data on the selling-process of the target company
which are generously provided to us by Aktas et al. (2010). They follow Boone
and Mulherin(2007) and analzye the merger background section of the SEC filings
14A and S-4 for mergers and 14D for tender offers: A merger is classified an auction
if multiple potential bidders are mentioned and a negotiation when there is only a
single buyer.
We then analye the effect of CEO industry experience on bidders’ CARs in
auctions and negotiations in table 13. We only have information on the selling
process available on 1,014 mergers. We therefore run our baseline regression on this
subsample. Column (1) reports the result. The coefficient on experience is very
similar (1.7%) to our baseline regression though less precisely estimated. In column
(2), we include the dummy variable and its interactions on whether the merger was
negotiated. Consisten with our hypothesis, we find that industry expertise greatly
matters if the merger is negotiated in a one-to-one setting. If there is a bargaining
between bidder and target the estimated coefficient is 4.6%, while it is literally zero
in auctions.
23See Abody and Lev 2000 for instance.
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1.6 Interpretation of the Findings
1.6.1 Summary
In the previous sections, we have shown that industry-experts CEOs are able to
generate higher abnormal returns for their shareholders. We provided evidence that
industry expertise allows the bidding CEOs the secure a larger fraction of the surplus
that is created in the merger. They pay a lower premium and they engage in lower
surplus deals on average. We argued that this is consistent with industry experts
being able to negotiate better deals. Anticipating that they will be able to secure a
larger part of the surplus, they are willing to accept lower value deals on average.
We also showed that industry expertise is particularly valuable in scenarios of high-
information asymmetries and when deals are negotiated one-to-one (in contrast to
auctions).
1.6.2 Ex-ante vs. Ex-post Effect
We argue that our empirical analysis provides evidence for ’value capturing’ as
the channel through which industry experience operates. However, we can not
differentiate between ex-ante and ex-post effects. This means that our findings are
consistent with both of the following explanations. i) Industry-experts are better at
bargaining per se, i.e. for a given potential merger, they are better at negotiating
terms. ii) Industry-experts are better at identifying weak bargaining partners (e.g.
partners with less outside options).
1.6.3 Experience: Knowledge vs. Connections
Working in a certain industry might affect the industry-specific human capital of an
executive in different ways. First, it can directly affect his understanding of a certain
industry (’knowledge’). He might gain superior, industry-specific insights that are
related to the market environment, business models, competitors, suppliers, valua-
tion, capital structure, etc. Secondly, work experience in a certain industry does also
affect the connections to an industry of a CEO. For instance, an industry insider
might have worked for the target company or he might have appointed executive or
non-executive directors that have links (’connections ’) to the target company who
are beneficial when implementing a deal.
Both ’knowledge’ and ’connections ’ are part of the human capital of a CEO and
it is not clear if (or why) we should differentiate between these two different dimen-
sions of the human capital. However, we have several pieces of direct and indirect
evidence that speak in favor of the knowledge-dimension of the human capital.
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We observe 5 cases where the CEO has personal connecttions with the target com-
pany as he is a former employee of that company. As we do not observe enough
variation along this dimension we can not apply rigorous econometric methods for
a further analysis. However, just comparing the means we do not find evidence that
these 5 cases are more favorable for the bidding shareholders. Moreover, excluding
these cases leaves our main analysis completely unchanged.
Social ties between the acquirer and target might be correlated with the industry
experience of the CEO. For instance, a CEO might appoint his old business partners
from his former industry as executive or non-executive directors. These directors
might be beneficial for negotiating terms of the deal in case of acquisitions. However,
we present two pieces of evidence that speak against this hypothesis as they both
document negative effects of connections between bidder and target on the returns
to the bidder. Ishii and Xuan (2010) investigate the effect of social ties between ac-
quirers and targets on merger performance. Using data on educational background
and past employment, they find that between-firm social ties have a significantly
negative effect on the abnormal returns to the acquirer. Similarly, Rousseau and
Stroup (2011) show that historical interlocks between bidder and target do not affect
excess returns accruing to the acquirer, but this is not the case for contemporane-
ous interlocks, which are associated with returns that are 2.6 percent lower. They
argue that this is consistent with market participants associating contemporaneous
interlocks with an increase in the potential for conflicts of interest.
1.7 Conclusion and Outlook
Analyzing mergers and acquisitions, we show that value capture is an important
dimension of CEO activity and that the ability to bargain differ amongst CEOs and
situations. We find that this ability is correlated to the specific experience profile of
the bidding CEO. In particular, we show that CEOs who previously worked in the
industry of the target generate two to three times higher abnormal announcement
returns for their shareholders compared to CEOs who are new to the target industry.
Moreover, we provide evidence that capturing a bigger fraction of the surplus (rather
than creating more surplus) is an important determinant for explaining our findings.
Experienced CEOs pay a lower premium and they engage in low value acquisitions
on average. This is optimal for them as they rationally expect to capture a larger
fraction of the surplus when bargaining with the target. Moreover, the value of
being an industry insider is particularly high in environments of high information
asymmetries. We also show that the benefits of industry expertise on the bargaining
outcomes are higher in bilateral negotiations (compared to auctions).
Though there is evidence that bargaining is important for other corporate deci-
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sions24, there is not yet further evidence that the CEO dimension matters in other
situations as well. Hence, it might be interesting to analyze related scenarios. For
instance, using the experience profiles of CEOs (as we do in this study) in combi-
nation with input-output tables, one could analyze how CEO experience affects the
rent-sharing with customers and suppliers.
24(See Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin 2010) and Hennessy and Livdan (2009) for instance.
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A Appendix
A.1 Tables
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A shows the experience and characteristics of CEOs. Age is measured in Dec. 2008. The variable work experience
counts the number of different companies and industries for which CEOs worked in a top management position (CEO,
CFO, COO, Chairman, President, Division CEO, Division CFO, Division Chairman, Division COO, Division President,
Head of Division, Regional CEO, Regional CFO, Regional President). Merger experience is the number of mergers that are
conducted by a CEO within our sample.
Panel B displays the distribution of all acquisitions and diversifying ones over time. We define an acquisition to be
diversifying if acquirer and targer are from different Fama-French 12 industries.
Panel C shows the fraction of diversifying acquisitions where the bidding CEO has prior work experience in the industry
of the target. Panel D presents the number of acquisitions that are undertaken by an average company in the sample.
Panel E illustrates deal characteristics. The transaction value (TV) is the total value of consideration excluding fees and
expenses. The public status of the target can take values (private, public, subsidiary). The relative size is the ratio of deal
value and the market cap of the bidder. Stock deal is a dummy equal to 1 if there are stocks in the consideration package,
and all-cash deal is equal to 1 if the whole acquisition is paid in cash. Percentage Cash/Stocks/Others denote the respective
fraction on the consideration. Contested bid is a dummy equal to 1 if there is at least one company challenging the bidder.
Panel A: CEOs Panel B: Mergers
mean median N Years All div. Frac.
Age 61.89 62 1854 1990-1994 618 151 24.43%
Male 96.61% 1854 1995-1999 1722 427 24.80%
# Industries 1.67 1 1854 2000-2004 1622 382 23.55%
# Companies 2.61 2 1854 2005-2007 882 233 26.42%
# Mergers 2.61 2 1854 1990-2007 4844 1193 24.63%
Panel C: Mergers and Industry Experience Panel D: Company Experience
mean N mean medianN
Mergers with exp. 16.51% 1193 # Mergers 3.37 2 1438
Panel E: Deal Characteristics
mean median
Transaction value 970.08 200.00
Relative Size 23.75% 8.83%
TV/Assets 13.76% 4.75%
TV/Equity 23.75% 8.82%
Private Target 32.11%
Public Target 35.59%
Subsidiary T. 31.68%
Stock Deal 40.95%
All-Cash Deal 30.07%
Percentage Cash 39.31%
Percentage Stocks 32.56%
Percentage Other 28.42%
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Table 2: Experience in Target’s Industry - Effects on Diversification
This table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on
different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study
using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from one day before the announcement until one
day afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s
industry. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and
tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by
event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***),
0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR
(1) (2) (3)
TOP-experience x diversifying 0.007 0.012* 0.013**
[1.235] [1.906] [2.220]
Diversifying 0.004 -0.000 -0.003
[1.587] [-0.040] [-1.109]
Acquiror’s size -0.003***
[-3.694]
Tobin’s q -0.000
[-0.887]
Free cash flow -0.002
[-0.079]
Cash flow measure -0.004
[-0.584]
Leverage 0.030***
[2.973]
Relative deal size -0.007
[-1.529]
Stock deal -0.007**
[-2.402]
All-cash deal 0.005**
[2.011]
Public target -0.020***
[-7.192]
Private target 0.001
[0.264]
Age -0.002
[-1.258]
Age square 0.000
[1.321]
Tenure -0.000
[-0.837]
Tenure square 0.000
[0.860]
Observations 4,844 4,844 4,844
Year x Industry dummies (AC) No Yes Yes
R2 0.001 0.064 0.097
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 3: CEO Fixed Effects and General Cross-Industry Experience
The table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on
different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study
using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from one day before the announcement until one
day afterwards. The analysis on column (1) is only based on a subsample of acquisitions of CEOs who made at least
two diversifying acquisitions whereas he is experienced in one industry and inexperienced in the other. This allows
us to include CEO fixed effects. In columns (2) and (3) two different measures of experience are presented: TOP
experience (TA) is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. TOP
experience (other industry) are dummy variables equal to 1 if the CEO has experience in any other industry but
the current one (industry of the acquirer). TOP experience (other companies) are dummy variables equal to 1 if the
CEO has experience in any other company but the current one. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix.
All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement
of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock
returns. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TOP-exp. (TARGET) x div. 0.031** 0.016**
[2.327] [2.461]
TOP-exp. (other Ind.) x div. 0.002 -0.004
[0.593] [-0.993]
TOP-exp. (TARGET) x div. 0.013**
[2.188]
TOP-exp. (other comp.) x div. 0.003 -0.001
[0.734] [-0.217]
Diversifying -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
[-0.490] [-0.535] [-0.642] [-0.671]
Observations 470 4844 4844 4844 4844
CEO fixed effects 213 No No No No
Year and Industry dummies (AC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.367 0.096 0.097 0.096 0.097
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 4: Merger Waves
This subsample consists only of mergers that were announced during a merger wave. Harford (2005) provides a
measure of clustered merger activity that specifies year, month and industry of a merger wave. We define a merger
being part of a merger wave if it the acquirer belongs to the affected industry and the merger was announced any
time in between 6 months before and 6 months after the date that is identified by Harford. We exclude waves that
are due to deregulation. The table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns
of the bidder (CAR) on different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns
come from an event study using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 day before the
announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP
position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age,
age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard
errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns. Asterisks indicate
significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR
(1)
Within Wave: TOP-experience x diversifying 0.024*
[1.704]
Outside Wave: TOP-experience x diversifying 0.011*
[1.836]
Observations 4844
Year and Industry dummies (AC) Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes
R2 0.097
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 5: Probability of Experienced Merger by Appointment Date
The table shows the regression of the a dummy that is equal to 1 if the merger is by a CEO that is experienced
on the appointment of the CEO, different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal
returns come from an event study using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 day
before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked
in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions
include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger.
All standard errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns. Asterisks
indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
P[experience]
(1) (LPM) (2) (Probit)
Appointment in t = 0 0.241*** 0.896***
[2.805] [2.859]
Appointment in t = -1 0.108** 0.486***
[2.377] [2.629]
Appointment in t = -2 0.151*** 0.630***
[3.323] [3.533]
Appointment in t = -3 0.211*** 0.812***
[5.181] [5.201]
Appointment in t = -4 0.202*** 0.786***
[4.396] [4.487]
Appointment in t = -5 0.141*** 0.599***
[2.903] [3.125]
Appointment in t = -6 0.090* 0.419**
[1.924] [2.168]
Appointment in t = -7 0.046 0.237
[0.926] [1.093]
Appointment in t = -8 0.152*** 0.633***
[2.616] [2.813]
Appointment in t = -9 0.074 0.360
[1.208] [1.392]
Appointment in t = -10 0.060 0.300
[1.091] [1.273]
Observations 1240 1240
Year and Industry dummies (AC) Yes Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes Yes
R2 0.046 .
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 6: Merger Performance by Appointment Date
The table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on the
appointment of the CEO, different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns
come from an event study using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 day before the
announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP
position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age,
age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard
errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns. Asterisks indicate
significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR
(1)
Appointment in t=-1 & Top exp. x div. 0.025
[0.918]
Appointment in t=-2 & Top exp. x div. 0.022
[1.488]
Appointment in t=-3 & Top exp. x div. 0.032
[1.578]
Appointment in t=-4 & Top exp. x div. 0.007
[0.551]
Appointment in t=-5 & Top exp. x div. -0.010
[-0.731]
Appointment in t=-6 & Top exp. x div. 0.020
[1.136]
Appointment in t=-7 & Top exp. x div. 0.011
[0.529]
Appointment in t=-8 & Top exp. x div. 0.045**
[2.128]
Appointment in t=-9 & Top exp. x div. 0.014
[0.372]
Appointment in t=-10 & Top exp. x div. 0.009
[0.344]
Diversifying -0.003
[-1.065]
Observations 4711
Year and Industry dummies (AC) Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes
R2 0.102
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 7: Relatedness of the Industry
This table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on
different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study
using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 day before the announcement until 1 day
afterwards. TOP experience is a discrete variable that is equal to 4 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the
same Fama-French 48 target’s industry, equal to 3 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the same Fama-French
30 target’s industry, equal to 2 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the same Fama-French 17 target’s industry,
equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the same Fama-French 12 target’s industry, and zero otherwise.
Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure
squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date
to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**),
and 0.10 (*) levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR
(1)
TOP-experience (weighted) x diversifying 0.008**
[2.138]
Diversifying -0.003
[-1.186]
Observations 4,844
Year x Industry dummies (AC) Yes
Industry dummies (TA) No
Controls available Yes
R2 0.097
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 8: Relevance of the Position
In this sample we analyze experience of low hierarchy levels or experience that is unrelated to the actual business of
an company. Examples are internships in a particular industry or working as a web programmer in the automotive
industry. The table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder
(CAR) on different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an
event study using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 1 day before the announcement
until 1 day afterwards. Experience in target’s industry is a dummy that is 1 if the CEO has experience in the
target’s industry. Unrelated experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a position that is likely
to be unrelated with the industry in the firm. Examples are low-ranked jobs like office workers or interns as well as
non-business positions in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions
include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger.
All standard errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns. Asterisks
indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR
(1) (2)
Any experience x diversifying 0.010**
[2.369]
Unrelated experience x diversifying 0.004
[0.684]
Diversifying -0.004 -0.001
[-1.532] [-0.513]
Observations 4844 4844
Year and Industry dummies (AC) Yes Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes Yes
R2 0.091 0.086
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 9: Recency and Tenure
This table analyzes the different effect of the recency of the experience on the performance. We make two different
splits of the experience by recency. The experience was obtained i) less than 10 years ago vs. more than 10 years
ago and ii) less then 5 years ago vs. between 5 and 10 years ago vs. more than 10 years ago. The table shows
the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on different manager,
deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study using the Fama-
French three-factor model and an event window from 1 day before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP
experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and
deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the
CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date to account
for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*)
levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR
(1) (2) (3)
TOP-exp. (less than 10 years ago) x div. 0.020***
[2.624]
TOP-exp. (more than 10 years ago) x div. -0.003
[-0.259]
TOP-exp. (less than 5 years ago) x div. 0.009
[0.892]
TOP-exp. (between 5 and 10 years ago) x div. 0.032***
[2.921]
TOP-exp. (more than 10 years ago) x div. -0.003
[-0.253]
TOP-exp. (tenure of less than 5 years) x div. 0.013*
[1.654]
TOP-exp. (tenure of more than 5 years) x div. 0.013*
[1.729]
Diversifying -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
[-0.915] [-0.922] [-1.096]
Observations 4711 4711 4711
Year and Industry dummies (AC) Yes Yes Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.101 0.102 0.097
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 10: Mechanism Results I: Premium
This regression analyzes only public targets. This conseqently decreases the sample size to 1,644 observations. The
table shows the regression of the offer price premiums and final price premiums on different manager, deal, and
company characteristics. The offer (final) price premium is defined as the ratio of the initially offered price per
share (finale agreed price per share) over the price per share of the target 1 day or 1 week before the announcement.
The relative gains by the target are calculated as the difference in dollar gains between the target and the bidder,
normalized by the sum of the acquirer’s and target’s market cap 50 trading days before the announcement date.
TOP experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position within the target’s industry.
Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure
squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date
to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**),
and 0.10 (*) levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
Offer pre-
mium 1d
Offer pre-
mium 1w
Final
premium
1d
Final
Premium
1w
Rel.
gains
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TOP-experience x diversifying -0.075* -0.091** -0.082** -0.098** -0.028**
[-1.862] [-2.101] [-1.966] [-2.175] [-2.151]
Diversifying 0.019 0.032 0.018 0.032 -0.001
[0.687] [1.129] [0.684] [1.126] [-0.097]
Observations 1,644 1,644 1,644 1,644 1,644
Year and Industry dummies (AC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.149 0.185 0.148 0.184 0.218
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Table 11: Mechanism Results II: Synergies
This regression analyzes only public targets. This decreases the sample size to 1,644 observations. The table shows
the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (AC), of the combined firm
(AC+TA: weighted by market cap), and of profitability changes (ROA) on different manager, deal, and company
characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study using the Fama-French three-factor
model and an event window from 1 day before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy
that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics
are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date
of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional
correlation of stock returns. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR (AC+TA) CAR (AC) ∆ROA (AC+TA)
(1) (2) (3)
TOP-experience x diversifying -0.023 0.020* -0.024
[-0.643] [1.866] [-0.668]
Diversifying -0.022** -0.004 0.011
[-2.033] [-0.742] [0.812]
Observations 1644 1644 1239
Year and Industry dummies (AC) Yes Yes Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.531 0.233 0.190
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 12: Informational Asymmetries
In specification (1) the public status (public, private, subsidiary) is analyzed. In specification (2) we split industries
along the median value of the average R&D spending in high and low R&D industries. In specification (3) we split
industries along the median value of the average intangibles in high and low intangibles industries. The table shows
the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on different manager,
deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study using the Fama-
French three-factor model and an event window from 1 day before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP
experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and
deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the
CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date to account
for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*)
levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR
(1) (2) (3)
Public - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.006
[0.711]
Private - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.029***
[2.649]
Subsidiary - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.005
[0.534]
R&D high - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.019***
[2.723]
R&D low - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.002
[0.236]
Intangibles high - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.017**
[1.987]
Intangibles low - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.010
[1.433]
Observations 4844 4844 4844
Year and Industry dummies (AC) Yes Yes Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.096 0.097 0.096
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 13: Auction vs. Bargaining
In this sample we analyze the selling procedure of targets. Negotiation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if only
one buyer is mentioned in the SEC filings. The table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal
stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative
abnormal returns come from an event study using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from
1 day before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. Experience in target’s industry is a dummy that is 1 if
the CEO has experience in the target’s industry. Unrelated experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO
worked in a position that is likely to be unrelated with the industry in the firm. Examples are low-ranked jobs like
office workers or interns as well as non-business positions in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics
are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date
of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional
correlation of stock returns. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR
(1) (2)
TOP-experience x diversifying 0.017 -0.003
[1.298] [-0.194]
Diversifying -0.006 -0.003
[-1.040] [-0.426]
Negotiation -0.002
[-0.438]
Negotiation x diversifying -0.006
[-0.546]
Negotiation x TOP-exp. x div. 0.046*
[1.910]
Observations 1,014 1,014
Year x Industry dummies (AC) Yes Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes Yes
R2 0.245 0.248
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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A.2 Data
The following table describes the variables that are used in the analysis.
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Table 14: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Panel A: CEO Characteristics
Age Age (in years) of the CEOs is measured at the announcement of
the merger.
Tenure The tenure of the CEOs in the current company (in years).
Industry experience A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the bidding CEO has
worked in the industry of the target in a top-management position.
(Main specification).
Panel B: Bidder Characteristics
Leverage Book value of debts over market value of total assets.
Tobin’s Q Ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. The mar-
ketvalue of total assets is defined as the book value of total assets
plus market capitalization minus book value of equity. The market
capitalization is computed as common shares outstanding times
the fiscal year closing price. The book value of equity is defined as
stockholders’ equity minus preferred stock liquidating value plus
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment credit minus post-
retirement assets.
Size Logarithm of the book value of total assets.
Free Cash Flow Operating income before depreciation minus interest expense mi-
nus income taxes minus capital expenditures, scaled by book value
of total assets.
Cash Flow / TA Operating cash flows (sales minus costs of good sold minus sell-
ing and administrative expenses plus depreciation and goodwill
expenses) over total assets.
Panel C: Deal Characteristics
Stock Deal A dummy that is equal to 1 if the bidder pays a positive fraction
of the transaction value with its stocks.
All-cash Deal A dummy that is equal to 1 if the transaction is 100% paid with
cash.
Relative Deal Size Ratio of the deal value and the market capitalization of the bidder.
Public Target Status of the target is ’public company’.
Private Target Status of the target is ’private company’.
Subsidiary Target Company is a subsidiary of a company.
Diversifying A merger is classified to be diversifying if bidder and target differ
in their Fama-French 12-Industries (FF12) classification.
Panel D: Performance Measures
CARs Three-day (eleven-day) cumulative abnormal return (in percent-
age points) calculated using the Fama-French 3-factor model. The
market model parameters are estimated using the return data for
the period (-270,-21).
Premium The offer (final) price per share that is paid to the target share-
holders over the price per share of the target stock 1 day and 1
week before the announcement.
∆ROA Change in the three-year average industry-adjusted ROA before
and after the acquisition. We allow for predictability by estimat-
ing a AR(1) model.
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A.3 Robustness
Exclusion of Conglomerates Some companies are multi-segment firms, oper-
ating in different industries.25 In our previous specifications we only consider the
biggest segment of the acquiring firm when defining its industry. A concern might
be that our results are purely driven by companies with large secondary segments in
the industry of the target. For instance there may be a concern that mergers are not
really diversifying and the positive effect of CEO experience is driven by potential
synergies. We therefore restrict our sample to firms that report either only one busi-
ness segment (according to COMPUSTAT segments) or where the largest business
segment is accountable for at least 90 percent of the sales. In column (1) of table
15 only single segment firms are considered. The effect of experience is still positive
and even higher than compared to our baseline specification (3.7 percentage points).
The results for companies with the largest segment accounting for at least 90 per-
cent of sales (column (2)) are similar, though a bit smaller (3.2 percentage points)
and not distinguishable from zero when considering all levels of experience. Overall,
the results seem to suggest that experience is more valuable when specialized firms
diversify.
Alternative Event Window In our previous specifications we compute cumu-
lative abnormal returns for three consecutive days, starting 1 day before the an-
nouncement and ending 1 day after. We test for the robustness of previous results
bu using an alternative window of time (from 5 days before the announcement to
5 days after). This approach allows us to account for possible leaks in information
about the acquisition before the public announcement. If this is the case, some of the
abnormal returns driven by the event would be realized before the announcement.
The result is shown in table 16. The effect of top management experience, confirm-
ing our previous results, is large (1.3 percentage points) and significant. Overall, the
result is consistent with our previous results though they are a bit weaker. However,
by increasing the length of the event window we also increase the likelihood that
unrelated events to the merger are affecting abnormal returns.
Diversifying Acquisitions only By looking only at diversifying acquisitions we
allow the covariates to have different slope coefficients for diversifying and non-
diversifying acquisitions. The restriction limits the sample to 1,189 acquisitions.
We then replicate our analysis by regressing abnormal returns on the CEO industry
experience and firm and deal characteristics as well as year and industry fixed effects.
The results in table 17 support our previous findings: CEOs who have experience
in the industry of the target perform better on average. Experienced CEOs are able
25Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) show that conglomerates might also differ from single-segment
firms when responding to industry shocks for instance.
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to generate 1.0 percentage points abnormal return if they worked in the industry of
the target. This effect is significant at a 5% level. The finding shows that results
also hold for the smaller sample. However, the bigger sample helps to estimate the
other coefficients leading to more precise estimates.
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Table 15: Conglomerates
In this sample we exclude conglomerates from our analysis. Column (1) reports regression results of firms that have
business in only one segment according to the COMPUSTAT segment data. In column (2) we consider only firms
where the biggest segment is accountable for at least 90% of the total sales. The table shows the regression of the
mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on different manager, deal, and company
characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study using the Fama-French three-factor
model and an event window from 1 day before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience (TA)
is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal
characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the
CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date to account
for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*)
levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR
(1) (2)
Conglomerate - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.012 0.010
[1.591] [1.319]
Focussed firm - TOP-experience x diversifying 0.038** 0.034***
[2.485] [2.625]
Diversifying -0.005 -0.005
[-1.512] [-1.523]
Observations 1336 1549
Year and Industry dummies (AC) Yes Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes Yes
R2 0.210 0.186
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 16: 11 Days Event Window
The table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on
different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study
using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event window from 5 day before the announcement until 5 day
afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s
industry. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix. All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and
tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by
event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock returns. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***),
0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR
(1)
TOP-experience 0.013**
[2.220]
Diversifying -0.003
[-1.109]
Observations 4844
Year and Industry dummies (AC) Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes
R2 0.097
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Table 17: Diversifying Acquisitions
This subsample consists only of diversifying acquisitions. The table shows the regression of the mergers’ cumulative
abnormal stock price returns of the bidder (CAR) on different manager, deal, and company characteristics. The
cumulative abnormal returns come from an event study using the Fama-French three-factor model and an event
window from 1 day before the announcement until 1 day afterwards. TOP experience is a dummy that is equal to 1
if the CEO worked in a TOP position in the target’s industry. Bidder and deal characteristics are in the appendix.
All regressions include age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared of the CEO at the date of the announcement
of the merger. All standard errors are clustered by event date to account for cross-sectional correlation of stock
returns. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
CAR
(1)
TOP-experience 0.010**
[2.004]
Observations 1189
Year and Industry dummies (AC) Yes
Deal and Firm Controls Yes
R2 0.236
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
1 HOW DO CEOS MATTER? 65
Table 18: Descriptive Statistics: Companies
Panel A shows data on corporate size, profitability and growth opportunities of the acquirer. The market
value of equity (market capitalization in millions of US-$) is computed as common shares outstanding times
the fiscal year closing price. Cash and debt are normalized by the book value of total assets. Tobin’s Q is the
market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets and book-to-market (BM) is defined
as the ratio of book value of equity and market cap. Profitability is measured as the ratio of operating cash
flows divided by the market value of total assets.
Panel A: Financial Data
Acquirer COMPUSTAT
Mean Median Mean Median
Assets (book) 12,560.25 1,634.30 1,303.15 74.31
Market capitalization 7,146.63 1,816.75 1,376.95 64.87
Cashassets (book) 0.146 0.068 0.167 0.082
Debtassets (book) 0.189 0.161 0.176 0.112
Debtassets (market) 0.129 0.095 0.132 0.071
Tobin’s q 2.48 1.68 2.106 1.41
BM (equity) 0.483 0.439 0.684 0.517
OCF/assets (book) 0.349 0.327 0.264 0.275
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A.4 Mechanism - Analytical Framework
Setup For a given CEO we split the economy into two sets according to his in-
dustry experience. We define set ”E” as the group consisting of all companies in
industries where the CEO has worked in. Group ”N” is the complement to group
”E”, i.e. it consists of all companies in industries that are new to the CEO.
The game is modeled as a simple two-stage game. In the first stage, the acquirer
(AC) gets a random draw of two potential targets (TA), of which is one from group
E and one from the other group N. The draws represent the net synergies that are
generated by an acquisition. We assume that the draws are identical independently
distributed (iid) from a uniform distribution with support [0, 1]. This means that
all acquisitions create value and the CEO only decides among the two targets. We
assume that the bidding CEO maximizes shareholder value of his company.26 Once
he has decided which target to buy, he negotiates the price in the second stage.
We model the price agreement process as a generalized Nash bargaining procedure
where the walk-away option of both companies is the value of the stand-alones.
Impact of Industry Experience We allow industry-experience to affect this
process in two ways. First, industry experience might allow CEOs to add value V
to the deal. The magnitude of this value creation potentially depends on whether the
CEO has experience in the industry of the target or not. Second, having experience
in the industry of the target might help to capture a larger fraction of the surplus.
In other words, other things being equal, a CEO who worked in the industry of
the target before, is able to extract more of the surplus. We model this by the
bargaining power, denoted by β.
Key Parameters The key parameters are as follows:
• Synergies S ∈ {SE, SN}: The synergy levels of the deal, i.e. the value that is
created in the acquisitions that is independent of the CEO.
• Value creation abilities V ∈ {VE, VN} with VE ≥ VN : The ability to create
value in the acquisition. For simplicity, we normalize VN = 0.
• Value capture abilities β˜ ∈ {βE, βN} with βE ≥ βN : The ability to capture
value in the acquisition. We define β ≡ βE
βN
≥ 1.
26The results also hold when we assume that the bidding CEO is maximizing his own payoff
which consists of the returns to his equity share plus private benefits of control of running a larger
company.
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Analysis In the following, we solve the game by backwards induction before cal-
culating the expected payoffs to different shareholders for deals in each of the two
groups, conditional on their implementation. In the last step, we calculate the ex-
pected difference of the payoffs for the two groups, mimicking the structure of our
regression analysis.
Second Stage: Bargaining Outcome Let VAC , VTA denote the stand-alone val-
ues of acquirer and target respectively. If the takeover goes through, the value of of
the combined entity is VAC +VTA +S+V . Bidder and target bargain over the price
X in a generalized Nash bargaining setting. The payoffs, conditional on completion
of the deal, are given as follows:
• Bidder: [VAC + VTA + S + V ]−X
• Target: X
The walk-away payoffs are the stand-alone values, i.e. VAC for the bidder and VTA
for the target. The two parties maximize the joint surplus by setting X accordingly
to the Nash bargaining solution.
X = argmax {[(VAC + VTA + S + V )−X]− VAC}β {X − VTA}(1−β)
The solution to this maximization problem is the well-known Nash solution where
the surplus S + V is split accordingly to the bargaining power of the two parties.
This means that the price for the target is given by
X = VTA + (1− β)(S + V )
First Stage: Choice between the two groups We assume that the bidding
CEOs get one draw each of potential merger targets from the two groups. We
further assume that the synergy levels SE, SN
iid∼ U [0, 1]. Given the sharing rule in
the second stage, the CEOs compare the payoffs of the two potential acquisitions.
They prefer to buy from group E if βE(SE + VE) > βN(SN + VN) and from group N
otherwise. This means that they prefer group E if β(SE + V ) > SN .
Comparative Statics In our regression analysis, we look at the impact of CEO
industry experience on the performance of acquisitions. We compare the returns
(that go to different shareholders) of acquisitions where the CEOs has experience
in the target industry with those of acquisitions where the CEO is new to the
target industry. In other words, we look at the difference between the averages
of acquisitions with and without CEO experience in the target industry. In the
analysis, using the analytical framework, we aim to reproduce the regression setting.
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Therefore, we define the differences in the returns between industry expert CEOs
and CEOs that are new to the target industry to the acquiring (AC) shareholders,
to the target shareholders (TA), and to both acquiring plus target shareholders
(AC+TA).
∆AC = βEE[SE|target E  target N]− βNE[SN |target N  target E]
∆TA = (1− βE)E[SE|target E  target N]− (1− βN)E[SN |target N  target E]
∆AC+TA = E[SE|target E  target N]− E[SN |target N  target E]
Theorem 2 Consider that industry experience is operating through V and β, i.e.
V and β are increasing functions of ExpTA.
1. ∆AC is positive and increasing in the value creation ability V and in the value
capturing ability β of an industry expert CEO.
2. ∆TA is increasing ( decreasing) in the value creation ability V (value capturing
ability β) of an industry expert CEO.
3. ∆AC+TA is increasing ( decreasing) in the value creation ability (value captur-
ing ability β) of an industry expert CEO.
Derivations
Expected value of deals from sector E: We first calculated the conditional
density of a deal value SE conditional on its implementation.
P (SE ∧ target E  target N) = P (SE ∧ β(SE + V ) > SN)
=
β(SE + V ), for SE ≤ 1β − V1, for SE > 1β − V
The total probability that the bidding CEO prefers a target of sector E over a
target of sector N is therefore given by:
P ≡ P [target E  target N] = P [β(SE + V ) > SN ]
=
∫ 1/β−V
SE=0
∫ β(SE+V )
SN=0
1dSNdSE +
∫ 1
SE=1/β−V
∫ 1
SN=0
1dSNdSE
= 1 + V − 1
2b
+
bV 2
2
The conditional density P (SE|target E  target N) is given by P (SE|target E 
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target N) = P (SE∧target Etarget N)
P (target Etarget N) . In the last step, we calculate the expected synergy
level of an implemented acquisition from sector A.
E[SE + V |target E  target N] = 1− 3 β
2 V 2 + 2 β3 V 3 − 6 V β2 − 3 β2
3 β (1− 2 β V + β2 V 2 − 2 β)
Expected value of deals from sector N: We first calculated the conditional
density of a deal value VN conditional on its implementation.
P (SN ∧ target N  target E) = P (SN ∧ β(SE + V ) < SN)
=
0, for SN < βVSN
β
− V, for SN > βV
The total probability that the bidding CEO prefers a target of sector N over a
target of sector E is therefore given by:
P ≡ P [target E  target N] = 1− 2 β V + β
2 V 2
2 β
The expected synergy level of an implemented acquisition from sector N:
E[SN |target N  target E] = β V
3
+
2
3
Relative performance of the two sectors In our analysis we are interested in
the relative performance of acquisitions with and without experience. Moreover, we
differentiate between the return to the bidding shareholders and to the bidding plus
target shareholders as a proxy for the surplus creation:
∆AC = βEE[SE|target E  target N]− βNE[SN |target N  target E]
∆AC+TA = E[SE|target E  target N]− E[SN |target N  target E]
We are interested in the comparative statics result. As illustration we plot the
partial derivatives of ∆AC and ∆AC+TA with respect to V and β.
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2 Boards of Banks27
2.1 Introduction
The recent global financial crisis has brought bank governance into the spotlight.
Regulatory proposals in the aftermath of the crisis have singled out boards of banks
as one of their main targets (Kirkpatrick (2009); Walker (2009); and European
Commission (2010)). These calls for regulation are mostly based on circumstantial
and anecdotal evidence, as we currently know little about the characteristics of
boards of banks and their relation to firm and country characteristics. We also do
not know how existing regulations shape the structure of bank boards.
In this paper we study the characteristics of boards of banks around the world.
We have two goals. The first one is to provide the most comprehensive and detailed
analysis to date of the determinants of bank board characteristics. The second goal
is to assess the extent to which regulation affects bank board composition.
Our focus is on two characteristics of outside (nonexecutive) bank directors: in-
dependence (from management) and experience (in the banking industry). We take
no stand on whether director independence and director experience are good or bad.
That is, we do not equate either independence or experience with good governance.
We are interested in these variables because of their policy relevance. For exam-
ple, some recent reform-minded reports identify insufficient director independence
from managers and directors’ lack of banking expertise as two of the main causes of
the governance failures that contributed to the 2007-09 banking crisis (Kirkpatrick
(2009); Walker (2009); and European Commission (2010)).
Our evidence suggests that board independence and board experience are de-
termined in significantly different ways. In the cross-section, the variation in bank
board independence is mostly explained by country characteristics, suggesting that
regulation and other institutional features are more important than bank-specific
and idiosyncratic factors. In contrast, neither country nor bank characteristics ex-
plain much of the cross-sectional variation in board experience. In the time-series,
we find that year effects are important, and that independence and experience evolve
in opposite directions, especially in the US. Once we factor out aggregate trends and
time-invariant bank characteristics, we find that changes in bank characteristics have
no statistically robust impact on board independence, which is consistent with the
view that bank-specific characteristics have little influence on board independence.
In contrast, bank characteristics matter substantially for board experience. We find
some robust evidence that changes in board experience are positively related to
changes in bank size and negatively related to changes in bank performance.
27The work in this chapter was carried out jointly with equal share by Daniel Ferreira, Tom
Kirchmaier, and me.
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A possible explanation for our findings is as follows. Regulation (both direct
and indirect) and business practices (often reflected in governance codes) vary sub-
stantially across countries. This variation may explain the importance of country
effects for board composition. But regulation is likely to affect board independence
more than board experience. Director independence has been on the top of the
agenda of regulators and governance activists for some time. For example, director
independence featured prominently in the cluster of governance reforms associated
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In contrast, director expertise has only re-
cently been considered an important issue, mainly in the context of the role of banks
in the financial crisis (e.g. Walker (2009)). Thus, if banks have little freedom in
choosing their board independence levels, country effects should be the main de-
terminant of board independence. By the same logic, if regulation plays a minor
role in determining bank directors’ expertise, country effects should be irrelevant for
board experience. Furthermore, if banks actively change their boards in response
to changes in the business environment, changes in board experience could occur in
tandem with changes in some other bank characteristics.
Our results raise some important questions. For example, would banks bene-
fit from being less regulated, allowing them to tailor board independence to their
specific needs? Or is regulation actually preventing them from choosing inferior
governance structures? Although answering these questions is beyond the scope of
this paper, the evidence in this paper underscores their importance.
Our study exploits a unique dataset of director characteristics that we construct
by collecting detailed biographic data for a sample of 12,010 directors working for
740 publicly-listed banks. The sample spans 9 years (2000-2008) and includes banks
from 41 countries. We collect data on four board/director characteristics: director
independence, previous banking experience, board size, and director busyness. We
match our director data with data on bank and country characteristics.
A reliable and meaningful measure of board independence is difficult to obtain.
Some previous studies consider the proportion of outside directors on the board
as a proxy for independence. This is a crude approximation, but it might be the
only alternative when working with samples that span periods for which better data
are not available (see e.g., Linck, Netter, and Yang (2009); and Ferreira, Ferreira,
and Raposo (2011)). Some papers use finer proxies for independence (e.g., Adams
(2009); and Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010)), such as the RiskMetrics (pre-
viously known as IRRC) classification, which considers a director independent if
he or she is not an employee, a former executive, a relative of a current corporate
executive, or someone who has business relations with the company.28 However,
even these improved measures of independence are imprecise. In the particular case
28The RiskMetrics director database only covers US firms and thus cannot be used for interna-
tional comparisons.
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of banks, this problem is complicated by the fact that some outside directors are
representatives of the bank’s best clients, and that this information is difficult to
obtain. According to Adams (2010, p. 14), ”customer-directors are likely to have
different incentives and motivations than other outside directors. To correctly mea-
sure board independence requires identifying them but this is virtually impossible.”
Another difficulty is the fact that the formal definition of independence varies across
countries.
We are able to construct a reliable measure of board independence because we
have data on bank directors’ employment histories, as well as a comprehensive record
of fees paid to banks by their corporate clients. We consider a director to be formally
independent if he or she (i) is not a current or former employee of the bank, (ii)
is not a representative of the bank’s employees, (iii) does not represent a firm that
has a significant commercial relationship with the bank, and (iv) is classified as
independent by the bank. Our definition of independence is a proxy for the alignment
of directors’ interests with those of shareholders.
Off-the-shelf data on directors’ banking experience do not exist; we need to
construct them from directors’ curriculum vitas. We consider an outside director
to have banking experience if the director has held at least one managerial or top-
executive position in a bank. From the employment histories of the outside directors
in our sample, we obtain a list of previous employers for each director. We match
these employers with company identifiers from a number of different datasets. We
are then able to infer the industrial classification for most of these companies.
We examine the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of our sample sepa-
rately. To make sure that our results are not specific to what happened to banks
during the 2007-09 crisis, we use 2006 as our benchmark year in the cross-sectional
analysis, but we also check for robustness to alternative years. All of our results are
unaffected by the crisis period. Our main findings are as follows.
Countries explain more of the cross-sectional variation in bank board indepen-
dence than bank characteristics do. While bank-specific characteristics alone explain
about 10% of the variation in bank board independence, country dummies alone can
explain up to 54% of the observed variation. After controlling for country character-
istics, the incremental explanatory power of bank-specific variables is just 3%. These
results are very robust; they are not explained by year effects, outlying countries,
or by the oversampling of US banks. In stark contrast, we find that bank-specific
characteristics alone explain 7% and that country dummies alone explain only 3%
of the cross-sectional variation in bank board experience. That is, most of the
cross-sectional variation in board experience is bank specific or idiosyncratic.
Our results lead naturally to the question of why countries matter so much
for bank board independence, but not so much for bank board experience. Coun-
try characteristics could be related to board characteristics because laws, regula-
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tions and institutions can either complement or substitute for internal governance
(Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007); and Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson
(2009)). Additionally, the direct and indirect regulation of bank board appoint-
ments could also explain why bank board independence varies so much across coun-
tries. To investigate these possibilities, we consider three sets of country-specific
variables: board regulations, proxies for financial and economic development, and
legal-environment variables.
The data provide some support for the importance of board regulations. Al-
though it is not surprising that board regulations can have an effect on board com-
position, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that shows evidence
linking specific board regulations to board independence across countries.
Countries differ in the extent to which courts can remove directors during the
reorganization of troubled banks. In countries where bank directors are less powerful,
it should be more difficult or costly to hire outside directors, especially independent
ones. Consistent with this view, we find that banks have less independent boards in
countries where courts have the right to remove bank directors in reorganizations.
Another one of the few board regulations that can be compared across countries
is the requirement that firms are run by a single board, as in the United States, or
by two different boards, as in Germany. In the two-tiered structure, the advising
and monitoring functions of boards are formally separated into a management and
a supervisory board (see Adams and Ferreira (2007)). We find strong evidence that
banks in countries with mandatory one-tiered structures have boards that are on
average more independent.29
When considering other country characteristics, we find strong evidence that
bank board independence is a ’normal’ good: countries with higher per capita GDP
have banks with more independent boards. However, we do not find robust evidence
that financial development and investor protection foster board independence. Thus,
there is no clear evidence that banks adjust their board independence levels to reflect
the country-wide quality of external governance.
We then turn to the time-series dimension of our sample. We start by showing
that bank board independence monotonically increases over time in the pre-crisis pe-
riod (2000-2006), with the largest increases occurring around 2002-03 for US banks,
and with one year delay for banks outside the US. While independent directors
already held 51% of the board seats in US banks in 2000, in non-US banks the av-
erage level of independence was 25 percentage points lower.. The respective figures
for 2006 are 74% and 40%. While independent directors now hold an overwhelming
majority of board seats in US banks, independent directors are still in the minority
in some other parts of the world.
29We see the rules on one-tiered and two-tiered board structures as a proxy for the overall
governance system of a country.
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Although it is not possible to determine the exact causes of these dramatic
changes over such a short time period, we note that banks, like all firms, were likely
affected by the increase in regulatory pressure on governance issues that culminated
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. Consistent with this explanation, the
increase in board independence over the 2002-03 period is less pronounced for non-
US banks, many of which are not directly subjected to SOX regulations. But overall,
both US and non-US banks exhibit similar time trends in board independence.
The evolution of the aggregate levels of bank board experience is the mirror
image of that of board independence, with average experience decreasing sharply
from 28% in 2002 to 21% in 2006. Experience then increases slightly in the crisis
years to about 24% in 2008 (similarly, independence falls from 2006 to 2008). As
in the case of board independence, these aggregate patterns in board experience
are mostly driven by US banks. In terms of economic significance, the over-time
changes in average experience are small: In the US, the largest changes occurred
between 2002 and 2005, when experience drops from 22% to 17%. In non-US banks,
experience stays relatively flat throughout the whole period at about 37%.
Lastly, we run firm fixed-effects regressions to control for time-invariant omitted
variables and get a more reliable picture of the relationship between bank charac-
teristics and board structure. We consider a set of bank variables that proxy for
size, performance, capital structure, and ownership structure. We find that yearly
changes in bank characteristics are not related to changes in board independence in
a statistically significant way. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that
bank-specific characteristics have little impact on board independence. In contrast,
we find that changes in firm size (as measured by assets) are robustly and positively
related to changes in bank board experience. Another robust finding is that changes
in performance variables such as market-to-book and operating performance display
a negative relation with changes in board experience.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that banks adjust the compo-
sition of their boards to their particular conditions, but only if regulations allow
them the freedom to do so. This interpretation of the evidence suggests that board
structure can have real consequences for bank performance, as regulation may push
banks away from their privately optimal board structures. We believe that our find-
ings can help explain some of the evidence uncovered by a number of recent papers
that investigate the link between board characteristics and bank performance during
the crisis.30 Adams (2009) is the first to find suggestive evidence that board inde-
pendence is positively related to bank bailouts. Minton, Taillard, and Williamson
(2010) provide more systematic evidence that board independence - but not finan-
30A possibly incomplete list includes Adams (2009), Beltratti and Stulz (2009), Erkens, Hung,
and Matos (2010), Chesney, Stromberg, and Wagner (2010), and Minton, Taillard, and Williamson
(2010).
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cial expertise - predicts the bailouts of financial institutions. Our main contribution
is to provide a coherent explanation for why board independence, but not board
experience, seems to matter for bank outcomes. By showing that regulation has
a substantial impact on independence, but not on experience, we believe that our
paper provides a compelling explanation for why the existing evidence linking bank
board independence and bank performance is so robust.
Our discussion of the determinants of board structure is limited by the difficul-
ties in establishing causal relations between the variables in our dataset. As we
are interested in examining the extent to which board structure is correlated with
observable firm and country-specific variables, determining the ultimate source of
such correlations is not our first order concern. In addition, reverse causation is not
really a concern in the case of country-specific variables. Although such variables
could proxy for omitted ones, these omitted variables must also be country-specific,
and thus our conclusions are unchanged.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the related
literature in Section 2, we describe the data and present summary statistics in
Section 3. In Section 4 we analyze the cross-section of board structure. In Section 5
we exploit the time-series dimension of the sample and we investigate more closely
the role of bank characteristics in explaining board structure. We conclude in Section
6.
2.2 Related literature
Our findings are consistent with some of the existing evidence collected by the in-
ternational corporate governance literature, such as the finding that most of the
cross-sectional variation in governance variables is explained by country characteris-
tics. Using samples of mostly non-financial firms, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007)
and Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) find evidence that the quality
of firm-level governance is increasing in a country’s level of economic and financial
development and of investor protection. Such empirical relations strongly suggest
that country-level governance and firm-level governance are complements. Our re-
sults are similar as they highlight the importance of countries for the governance of
banks.
Our work complements the empirical literature on (non-financial) corporate
board structures. This literature shows that the composition of boards is related
to a number of firm characteristics such as size, growth opportunities, leverage,
and proxies for information asymmetry, among others (Boone, Field, Karpoff, and
Raheja (2007); Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008); Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008);
Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2009); and Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011)). There
is also evidence that boards of banks are different from those of non-financial firms
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(Adams and Mehran (2003) and (2008)). Boards of banks may play a more central
role in the governance framework. As banks are more opaque than non-financial
firms (Morgan (2002)), outsiders could face difficulties in assessing risks and prop-
erly valuing banks. Under such conditions, external governance mechanisms may
not work well, putting additional pressure on the board.
Although our focus is on the potential determinants of board structure, a nat-
ural question is whether board structure, and in particular director independence,
matters for firm policies and performance. In the context of non-financial firms,
there is robust evidence that board composition affects important firm outcomes,
such as CEO turnover (Weisbach (1988); Adams and Ferreira (2009); and Jenter
and Lewellen (2010)). In banks, there is some evidence linking board governance
and risk taking (Laeven and Levine (2009)).
Research on the role of bank directors during the recent global financial cri-
sis reveals some surprising results. Adams (2009) finds that US banks with more
independent directors were more likely to receive Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) money. Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2010) provide ample evidence
that board characteristics in financial institutions are related to a number of per-
formance measures during the crisis. Similarly, Beltratti and Stulz (2009) find that
banks with more pro-shareholder boards performed worse, and Erkens, Hung, and
Matos (2010) find that financial firms with more independent boards experienced
larger losses.
This literature suggests that bank governance does indeed matter, but not neces-
sarily in obvious ways. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) find that banks run by CEOs
with large ownership stakes, if anything, performed worse than those with low CEO
ownership stakes during the 2007-08 crisis. Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2009)
present evidence that a culture of short-term compensation leads to more risk-taking
in financial firms, but they argue that such risk taking is consistent with sharehold-
ers’ goals. This explanation is compatible with findings by Laeven and Levine (2009)
that banks with more shareholder-oriented governance structures take more risks.
More generally, the last generation of papers on board structure and firm per-
formance has brought board composition back into the spotlight. These papers use
innovative empirical designs to circumvent the endogeneity problems that plague
earlier studies. Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) use regulations associated
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as an exogenous source of variation in board
independence. In a difference-in-differences estimation, they find that increases in
director independence improve performance in those firms in which the costs of ob-
taining information are low, while performance worsens in firms in which information
costs are high.31 Adams and Ferreira (2009) use instrumental variables methods to
31Analyzing the direct effect of the 2002 governance rules, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007)
also find heterogeneous effects of governance rules on firm value.
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estimate the causal effect of board gender diversity on performance. They find that
gender diversity improves performance only in firms with many takeover defenses.
They also provide evidence that more diverse boards are tougher monitors of man-
agers, validating the use of gender diversity as a proxy for independence. Nguyen
and Nielsen (2009) use director sudden deaths as a natural experiment to identify
the market value of independent directors. They also find that the value of indepen-
dent directors varies with firm characteristics and director functions. Overall, all
these papers show remarkably consistent results. Director independence matters for
firm performance, but its effects are not homogeneous across different companies.
To identify such effects, it is necessary to use exogenous sources of variation in board
independence and to allow for heterogeneous effects.
The most recent literature provides strong evidence of the importance of board
composition. Understanding the determinants of board composition thus merits
special attention. We believe that we can only make sense of the evidence that links
boards to firm outcomes after a thorough investigation of the determinants of board
composition. The evidence is this paper is a step in this direction.
2.3 Data and Sample
Our initial sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 740 publicly-listed banks in
41 countries for the nine-year period from 2000 to 2008.32 We have a complete
set of director-level biographical data for all of our 4,081 bank-year observations.
We source our director data from BoardEx. The entire BoardEx database gives us
a total of 49,665 director-year observations for 12,010 unique directors who have
served on the boards of our sample banks between 2000 and 2008.
We define banks as those companies that held a banking license at the end of
2008. Our sample includes all US investment banks that obtained a banking license
as part of the 2008 bailout. We validate our definition of banks by cross-checking
it with regulatory listings; we include only those firms that operate within the 60
two-digit SIC code. Our unit of analysis is a bank holding company. Boards of
fully-owned subsidiaries are not included.33
Table 19 gives an overview of the distribution of our sample by year and country.
The sample is skewed towards both US banks and more recent observations. We
have complete data for banks in 31 countries for 2006, which is our benchmark year
32Our sample is based on all banks available in the BoardEx database, which only includes banks
with some public securities. These securities are not necessarily common equity. For an example,
of the six Austrian banks in our sample, one (Osterreichische Volksbanken AG) only has non-voting
preference shares that are publicly traded.
33We treat banks that are part of banking groups as individual companies as long as they issue
their own public securities. For example, in Austria we consider each of the banks of the 3 Banken
Gruppe as individual banks, because they are listed separately. We use data on ownership structure
to control for some of the possible effects of such variables on our results.
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in the cross-sectional analysis. We use data from 41 countries in 2008. We perform
a number of robustness checks to make sure that our results are not driven by these
sample imbalances.
(Table 19 about here)
BoardEx provides standard biographical information such as age, nationality,
and gender for all board members, as well as information about their current and
past board positions, including the company’s name and director tenure at each
position. It also provides information on directors’ past non-board positions, income,
and educational background (albeit at times incomplete). To construct the banking
experience variable, we identified 27,773 companies and non-profit organizations
that employed at least one of the 12,010 directors in our sample at some point.
We matched the names of these companies with more detailed company-specific
information from various alternative databases. To do so, we developed an algorithm
that allowed us to match the names from BoardEx with the population of company
names in Compustat. We then manually verified each of the automatic matches, and
where applicable linked subsidiaries to the respective parent company. We repeated
this process several times with other company databases such as Amadeus, Icarus,
Orbis, and Oriana, allowing us to match ever smaller companies. This procedure
yields a company identifier for most firms, enabling us to extract a wealth of financial
and non-financial data. After internet-researching the remaining firms, we obtain
SIC codes for more than 95% of our sample.
We obtain information on whether directors are also representatives of the banks’
most important customers from the Deals Analysis option in the Thomson One
Banker database. We downloaded all available information in the M&A, Equity,
Bonds and Loans sections and matched the company names from Thomson One
Banker to those in our dataset.
We use these data to construct our director-level variables. Our independence
variable classifies a director as independent if all of the following four criteria are
met: (1) the director has never been employed by the bank, (2) the director does
not represent a firm that has a significant commercial relationship with the bank,
(3) the director is not a representative of the bank’s employees, and (4) the bank
classifies the director as independent.34
We construct a banking experience indicator variable that equals one if the di-
rector had a prior managerial or top-executive position in any bank. We construct a
34In the case of Germany, we do not use criterion (4), as German banks - like all other German
companies - do not report the independence of outside directors (Aufsichtsratsmitglieder). This
procedure implicitly overstates independence levels, as some unobserved dimensions of indepen-
dence cannot be taken into account.
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director busyness variable by counting board positions of each director at each year.
We measure board size by the count of all directors per bank-year.
To obtain bank financial data, we merge our sample with Worldscope. We use
book assets and sales as proxies for bank size.35 To control for the various dimensions
of bank performance, we use Market-to-Book and Return on Assets (ROA). We
calculate market-to-book as the market value of shares over common equity36 and
ROA as net income over assets. We follow the standard practice in the banking
literature of measuring leverage as assets over common equity (e.g. Adrian and
Shin (2010)). We obtain share price data from Thomson One Banker.
Previous research finds that the ownership structure of banks matters for bank
governance and performance (Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007); and Morck, Yavuz,
and Yueng (2010)). We collect detailed data on ownership structure. The prime
data source of bank ownership data is Bankscope, which has ownership data for 687
banks. For other 12 banks we were able to collect ownership data from Thomson
One Banker. This gives us ownership data for 3,905 bank-year observations; 3,870
based on Bankscope data and 35 on data from Thomson One Banker. We have no
ownership data for 294 bank-year observations.
Bankscope reports ownership changes on investor level, which give us 101,409
records. We classify the investor type categories reported by Bankscope into the
following groups: Employee, Family, Government, Institutional Investor, Financial
Institution, and Others. We then fill in the missing observations for those years when
no change occurred. We spent considerable time cleaning the data, first on bank-
year-investor level and then on bank-year level. One of the problems that we faced
was that ownership stakes of business groups are reported multiple times. In this
case we use the stake that is attached to the highest level in the group. For better
handling of the data, we also exclude ownership stakes of less than 3%. We use the
ownership thresholds of 10%, 20%, 50% and 100%. We include the 100% threshold
to separate firms that were taken over, which typically also correspond to the last
year of the bank in the sample. For each for the bank-year observation, we construct
dummy variables indicating the existence of an ownership block for each of these
ownership thresholds. We also create similar indicator variables that discriminate
among different types of owners.37 We collect many country-specific variables. In
line with Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007), we construct a variable measuring the
quality of investor protection (which we call Antidirector) by multiplying the anti-
director rights index (the DLLS index) constructed by Djankov et al. (2008) by
35Our base currency for assets as well as all other accounting variables is the US dollar (USD).
All non-USD denominated values were converted into USD at market exchange rates on the day
of announcement. We do not correct assets for inflation as it is unnecessary given that we use the
log of assets in the regressions, so that year dummies implicitly capture the effects of inflation.
36WS Code 03501.
37For an analysis of bank ownership around the world, see Morck, Yavuz, and Yueng (2010).
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the rule of law index reported by La Porta et al. (1998). As a robustness check,
we construct an alternative investor protection variable by multiplying the anti-
director rights index developed by Spamann (2010) by the rule of law index. We do
not report results using this alternative measure in the tables, but where appropriate
we discuss them in the text. We also collect the credit market regulation index used
in Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2010), which we use only in robustness checks.
We use GDP per capita38 from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
as a proxy for economic development and stock market capitalization over GDP from
Euromonitor as a measure of financial development. Our dummy indicating the right
of courts to remove board directors in reorganizations comes from the World Bank
database on bank regulation and supervisory practices developed by Barth, Caprio
and Levine (2008). We also hand-collected data from many sources to construct a
dummy variable indicating whether a country has a compulsory one-tiered board
structure.
Table 20 depicts the summary statistics for all variables over the period 2000
to 2008. The unit of observation is a bank-year. There is considerable variability
in bank board characteristics. We observe boards of banks without independent
directors, or without any outside director with banking experience, while on the
other hand we see boards that are staffed fully with independent directors, and
also some in which all outside directors have some banking background. Similarly,
there is substantial variation in board size, ranging from four to 35 members. The
spectrum for the average number of board appointments is equally wide, ranging
from no other appointment to a board-level average of 15.8 board seats.
(Table 20 about here)
In our cross-sectional analysis we focus on data from 2006, which is the last
year prior to the financial crisis. For that year, our sample contains data from 622
banks and 31 countries. Table 21 gives a detailed overview of the board structure
variables by country. There is considerable variation in board characteristics across
countries. In 2006, the minimum board size in our sample is four (a US bank)
and the maximum is 34 (a Russian bank). The equally-weighted average of board
size across all countries is 15.6; the average board size in the US is 10.7, 12.4 in
the UK, and 21.3 in Germany, to give a few examples. Among developed countries,
France and Switzerland have very low levels of independence. In contrast, Australia,
Canada, and the US exhibit comparatively high levels of director independence.
The equally-weighted cross-country average of the ratio of outside directors with
banking experience is 36%. This average however overestimates the number of
38GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international USD). WB code NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD.
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outside directors with banking experience, as in the US (where most of our sample
banks are located) this proportion is just 18%.39
Some of the countries with high levels of bank board independence - such as
Australia, Canada, and the US - exhibit relatively low banking experience ratios.
In our sample, 142 banks (23% of the total) have no outside director with banking
experience on their boards. Two banks are fully staffed with outside directors with
prior experience in banking and 60 banks (about 10% of the total) have a majority of
such directors. In terms of busyness (the average number of board appointments held
by outside directors), we observe values ranging from no other board appointment
(in US banks) to 13.6 additional board appointments on average (in one Italian
bank). The equally-weighted average across all countries is 4.4 board appointments.
(Table 21 about here)
2.4 The Cross-Section of Board Independence and Board
Experience
In this section we focus on the cross-sectional variation in board structure. As we
have nine years of bank-level data, we focus initially on a representative year. We
choose the year of 2006 as the benchmark because the years after the crisis could
be atypical, as board structure may have changed as a consequence of the crisis.
The crisis period is unusual in that there are sudden changes in bank ownership,
widespread financial distress, and ad hoc government intervention. However, we find
that the crisis period does not significantly affect the key results.
2.4.1 Explaining Variation in Bank Board Structure: Countries versus
Firm Characteristics
How much of the cross-sectional variation in board structure is explained by country
effects and firm characteristics? Methodologically, we follow the approach of Doidge,
Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) and run linear regressions of board structure variables
(independence and experience) on firm characteristics and country dummies. We
then compare the incremental (adjusted) R2 of each set of explanatory variables.40
39A natural question is whether the current level of banking experience among bank directors
is inefficiently low. Regulators and policy-makers have recently emphasized the importance of
banking experience and financial expertise for outside directors; an example is the Walker (2009)
review in the UK. Hau and Thum (2009) find that measures of board competence, including
previous banking experience, are positively related to the performance of German banks during
the crisis. Cun˜at and Garicano (2010) find that chairmen’s human capital crucially affected the
performance of Spanish savings banks during the crisis.
40Rauh and Sufi (2010) employ a similar approach in their investigation of the role of measure-
ment errors in explaining the poor explanatory power of firm and industry characteristics in the
cross-section of capital structure.
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Specifically, we estimate the following models:
yij = α + x
′
ijβ + uij
yij = d
′
jθ + uij
yij = x
′
ijβ + d
′
jθ + uij
where yij is the board structure variable of bank i in country j, α is a constant, xij
is a vector of bank characteristics, dj is a vector of country dummies, β and θ are
vectors of parameters to be estimated, and uij is the error term. Our goal in this
section is not make inferences about the estimated parameters but to compare the
explanatory power, or goodness of fit, of these three models.
Our main variables of interest are either the fraction of independent directors
or the fraction of outside directors with banking experience. As these variables
are bounded between zero and one, we use a logistic transformation (also known
as the log odds ratio) of the original variable zij as our dependent variable: yij =
ln[(zij)/((1− zij))].41
We report the results in Tables 22 and 23. The first three columns of each table
show results for board independence regressions and the last three show results
for board experience regressions. Because the missing data on ownership variables
substantially reduce the 2006 sample size from 609 to 572 banks, we report results
both without and with the block holder dummy among the set of controls (Tables
22 and 23 respectively). Column (a) in Table 22 shows results for model 1.a, i.e.
a regression of board independence on a vector of five firm characteristics: (log)
assets, (log) sales, (log) market to book, return on assets, and (log) leverage. In
that regression, only ROA displays a statistically significant (at 10%) relation with
board independence. Overall, these five bank characteristics explain 10% of the total
variation in the sample (using the adjusted R2 as the metric). Including additional
bank-specific variables (e.g. alternative measures of capital strength, such as the
tier 1 capital ratio, or performance, such as sales growth) does not alter the results
qualitatively. We choose a parsimonious model specification in order not to lose too
many observations due to missing data.
At first sight, bank variables seem to explain only a small fraction of the het-
erogeneity in board independence. A natural question is whether this is a feature
of our empirical design. For example, there could be other bank-specific variables
with stronger explanatory power that are omitted from our specification. To put
our results into perspective, we compare them with those found in other papers on
board independence in non-financial firms. In regressions of board independence
41In practice, this transformation has no important consequences for our results. We transform
all bounded dependent variables because not doing so may lead to implausible estimates of marginal
effects.
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on a much larger set of firm-level controls, Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) report
a maximum R2 of 17%. Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) report R2’s varying
from 14% to 16%, using up to 18 firm-specific variables as regressors. Thus, the
relatively low R2’s in board independence regressions on firm-specific variables is
a well-established regularity. It seems unlikely that by adding more firm-specific
controls we could increase the joint explanatory power of the regressors by much.
Column (b) shows results for model 1.b, i.e. a regression of board independence
on a set of country dummies (all dummy coefficients are omitted from the table).
This exercise reveals that country dummies alone can explain 54% of the observed
variation in board independence.
(Table 22 about here)
Finally, in column (c) we include both bank characteristics and country dummies.
The incremental explanatory power of bank characteristics is quite small; the R2
increases by 3 percentage points when moving from (b) to (c). This is in contrast
with the large incremental R2 for country dummies: moving from (a) to (c), the R2
increases by 47 percentage points. Country effects can explain much of the observed
variation in bank board independence.
A natural question is whether the high R2 associated with country dummies is
mechanically driven by the fact that some countries only have a few banks in the
sample. This is not the case. Even if we drop from the sample all countries with
fewer than 5 banks, we still obtain an adjusted R2 of 41% for model 1.b. This
is a very conservative approach, as it leaves us with only 12 country dummies for
581 observations. On the other extreme, dropping the US leaves us with only 116
observations and an adjusted R2 of 28% for model 1.b.42 Instead of dropping all
US banks, we also run a regression in which we keep only 15 randomly selected
US banks. This regression yields an adjusted R2 of 34% for model 1.b. Thus,
homogeneity among US banks seems to be more important for the high explanatory
power of country dummies than the presence of small outlying countries. We thus
conclude that the importance of countries for board independence is real; it is not
just a feature of how the sample is constructed.
We also find very similar results if we consider alternative years. For example,
if we use the year 2008 (620 banks from 41 countries), we obtain an adjusted R2
the models 1.a to 1.c of 12%, 53%, and 52% respectively. Overall, our results
suggest that while bank characteristics can explain little of the observed variation
42Adjusted R2’s are not comparable across samples of substantially different sizes because the
ad hoc penalty for adding more regressors is relatively more important when the sample is small.
For example, the non-adjusted R2 for model 1.b when the US is dropped is 47%, while it is 56%
in the full sample. Adjusting the R2 yields a penalty of 20 percentage points in the former case
but only a 2 percentage point penalty in the latter case.
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in board independence, country-specific characteristics account for a large fraction
of that variation. We now address the question of whether the same applies to
board experience. In Table 22, columns (d)-(f), we report the results of estimating
models 1.a-c for the (logistic transformation of the) percentage of outside directors
with banking industry experience. These results are in sharp contrast with those of
board independence. Bank characteristics can explain only 7% of the total variation
in board experience, while country dummies alone account for just 3%. From column
(f) we conclude that most of the variation in the proportion of directors with banking
experience cannot be explained by variation in observed characteristics; the adjusted
R2 for the model 1.c regression is only 5%. While there is substantial variation in
director banking experience, this variation is not explained by countries or by some
of the most salient bank-specific characteristics, with the notable exception of firm
size.43
Our independence variable is comparable across countries because most of the
criteria that we use to define independence are not country-specific. Although we
never consider a director independent simply because the bank has classified them as
such, we do consider a director as non-independent if the bank does not classify the
director as independent. We believe that our approach is conservative, as banks are
more likely to overstate independence rather than understate it. However, this ap-
proach has potential drawbacks, because bank self-reporting of independence could
be country specific. In particular, in some countries, directors are not considered
independent if they are representatives of some of the bank’s major shareholders.
Thus, differences in ownership structures across countries could explain our results,
as countries with large block holders could display low levels of independence. We
thus need to investigate the effect of ownership structures on board independence.
Ownership variables feature prominently in previous papers on banks around the
world (Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007); and Morck, Yavuz, and Yueng (2010)).
As a first step to investigate the importance of ownership variables, in Table 23 we
redo the analysis above including the block holder ownership dummy (using the 10%
threshold) in the set of controls. Despite the loss of 37 observations, the results are
basically the same: country dummies matter substantially for board independence,
but not for board experience. The presence of a block holder is associated with
less independence, but this association is not statistically significant once country
dummies are included in the regression. Block holders are also associated with lower
banking experience.
In unreported regressions, we also analyze the importance of ownership struc-
tures in more detail by replacing the block holder dummy with a set of six dummies
describing the type of the largest block holder (if there is one): Financial institu-
43We obtain similar results if we measure experience in the financial services industry more
broadly.
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tions, institutional shareholders, governments, families, employees, and others. Of
these variables, only block ownership by either families or employees are robustly
(negatively) related to board experience. None of the block holder type dummies
is robustly related to board independence. We conclude that countries are more
important for understanding the cross-section of board independence than are bank
characteristics. In contrast, neither country characteristics nor observed bank char-
acteristics are good predictors of banking industry experience of outside directors.
The potential links between ownership concentration and board independence can-
not explain the importance of country effects for board independence.
2.4.2 Estimating Country Effects
Given that countries matter so much for board independence, a natural question
is: Which countries have high levels of board independence? Table 21 shows the
average board independence levels for the 31 countries in our 2006 sample. There is
substantial variation in board independence across countries. While countries such
as the US and Canada display levels of bank board independence at about 74%,
countries such as Spain, Sweden and the UK have independence levels in the 40-
50% range, and countries such as Argentina, Denmark and France are in the 10-30%
range.
These numbers are interesting but difficult to interpret because for most countries
our sample size is small. In fact, US banks represent 80% of the whole sample in
2006. This sample imbalance creates two problems. First, with few observations
per country, country effects cannot be estimated with much precision. Second,
differences in bank characteristics across countries may explain some of the cross-
country variation in board independence.
There is nothing we can do with respect to the first problem, as it is simply a
limitation of the available data. The small sample sizes in most countries other than
the US are not just a consequence of better availability of US data; they are mainly
due to the fact that most countries have few publicly-traded banks. As our goal here
is to describe the data given our sample, the small sample sizes in some countries
only mean that we should attach less confidence to their estimated country effects.
The second problem is more important. For example, comparing the average
board independence in Belgian banks with the average board independence in US
banks can be seriously misleading if the three Belgian banks in our 2006 sample are
very different from the typical US bank. Any observed differences in independence
could be attributed to Belgian banks being different rather than to the location of
these banks in Belgium. One solution is to estimate country effects as the coefficients
on the country dummies in regressions that include firm controls, as the ones in Table
22. The problem is that, with few observations per country, country effects are likely
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to be overestimated for those countries with few banks in the sample.44 To address
this problem, we use an alternative approach. We estimate country-specific effects
by means of a matching procedure in which non-US banks are matched with US
banks that have similar observable characteristics.
Our procedure is as follows. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , N} index the N countries in our
sample, with the convention that j = 1 denotes the US. Let zij be the board struc-
ture variable for bank i in country j and let xij be a vector of observable bank
characteristics (covariates). We match each bank i from country j 6= 1 with a US
bank with observable characteristics similar to xij. We then compute the effect of
country j 6= 1 as
cj = zj − yjm (4)
where zj is the average level of the board characteristic (independence or experi-
ence) in country j and zjm is the respective average among matching US banks.
This matching approach allows us to make meaningful comparisons by benchmark-
ing non-US banks against observationally similar US banks. Such an approach is
implementable even when country samples are small, which is an important concern
in our application. If the assumptions underlying the matching procedure hold, we
can estimate meaningful country effects even for countries with only one bank. As
these estimates can be imprecise, we refrain from making strong statements about
their importance.
We implement this method by matching banks on propensity score.45 Using the
full sample, we first estimate the parameters of a Probit model as in
p(xij) ≡ Prob(Yij = 1|xij) = Φ(x′ijβ) (5)
where Yij is a ’treatment’ variable that takes the value of 1 if bank i is from the
US (i.e. if j = 1), β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and Φ is the
standardized normal cumulative distribution function. The probability of receiving
treatment conditional on the covariates is the propensity score, p(xij). We then
match each non-US bank with a US bank on the basis of their estimated propensity
scores.
We use five bank characteristics in the matching procedure: (log) assets, (log)
sales, (log) market to book, return on assets, and (log) leverage. For each non-US
bank, we define the matching bank as the US bank whose propensity score is the
44To see this intuitively, consider the extreme case in which there is only one bank per country.
In such a case, the country dummy in a cross-sectional regression explains the independence level
perfectly. Our matching approach allows us to circumvent this problem and produce meaningful
estimates of country effects even when there is only one bank in a country. Obviously, this approach
relies on somewhat strong assumptions.
45This is similar to the approach of Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009).
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closest (in absolute terms) to that of the non-US bank.46 To obtain an estimate of
(2), we calculate the difference between the board structure variable of each non-US
bank and their matched US bank, and then average this difference by country.47
We call the difference between the average of country i’s independence levels
and those in the matching sample the independence gap of country i. A negative
gap means that the country has a lower level of board independence than what is
observed in similar US banks (by construction, the US has an independence gap of
zero). In Table 24, for each country we present four estimates of their independence
gap: columns (a) and (b) report gaps obtained after banks are matched on their
characteristics and columns (c) and (d) report results obtained by a naive approach
(no matching). In columns (b) and (d), we use self-reported levels of independence
rather than our independence measure.
(Table 24 about here)
Table 24 shows many interesting results. First, comparisons between columns (a)
and (c) reveal that matching may either reduce (in 18 cases) or increase (in 12 cases)
the differences in board independence between US and non-US banks. A second
finding is that there is much cross-country variation in bank board independence.
Notably, only Canada appears to have a substantial edge over the US; in Canada,
boards are more independent than those in similar US banks by 21 percentage
points. This effect arises because the matching procedure benchmarks Canadian
banks against a group of US banks that have very low independence levels, which
highlights the importance of matching on bank characteristics. At the other end of
the spectrum, there are many countries with bank board independence gaps of -40%
or less, including France (-67%), Greece (-46%), Brazil (-67%), Russia (-79%), and
Switzerland (-42%), among others.
A third important finding is that, overall, most countries display an independence
deficit with respect to the US. In all but three cases (Austria, Canada, and Puerto
Rico), measured gaps (in column (a)) are negative. Although the small sample sizes
in most countries do not allow for testing each country effect in isolation, we can test
for whether there is a significant US effect. Using the whole sample of non-US and
matched US banks, we find that the US effect is about 26%, an effect that is both
statistically and economically significant. This number suggests that a randomly
46As a robustness check, we also match each non-US bank with the two US banks with propensity
scores that are the closest from above and below (provided both exist). The results using this
alternative procedure are qualitatively similar from the ones obtained with the simpler closest
neighbor approach.
47This approach can be formally justified under the assumption that a non-US bank, if it was
located in the US, would have the same expected level of the board structure variable as a US
bank with similar characteristics. This is a version of what Imbens and Wooldrige (2009) call
unconfoundedness assumption.
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chosen non-US bank from our sample would have its independence level increased
by 26 percentage points on average if it was to move its headquarters to the US. This
large US effect - being net of observable bank characteristics - strongly suggests that
the institutional and business environments in the US differ markedly from those in
other countries.
A final lesson from this analysis is the importance of using a measure of inde-
pendence that is not based only on self-reporting by banks. In columns (b) and
(d), Table 24, we report the estimated independence gaps using the self-reported
independence levels. We find that the US banks in the matching sample have lower
levels of independence on average if we use our definition of independence instead.
For example, using the self-reported independence variable, Canadian banks display
a gap of only 4%; this gap jumps to 21% if we use our measure of independence.
In sum, when estimating the effects of countries on bank board independence, it is
important: (1) to take bank characteristics into account and (2) to use a definition
of independence that is (more) consistent across countries. Once both issues are
considered, the measured independence gap between US and non-US banks falls,
but it is still quite large at about 26%. A fair amount of heterogeneity across coun-
tries is hidden behind this average effect, with independence gaps varying from 21%
to -87%.
For completeness, we also estimate country effects for board experience, despite
the fact that our previous results reveal that these effects can only explain a trivial
part of the cross-sectional variation in board experience. Table 25 reports the results
of a matching procedure similar to the one reported in Table 24. Only six countries
display negative experience gaps with respect to the US; in most countries, directors
with banking experience represent a larger fraction of outside directors than they
do in US banks. The average experience gap between non-US and US banks is 17%.
(Table 25 about here)
2.4.3 Why do countries matter so much for bank board independence?
Our results suggest that countries have a substantial influence on bank board struc-
ture and that their importance is disproportionately higher for independence than
they are for experience. In this section we address the question of why countries
matter so much for bank board independence.
One possibility is that stronger governance at the bank level is complementary
to stronger investor protection at the country level. Using samples of mostly non-
financial firms, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) and Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and
Williamson (2009) find evidence of such complementary effects: the quality of firm-
level governance is increasing in a country’s level of investor protection.
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Related to the previous point is the possibility that board independence is higher
in countries with more developed capital markets. This effect could again be a
consequence of complementarities between internal governance and country-level
governance, as financial development is likely to be associated with better investor
protection. Independent directors could also be easier to find in countries with more
publicly-listed firms.
Other possible explanations for the importance of countries include idiosyncrasies
in business practices across countries (e.g. business culture) and differences in laws
and regulations. Laws and regulations can have direct effects on board composition.
For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has effectively increased the demand
for independent directors by requiring audit committees to be entirely composed
of independent directors.48 Laws and regulations can also affect board composition
indirectly, for example by redefining directors’ fiduciary duties and liabilities. These
duties and liabilities can affect companies’ perceptions of the costs associated with
hiring independent directors.
To test these explanations, we use country-specific variables that capture some
of these possibilities. We note however that none of these explanations are mutually
exclusive. We estimate the following model:
yijt = x
′
ijtβ + h
′
jδ + p
′
tγ + uijt (6)
where yijt is the board structure variable for bank i in country j in year t, xijt is a
vector of bank characteristics, hj is a vector of country characteristics, pt is a vector
of year dummies, β, δ and γ are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and uijt is the
error term. Because our goal is to make inferences about the estimated parameters,
in particular δ, to facilitate the comparison with previous results we choose to work
both with the 2006 sample only with clustered standard errors by country and with
the whole sample up to and including 2008, in which case we estimate (5) by pooled
OLS. We include year dummies to account for year effects.
To proxy for the quality of investor protection, in the vector of country charac-
teristics hj we include the anti-director index times the rule of law index. We choose
this variable to facilitate the comparison with the existing literature, in particular
with Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) and Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson
(2009). To proxy for the level of financial development, we use the country’s stock
market capitalization over GDP. We use per capita GDP to proxy for the level of
economic development. We also include dummies indicating three different legal
origins: English (the omitted dummy), German, and French.
To address whether regulation affects board composition more directly, we use
two variables that are particularly relevant for board structure. The first one is
48This rule has been in place for NYSE and Nasdaq listed firms since 1999.
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an indicator of whether courts are allowed to remove directors from the boards of
banks, in cases of reorganization. Although in virtually all countries in our sample
(Germany is the exception) regulators have the right to remove bank directors,
whether courts enjoy the same right shows more variation across countries. We
hypothesize that this variable captures the extent to which bank board composition
can be influenced by courts. This is the only variable we are aware of that is
specific to the board composition of banks and widely available. Our second board
regulation variable is a dummy indicating whether a country has a mandatory one-
tiered board structure. This is a regulation that affects board structures directly.
We note however that this variable indicates the requirement of a one-tiered board
for all companies, not only banks.
Table 26 displays the results. As before, we report regressions with and without
ownership dummies. Results are very similar in both cases, thus we focus on the
regressions that do not include ownership variables, as these are run in a larger
sample. In columns (a) and (b), we report the results for regressions that use the
(logistic transformation of the) fraction of independent directors as the dependent
variable. We first note that, although replacing country dummies with country
characteristics expectedly reduces the adjusted R2, the country characteristics model
in (5) does a reasonably good job in fitting the data, with an adjusted R2 of 42%.
Table 26 shows that a reliable association between bank board independence and
investor protection does not exist. Thus, we find no evidence of complementarities
between bank board independence and country-level governance. This interpretation
is strengthened by the lack of a statistically robust relation between French Civil
Law legal origin and board independence. Previous works on legal origins usually
find that French legal origin countries have lower levels of investor protection.
(Table 26 about here)
Spamann (2010) develops an alternative measure of anti-director rights and argue
that the DLLS measure (the one that we use in Table 26) is flawed in important ways.
To investigate whether our results are driven by the choice of investor protection
variable, we redo our analysis using Spamann’s index. We find virtually identical
results, thus we omit the tables to save space.49
If board independence was complementary to country-level governance, we would
expect to find a positive relation between financial development and board indepen-
49Because the Spamman index is missing for six countries in our 2006 sample, we fill in the missing
data with the DLLS index. We re-scale the Spamman index to the DLLS scale. Using this measure,
the investor protection variable enters with a positive coefficient in both specifications, with low
t-statistics below 0.8. We conclude that, at least in our case, the lack of a robust association
between investor protection and bank board independence is not driven by the particular choice
of investor protection indices.
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dence. For example, Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) document pos-
itive correlations between financial development and firm-level governance, while
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) find similar but weaker results. Table 26 reveals
that financial development seems to be negatively related to bank board indepen-
dence, but this association is not statistically robust. Overall, our evidence suggests
that the importance of countries for bank board independence is not driven by a
complementarity (nor a substitution) effect between internal and external gover-
nance.
In contrast to financial development, economic development (measured by per
capita GDP) is positively related to board independence in a statistically robust
manner. The mechanism linking economic development to board independence is
not clear. One possibility is that the business and regulatory environments of coun-
tries in similar stages of economic development share common features.
Our most original results concern the board regulation variables. Bank board
independence is lower in countries where courts are legally allowed to remove bank
directors during reorganization procedures. Bank board independence is signifi-
cantly higher in countries with mandatory one-tiered board structures.50 Statistical
significance alone cannot tell us whether the effects of these regulation variables are
large enough to explain the country effects. In Subsection 3.2, we estimate an aver-
age independence gap of 26%. From Table 21, we see that changes of 50 percentage
points in average independence between two countries are not uncommon. Thus,
country-specific variables must be able to explain changes in independence ratios of
similar magnitudes if they are to explain the large R2 found in Subsection 3.1.
The economic significance of the regulation variables is substantial. Column (a)
shows that countries with empowered courts have independence log odds ratios that
are 1.45 lower than countries without empowered courts. To translate this effect into
a change in independence ratios we need to choose an initial independence level, as
the marginal effects are not constant. For example, a bank with 67% independence
(the overall average in 2006) has a log odds ratio of 0.71. An increase of 1.4 in the
log odds ratio brings this bank close to 90% independence, while a decrease of the
same magnitude yields an independence ratio of 33%. An independence ratio of
67% may be a reasonable benchmark for North America but is too high for most
countries. If we use a benchmark of 50% independence (about the average value
for Holland), an increase of 1.4 amounts to 81% independence, while a decrease of
the same magnitude amounts to 20% independence. As the estimated coefficients
50In recent work, Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2010) report that an index of credit market
regulation seems to be the key predictor of country performance during the crisis. In unreported
results, we include this index among the set of country characteristics. This index is negatively
correlated with both board independence and board experience, but these correlations are never
statistically significant; the t-statistics are always below 0.8. Including this index reduces the
sample due to missing data but does not change the results qualitatively.
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for the one-tier dummy are larger (in the 2.2 to 3.1 range), their effects are even
stronger.51
In sum, we find no evidence that bank board independence is chosen so that it
complements external governance at the national level. In contrast, we find direct
evidence that board independence is related to board regulations that vary across
countries. The magnitude of these effects is substantial. Thus, our tentative conclu-
sion is that laws and regulations that are specifically targeted to board structures
can partly explain the large country effect on bank board independence.
For director experience, only financial development and the legal origin vari-
ables appear to matter in a robust manner. There is also some weak evidence that
countries with one-tiered board structures have boards with less banking expertise.
We conclude that countries matter so much for bank board independence in
part because there are some board regulations that vary across countries. These
regulations seem to have an important effect on bank board independence, but
somewhat relatively less so on director banking expertise. For board experience,
country effects are relatively less important.
2.5 The Evolution of Board Structures
In this section we exploit the time-series dimension of our data to understand the
evolution of bank board structures. We first look at the aggregate trends and then
we consider how banks change their boards when bank characteristics change.
2.5.1 Trends in Board Independence and Experience: The Importance
of Year Effects
Inspection of the time series trend for our key variables reveals that, around 2002
and 2003, the fraction of independent directors considerably increases, while the
fraction of outside directors with banking experience decreases (see Figure 1).
(Figure 1 about here)
Especially for board independence, these changes are substantial: independence
levels increase from about 40% in 2000 to a plateau of about 67% in 2004-2006. We
see a small decline in board independence in the crisis years (2007-08). In Figure
2, we normalize both variables to 100 in the year 2000. We can then see even more
clearly the magnitude of the relative changes occurring around 2002. These changes
are indeed substantial for both variables, but they are particularly dramatic for
51The incremental R2 of the two board regulation variables is about 5%.
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independence: in 2006, average independence is 70% higher than it was in 2000.52
(Figure 2 about here)
We do not know why bank board independence increases so much and so quickly.
We note however that changes in the regulatory environment such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 coincide with the period of the most dramatic changes in
board structure.53 Figures 3 and 4 show that the increase in board independence
over the 2002-03 period is less pronounced for non-US banks, but also that both US
and non-US banks exhibit similar time trends in independence and size.
(Figure 3 about here)
(Figure 4 about here)
The evolution of aggregate levels of bank board experience is the mirror image of
that of board independence, with average experience decreasing sharply from 28% in
2002 to 21% in 2006. Experience then increases slightly in the crisis years to about
24% in 2008. Figures 3 and 4 show that year effects in board experience are mostly
driven by US banks. In non-US banks, experience stays relatively flat throughout
the whole period at about 37%.
The data suggest that year effects are important and can explain much of the
evolution of board independence and board experience. Aggregate levels of board
independence and experience are negatively correlated and appear to be affected by
shocks such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the financial crisis of 2007-08.
2.5.2 Changes in Bank Characteristics and Changes in Board Structure
If regulation is an important determinant of board independence, one may wonder
whether board composition in banks is set optimally. Although there is no em-
pirical design that can satisfactorily address this issue, we can investigate the link
between bank characteristics and board structures in more detail. One possibility is
that regulatory effects are so important that bank characteristics become irrelevant
for board structure. Or it could also be that regulations affect banks differently
depending on bank characteristics.
52Our trend figures use the whole sample, which is unbalanced. The pattern that we observe is
not due to composition effects though; we find basically the same results if we use only data for
those banks for which data are available for all years.
53NYSE and Nasdaq implemented changes in their listing requirements between 1999 and 2003
which, together with SOX regulations, were likely to affect the demand for independent directors.
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To shed some light on these issues and to provide a broader picture of the bank-
level determinants of board structure, we estimate the following model:
yijt = x
′
ijtβ + p
′
tγ + fij + uijt (7)
where yijt is the board structure variable for bank i in country j in year t, xijt is a
vector of bank characteristics, pt is a vector of year dummies, β and γ are vectors
of parameters to be estimated, fij is a unobservable time-invariant bank-specific
effect, and uijt is the error term. We estimate (6) by fixed-effects methods. We used
our whole panel (2000 to 2008) to exploit fully the times-series and cross-sectional
variation in our sample. The fixed effects eliminate the impact of time-invariant
bank characteristics, including country-specific effects. One possible concern is that
year effects are important. To estimate (6), our identifying assumption is that, as
long as the underlying relationship between bank characteristics and board structure
remains stable over time, year dummies can capture the effects of the crisis and other
year effects. To check whether this assumption is reasonable, we also estimate (6)
using the 2000-2006 sample. We find very similar results, thus we omit the tables
for brevity.54
Table 27 displays the results of the fixed-effects regressions. In column (a) we
report the results for a regression that uses the (logistic transformation of the)
fraction of independent directors as the dependent variable. We find no statistically
reliable evidence that within-bank changes in observable characteristics are related
to changes in bank board independence. The high R2’s in all these regressions are
mostly due to the inclusion of bank fixed effects.
This evidence does not imply that board independence does not change over
time. We know from the previous subsection that board independence does change
substantially over time in our sample; these changes are captured by the year dum-
mies. But these yearly changes in board independence do not appear to be driven
by changes in bank characteristics. Rather, they seem to be a response to changes
in the institutional environment that affects all banks similarly.
(Table 27 about here)
The results for bank experience are again different. Column (b) shows that, as
banks become larger (as measured by assets), board banking experience increases,
a result that is very robust. Additionally, as market-to-book ratios decrease, board
experience increases. In columns (c) and (d), the block holder dummy is added
to the set of regressors. There is no important effect driven by this variable (as it
54When using the 2000-2006 sample we find similar estimated coefficients but often higher stan-
dard errors (with few exceptions), which is to be expected due to the smaller sample.
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does not change much over time), but there are some minor effects on the results
due to the change in the sample. The effect of assets is about the same. The
effect of market-to-book is virtually unchanged (the absolute value of the point
estimate falls from 0.365 to 0.301), although it becomes significant only at 10% in
the smaller sample. ROA now seems to matter, again consistent with the hypothesis
that more experienced directors are more likely to be added (or retained) after poor
performance. Finally, we find that leverage is negatively related to board experience
in the smaller sample.
Overall, we find that there is sufficient over-time variation in board experience,
and that this variation is associated with changes in observable bank characteristics,
especially size and performance. These results contrast with the relative insensitivity
of board independence to changes in bank characteristics.
2.6 Final remarks
We assemble the most complete data set on boards of banks to date. Our data allow
us to draw a detailed picture of bank board composition up to and including the crisis
period. The data reveal a number of new empirical facts. Our evidence suggests
that bank board independence around the world is mostly determined by regulatory
pressure and by factors external to banks. In contrast, the level of previous banking
experience among outside bank directors is mostly explained by bank characteristics.
Overall, our findings raise the question of whether board regulation helps or hinders
bank governance. We see this as a promising agenda for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Tables
Table 19: Number of Observations per Country over Time
This table shows the number of banks available for each country-year.
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Table 20: Summary Statistics
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 4,205 bank level observations from 718 banks for the period 2000-
2008. Director data are from the BoardEx database. We obtain additional financial information from Worldscope
and Bankscope, and country information from Djankov et al. (2008), La Porta et al. (1998), Euromonitor, and the
World Bank Database. Independence is the ratio of independent outside directors over board size. Board size is
the number of directors on the board. Banking Experience is the ratio of outside directors with prior managerial or
top-executive experience in banking over all outside directors. Busyness is the average number of commercial and
non-commercial outside director appointments of all outside directors. Assets is the book value of total assets (in
billions of USD). Sales growth is the annual change in sales over the previous year’s sales volume. Market-to-book
is market value of equity over book common equity. ROA (return on assets) is net income over assets. Leverage is
assets over common equity. Block ownership is a dummy that is equal to one if an owner holds a block of at least
10% of the shares. The variable Antidirector is obtained by multiplying the anti-director rights index constructed
by Djankov et al. (2008) with the rule of law index reported by La Porta et al. (1998). GDP per capita (PPP
adjusted, in thousands of 2005 international USD) is sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators,
and market capitalization over GDP (a measure of financial development) is provided by Euromonitor. Removal of
directors by courts is a dummy variable that equals 1 if courts are allowed to remove bank directors; this variable
is taken from the revised World Bank database on bank regulation and supervisory practices developed by Caprio,
Levine and Barth (2008). One-tier board is a dummy variable that equals 1 if boards are required to have a unitary
board structure; this variable was hand-collected from various sources.
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Table 21: Summary Statistics of Bank Board Characteristics in 2006
This table shows summary statistics of four bank board characteristics across countries in 2006. Independence is
the ratio of independent directors over board size. Banking Experience is the ratio of outside directors with prior
managerial or top-executive experience in banking over all outside directors. Board size is the number of directors
on the board. Busyness is the average number of commercial and non-commercial outside director appointments of
all outside directors.
Table 22: Regressions of Board Characteristics on Bank Characteristics and
Country Dummies in 2006
This table shows ordinary least squares regressions of two board characteristics on bank characteristics and country
dummies in 2006. The dependent variable in columns (a)-(c) is the logistic transformation of board independence.
The dependent variable in columns (d)-(f) is the logistic transformation of board experience. See Table II for the
definition of variables. Robust t-statistics (clustered by country) are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at
0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
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Table 23: Regressions of Board Characteristics on Bank Characteristics and
Country Dummies in 2006, with Ownership Controls
This table shows ordinary least squares regressions of two board characteristics on bank characteristics and country
dummies in 2006. The dependent variable in columns (a)-(c) is the logistic transformation of board independence.
The dependent variable in columns (d)-(f) is the logistic transformation of board experience. See Table II for the
definition of variables. Robust t-statistics (clustered by country) are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at
0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels
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Table 24: Bank Board Independence Gaps in 2006
This table shows the average difference in board independence between non-US banks and matched US banks. A
negative gap means that the country has a lower level of board independence than what is observed in similar
US banks (by construction, the US has an independence gap of zero). In columns (a) and (b) banks are matched
on five characteristics (assets, sales, market-to-book, ROA, and leverage) using the nearest neighbor propensity
matching procedure. In columns (c) and (d) country averages are compared with the US average, without matching
on characteristics. Columns (b) and (d) use banks’ self-reported independence classifications, while columns (a)
and (c) use our independence variable, which is corrected for internally appointed directors, client-directors, and
employee representatives.
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Table 25: Bank Board Experience Gaps in 2006
This table shows the average difference in board experience between non-US banks and matched US banks. A
negative gap means that the country has a lower level of board experience than what is observed in similar US banks
(by construction, the US has an experience gap of zero). In column I banks are matched on five characteristics
(assets, sales, market-to-book, ROA, and leverage) using the nearest neighbor propensity matching procedure. In
column (b) country averages are compared with the US average, without matching on characteristics.
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Table 26: Regressions of Board Characteristics on Bank Characteristics and
Country Characteristics
This table shows ordinary least squares regressions of two board characteristics on bank characteristics and country
characteristics in 2006 and for the 2000-2008 period. The dependent variable in columns (a)-(b) and (e)-(f) is the
logistic transformation of board independence. The dependent variable in columns (c)-(d) and (g)-(h) is the logistic
transformation of board experience. See Table II for the definition of variables. Robust t-statistics (clustered by
country) are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
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Table 27: Bank Fixed Effects Regressions of Board Characteristics on Bank Char-
acteristics
The sample consists of panel data of banks between 2000 and 2008. The dependent variable in columns (a) and (c)
is the logistic transformation of board independence. The dependent variable in columns (b) and (d) is the logistic
transformation of board experience. See Table II for the definition of variables. Robust t-statistics (clustered by
country) are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. Reported R2’s
include the effect of bank dummies.
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A.2 Figures
Figure 1: Time Trends in Board Characteristics - 2000-2008, full sample
This figure shows average board independence and banking experience for all banks in the sample. Board
independence is measured as a fraction of board size while banking experience is measured as a fraction of the
number of independent directors.
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Figure 2: Time Trends in Board Characteristics in Percentages- 2000-2008, full
sample
This figure shows average board independence and banking experience for all banks in the sample. Board
independence is measured as a fraction of board size while banking experience is measured as a fraction of the
number of independent directors. All values are expressed as a percentage of their 2000 levels (year 2000 = 100).
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Figure 3: Time Trends in Board Characteristics - 2000-2008, US banks only
This figure shows average board independence and banking experience for all US banks in the sample. Board
independence is measured as a fraction of board size while banking experience is measured as a fraction of the
number of independent directors. All values are expressed as a percentage of their 2000 levels (year 2000 = 100).
Figure 4: Time Trends in Board Characteristics - 2000-2008, Non-US banks only
This figure shows average board independence and banking experience for all non-US banks in the sample. Board
independence is measured as a fraction of board size while banking experience is measured as a fraction of the
number of independent directors. All values are expressed as a percentage of their 2000 levels (year 2000 = 100).
3 THE LABOUR MARKET FOR EXECUTIVES 108
3 The Labour Market for Execu-
tives
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I analyse the careers of executives in general and the careers and
turnover of CEOs in particular.
Research on CEOs is usually centred around three main questions: 1) How are
CEOs paid and do CEOs perform for pay?, 2) Are CEOs fired for bad performance?
3) What is the relation between CEO characteristics and corporate performance?
However, less is known about the careers of the individuals who made it to a CEO
position. Moreover, we do not understand well how firms select their CEOs and
what determines whether a certain executive becomes CEO or not in his career.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it provides an exhaustive analysis
of the careers of people who make it to a CEO position and it is centred on three
questions: i) How does the career of a CEO look like before he was promoted?, ii)
What are the details of his promotion, i.e. how does the turnover look like (e.g.
internal vs. external turnover)?, iii) What do former CEOs do after they leave a
certain CEO position? Second, it aims to give a first (and partial) answer to the
question whether luck, i.e. being in the right place at the right time, plays a role
for individuals becoming CEOs.
I start my analysis by providing new and detailed descriptive insights in several
aspects of the careers of CEOs. Some dimensions (e.g. insider vs. outsider hires)
have been analysed before; in these cases, this paper is extending the time series to
the 2000-2008 period. Moreover, using a single dataset (in both the cross-section
and over time) as well as coherent definitions of variables, it makes it possible to
relate different variables of interest to each other or to analyse them jointly. Other
dimensions, such as the future career of managers after they leave a certain CEO
position, have not been documented before (to the best of my knowledge). In
particular, some results of my analysis raise further questions on earlier research
results. For instance,
1. How shall we classify insider vs. outsider hires? The data reveals that only a
minority of insider CEOs had already been with the company for a substantial
part of their career (e.g. 50% or more than 10 years). About 25% have only
been with the company for less than 3 years and were likely to be hired in
order to replace the CEO. This observation leads to the question how should
we think about a classification in insider and outsider turnovers? Which (and
why) industries or companies hire executives a few years before promoting
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them?
2. Some research exploits variation in the background of a newly hired CEO in
order to evaluate the importance of industry specific skills (e.g. Cremers et
al. (2011)) in different sectors. Moreover, Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2011) develop
a competitive assignment model in which CEOs and firms are matched based
on multiple characteristics. They argue that, if industry conditions change,
another set of CEO skills might be required which leads to CEO turnover
and more precisely to a turnover with an industry-outsider. In their empirical
analysis, Cremers et al. as well as Eisfeldt and Kuhnen only consider the last
position of the CEO. However, results by Custodio and Metzger (2011 a,b) as
well as by analysing the backgrounds of CEOs within this sample suggest that
considering the full employment history (not only the last position) makes a
difference and neglecting important parts of the CEOs’ human capital might
lead to wrong conclusions.
3. Career concern models explicitly and the market for corporate control implic-
itly assumes that a forced turnover comes at some costs for the dismissed CEO.
Moreover, Peters and Wagner (2009) argue that CEOs receive a turnover risk
premium that compensates them for the risk of a turnover. However, it is not
clear how much bite these mechanisms have in reality. There is evidence that
dismissed CEOs or laid off investment bankers are not heavily punished by
the market and able to get access to good positions again. To the best of my
knowledge, the destination of leaving CEOs has not been analysed before. I
find preliminary evidence that a substantial fraction of leaving CEOs get a new
CEO position in future. Interestingly, classifying turnovers into voluntary and
forced ones, I document that CEOs classified as dismissed are actually more
likely to get a new CEO position in future.
In the second part of the paper, I am making a first attempt to estimate a causal
effect of the economic environment (such as recessions) on the careers of executives.
When analysing the determinants of successful CEO careers for instance, the key
issue is to identify the right counterfactual. Inferences based on a comparison be-
tween CEOs are potentially to be biased as executives who already made it to a CEO
position are likely to be the wrong ”population at risk”. Using a broader definition
and exploiting exogenous variation, I show that exogenous shocks (such as industry
performance) affect the careers of executives. I follow cohorts who enter the board of
companies as executive directors over time. I observe whether the industries of these
individuals are hit by negative shocks. I show that individuals whose industries are
performing badly are less likely to be promoted to a CEO position. This finding
suggests that luck is not only affecting CEO pay (see Bertrand and Mullainathan
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(2001)) but also who is promoted to a CEO position at first.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly surveys related literature.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics of CEO ca-
reers. Section 5 analyses the impact of changes in the economic environment on the
careers of executives. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Survey
This paper is related to three different aspects of the literature on CEOs. First,
it relates to research that analyses characteristics and experience of managers and
their impact on firm performance. Second, it relates to questions on CEO turnover
and how CEOs are replaced. Third, it contributes to the literature that is interested
in how CEOs are selected.
3.2.1 CEO Characteristics and Experience
It it is now well established that CEOs matter and that they affect corporate per-
formance (for example, Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira
2005, Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon 2008, Malmendier and Tate 2008,
and Graham et al. 2009). Moreover, there is one strand of research that relates CEO
characteristics (such as overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate (2008)) to manage-
ment style. Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2011) study individual characteristics
of CEO candidates for venture capital. They show that subsequent performance
is positively related to general ability and execution skills. Other research relates
(early) experience of the CEOs to corporate decision making. Custodio and Met-
zger (2011 a,b) show how industry-specific human capital that was accumulated
over the career of the CEOs affects corporate performance. They show that CEOs
who have experience in the industry of the target perform better in mergers and
acquisitions by negotiating a better price with the target. Moreover, they find that
CEOs with experience in the financial sector manage corporate cash differently. Fi-
nancial experts hold less cash on average but react more dynamically when times are
tight. Malmendier et al. (2011) show that early-life experiences of CEOs their style:
”CEOs who grew up during the Great Depression are averse to debt and lean exces-
sively on internal finance”. Moreover, ”CEOs with military experience pursue more
aggressive policies, including heightened leverage”. Schoar and Zuo (2011) show the
effect of graduating in a recession on the careers of CEOs and ultimately on their
management style. They document that these so-called ’recession CEOs’ spend less
in capital expenditures and R&D, have lower leverage, are more diversified across
segments, and show more concerns about cost effectiveness.
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3.2.2 Turnover
There is substantial literature on CEO turnover in general and on voluntary vs.
forced and outside vs. inside turnover (e.g. see Parrino (1997), Huson et al. (2001),
Huson et al. (2004)) in particular. Moreover, there is also more recent literature
being concerned with the sensitivity of firm performance and turnover. Jenter and
Lewellen (2010) find that boards aggressively fire CEOs for poor performance, and
that the turnover-performance sensitivity increases substantially with board quality.
Jenter and Kanaan (2010) show that CEOs are also fired after bad firm performance
caused by factors beyond their control. They document that CEOs are significantly
more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry or bad market per-
formance. Eisfeld and Kuhnen (2011) explain this somehow puzzling result from
Jenter and Kanaan by showing that both absolute and relative performance driven
turnover can be natural and efficient outcomes of a competitive assignment model in
which CEOs and firms form matches based on multiple characteristics. One of their
empirical predictions is that firms are more likely to hire an industry outsider if a
turnover is triggered by bad industry performance. They interpret industry shocks
as shocks to firms’ skill demands and CEOs with other skill sets might improve the
firm-CEO match quality.
3.2.3 Careers
Though we know something about the careers general histories of CEOs (e.g. Fryd-
man and Saks (2010), Schoar and Zuo (2011), Murphy and Zabojnik (2007), Custo-
dio and Metzger (2011,a,b)), there is little evidence on how firms select CEOs and
why certain individuals become CEOs at first. However, there are a few notable
exceptions. Kaplan et al. (2011) study the characteristics of CEO candidates in
venture capital transactions. In a theoretical work, Goel et al. (2008) show that
an overconfident manager has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being
deliberately promoted to CEO under ”value-maximizing” corporate governance. In
similar spirit, Kaniel et al. (2010) use a longitudinal data set that tracks the job
search performance of MBA students in order to analyse the effect of optimism on
careers. They find that ”dispositional optimists experience significantly better job
search outcomes than pessimists with similar skills. During the job search process,
they spend less effort searching and are offered jobs more quickly. They are choosier
and are more likely to be promoted than others.” Schoar and Zuo (2011) relate
early career experience (such as starting in a recession) to the career progression of
CEOs. However, as I elaborate in more detail in section 3.5.1, due to the nature
of the data, it is very difficult to establish a causal effect in their analysis. Bender
and von Wachter (2006), analysing young workers in a German context, show that
workers ”who are in the right place at the wrong time” suffer persistent losses. In
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related work, Kuhnen (2011) analyses how MBA students ”search and compete for
jobs.” She finds ”that candidates search harder if they have lower ability or worse
outside options, the job sought is more valuable, or if firms are more likely to hire.
Candidates self-select into positions for which they are better qualified and higher
ability types choose to compete for better paying jobs, such as those in the financial
industry.”
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data Sources
My initial sample is the BoardEx database which contains detailed information on
the complete board (executive directors (EDs) and non-executive directors (NEDs))
of listed US companies. I merge this database with the Executive Compensa-
tion database (COMPUSTAT ExecuComp) that covers over 2500 companies. This
merged universe of firms covers the S&P 1500 from 2000 onwards, including com-
panies that were once part of that index. For each firm-year, BoardEx classifies the
position of all directors, allowing me to identify the current CEO as well as other
executive and non-executive positions.
In many questions of this paper, I am interested in the various aspects of the em-
ployment history as well as future positions of these executives and non-executive
directors. BoardEx does not only provide information on the identity of current
board members, it also collects information on their complete employment history
(including company roles and positions), education, and other activities (such as
social activities). To construct measures of experience, I am interested in character-
istics of the previous and future positions of the CEOs. These characteristics include
the firms’ industries, the role, and the exact tenure in each position. To learn more
about these firms (such as the firms’ industries), I match the list of the executives’
past and future companies with different data sources that file information on their
lines of business. I obtain information on quoted firms from COMPUSTAT and
information on private firms from ICARUS.55
I also obtain basic demographic information such as gender and date of birth from
the BoardEx database. BoardEx is also providing information of the education of
the CEOs which allows me to identify whether an executive has participated in a
MBA program or not. I obtain basic information on compensation such as total pay
in a given year from BoardEx as well.
Accounting and stock price information for this set of companies as well as for
the whole CRSP universe (when constructing industry benchmarks) is taken from
55Sometimes company names are spelled differently in the datasets or the company in the
BoardEx database refers to a subsidiary or a financial shell of the company. A simple example is
’Microsoft Corp’ and ’Microsoft.
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the CRSP-COMPUSTAT files. Last, several parts of the upcoming analysis compare
the outcomes of interest between different sectors. In order to classify industries,
I rely on a definition of different sectors. I use the Fama-French 12 (48) sectors
classification from Fama’s webpage.
3.3.2 Construction of Variables
Number of firms a CEO has worked in I obtain the previous position of the
CEO from BoardEx and I merge the corresponding firms with COMPUSTAT and
ICARUS as describe in the section before. For each CEO I compute the number
of unique firms he was working in before becoming CEO in the current company.
Positions at these firms include all sorts of roles.
Number of industries a CEO has worked in In order to understand in how
many different industries a certain CEO has worked in before. I obtain information
on the primary SIC code that is obtained from the firms the CEO was working in
before from COMPUSTAT and ICARUS (as described in 3.2.1). I use the translation
table provided on Fama’s webpage in order to get the corresponding SIC12 and
SIC48 industry classification. I then compute the number of unique industries a
CEO was working in before becoming CEO at the current company.
Age when become CEO I obtain the date of birth, year of birth, or age from the
BoardEx files (depending on the level of detail of the provided information) allowing
me to compute the age of the executive when he became CEO.
Education I use the education filings of BoardEx in order to obtain information
on the education of a CEO. I define a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO
graduated from a MBA program and information on his education is non-missing,
and equal to 0 if information of the education of a CEO is non-missing but he did
not participate in a MBA program. If information on education is not available, I
code the MBA dummy as missing.
Wage I use BoardEx information on directors’ compensation to construct a very
basic measure of their remuneration. Please note that the quality of the data on
compensation is less detailed as in ExecuComp. However, BoardEx provides basic
information on compensation such as salary, bonus, equity, and options. I use the
total annual compensation (i.e. the value of the sum of all compensation compo-
nents) as my main measure of compensation. I also use the total annual income as a
metric in order to rank executive and non-executive directors within a firm in every
year. I.e. the director with the highest annual income is ranked first, the one with
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the second highest income is ranked second etc. I am going to use this rank in order
to analyse within firm promotions.
Roles BoardEx provides information on each position of a director has throughout
his career. It classifies each position into an executive or non-executive position.
Moreover, it also provides the title of each position (as a string variable). I analyse
each position and classify it into the following roles:
• Non-Executive Director (Score = 10)
• Board member (Score = 20)
• Director (Score = 30)
• Vice Chairman (Score = 40)
• Executive Director (Score = 50)
• Vice President (Score = 60)
• Regional CEO, Division CEO (Score = 70)
• Chairman (Score = 80)
• Non-executive Chairman (Score = 90)
• Chief Technology Officer (Score = 100)
• Executive Chairman (Score = 110)
• President (Score = 120)
• Executive Vice President (Score = 130)
• Chief Financial Officer (Score = 140)
• Chief Operating Officer (Score = 150)
• Interim CEO (Score = 180)
• CEO (Score = 200)
Please note that the roles are not conclusive. For example, a CEO is usually an ex-
ecutive director as well. Therefore, I obtain the highest position for each individual,
for each company and year by using the scoring as illustrated above.
I use the roles as an alternative measure in order to establish a ranking among
executive directors.
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Founder I separately code whether an individual was an entrepreneur and founded
a company.
Business Expertise For the segments ’finance’, ’consulting’, and ’auditing’ I con-
struct separate dummies.
Finance I classify a company as a financial company if its FF12 classification is
’11’ - Finance .
Banking I classify a company as a bank if its SIC classification is ’60XX’ or
’61XX’.
Auditing I am interested in current and former top-tier auditing companies. I
define a dummy variable ’auditing’ that is equal to 1 if the CEO has worked in at
least one company out of the following list : Pricewaterhouse, Deloitte, Ernst and
Young, KPMG, Arthur Anderson, Coopers, Peat Marwick, Touche Ross
Consulting I am interested in current and former top-tier consulting companies. I
define a dummy variable ’consulting’ that is equal to 1 if the CEO previously worked
for at least one of the following companies : McKinsey, Boston Consulting Group,
Bain & Company, Booz & Company, Deloitte Consulting, Monitor Group, Price-
waterhouseCoopers, Mercer, Ernst & Young, Oliver Wyman, Accenture, KPMG,
AT Kearny, Cambridge Group, Analysis Group, LEK Consulting, Roland Berger,
Cap Gemini, Arthur D. Little, Hewitt Associates, Mitchell Madison Group, Huron
Consulting Group, Slalom Consulting
Tenure I use the start date and the end date of each role in order to calculate the
tenure for each individual and role. I compute the tenure within a firm as the sum
of non-overlapping tenure periods of all roles by an individual and firm.
Recession I use the NBER classification in order to classify a certain year into a
’recession year’ or not.
3.4 CEO backgrounds and Turnover
3.4.1 Companies
Table 28 provides the distribution of firms within this sample across industries.
There are 2,192 companies in the sample. The dominant sectors are Manufacturing,
Business Equipment, Wholesale, and Finance with more than 10% of the firms in
each sector (11% - 19%).
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(Table 28 about here)
3.4.2 CEO backgrounds
Demographic Statistics and Career Paths I observe 3,773 different CEOs
working in 2192 different large US companies (ExecuComp universe) between 2000
and 2008. Table 1 shows basic demographic statistics. CEOs are mainly male (about
97%) and they get promoted to the CEO position of an ExecuComp firm at the age
of almost 49 years on average. About one third of the CEOs participated in a
MBA program during his career. Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) do a similar analysis
on Forbes companies over an earlier time period. They report an average age of
53.9 years at CEO appointment and a fraction of 28.7% holding a MBA in sample
over the period from 1990-2000. Comparing the gender of CEOs in my sample
with earlier studies, I find a slightly higher fraction of female CEOs. Bertrand and
Hallock (2001) report only a fraction of 0.5% of female CEOs for a large number of
U.S. firms for the years 1992-1997 and Chairman and Wolfers (2006) 1.3% of female
CEOs between 1992 and 2004 .
(Table 29 about here)
Table 29 describes the career paths of these managers before being appointed
CEO. Throughout their career, CEOs worked in 5.52 different firms in 2.29 different
industries on average (using the Fama-French 12 industries classification). They
worked mainly in executive positions and in unlisted firms (or subsidiaries) before
becoming CEO of a listed ExecuComp firm. Next, I analyse specific industry ex-
posure that have been suggested to matter for executive careers such as finance or
consulting experience. A substantial fraction of CEOs has prior work experience
in the financial industry (40.9% considering all positions, 32.0% considering only
executive positions). Restricting the finance experience to banking experience only,
21.9% (15.1%) have experience in banks. Less than 10% have experience in consult-
ing or auditing firms. These magnitudes are very similar to numbers presented by
Schoar and Zuo (2011), though there are a few notable differences. Schoar and Zuo
(2011) report a slightly smaller number of firms (2.57), less cross-industry experience
(1.91) and less experience in consulting and banking. These differences are likely to
arise from a better quality (in terms of completeness) of the BoardEx dataset but
could also originate from trends over time.
(Table 30 about here)
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(Table 31 about here)
Tables 30 and 31 present descriptive statistics on the average tenure of the future
CEOs in different firms and roles. In my analysis, I can only include roles where the
start date and end date of a specific position are not missing. When analysing exec-
utive positions, CEOs stay on average almost 8 years in each firm before switching
companies. Within a firm they stay almost 4 years in a position before changing
roles (and they have 2 different positions within one firm on average). Schoar and
Zuo (2011) reports slightly longer shorter of 3.15 years in a certain positions (she
does not analyse firm tenure).
Initial Position Scholars in labour economics but also in the finance literature
have stressed the importance of early career choices and working conditions for the
future career of workers / executives. Von Wachter (2010, 2011) shows the ini-
tial economic conditions early in the career have long-lasting effects for the career
of workers. Oyer (2008) shows that MBA students who graduate in a bad Wall
Street year are less likely to become investment bankers and earn approximately
1.5millionto5.0 million less throughout their careers. Schoar and Zuo (2011) and
Malmendier et al. (2011) analyse the effect of early life experiences and first posi-
tions on careers and CEO style. For instance, Schoar and Zuo (2011) shows that
”economic conditions at the beginning of a manager’s career have lasting effects on
the career path”. Malmendier et al. (2011) show that early life experiences of CEOs
help to explain corporate financing decisions. They show that CEOs ”who grew
up during the Great Depression are averse to debt and lean excessively on inter-
nal finance” and ”CEOs with military experience pursue more aggressive policies,
including heightened leverage”.
Table 32 shows descriptive statistics on the first position of future CEOs in this
sample. Column (1) exploits the full sample and includes also CEOs with positions
where the starting date is missing. About half of the future CEOs starts their career
in public firms, half in private firms. About 4.0% of the CEOs started their career
as entrepreneurs and about 3% start in a consulting or auditing firm. About 14% of
the CEOs move first to a firm in the financial sector (7% in banking). About 17%
of the future CEOs enters the labour market in a recession year (as defined by the
NBER).
(Table 32 about here)
As some positions are reported without a starting date, there is the concern
that these observations include also the first observation (in which we are mainly
interested in). Therefore, analyse a subsample of CEOs with complete information
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about the positions, i.e. I drop all CEOs who report at least one position without a
valid starting date. Column (2) reports these results. The numbers are very similar.
The average starting date is slightly lower (27.5 years) and less people started in
finance or founded their own company. The drop in entrepreneurship can actually be
explained be the fact that the starting date for entrepreneurial positions is relatively
often missing - which might be due to the fact that a starting date is often not well
defined - anecdotal evidence reveals that some entrepreneurs start their business in
a garage, parallel to college.
Some studies that aim to estimate causal effects of early life market conditions
on the career paths and management styles of CEOs. For instance, Schoar and Zuo
(2011) exploit variation in the market conditions (starting the first job in a recession
or in a normal year). She argues that a recession is arguably exogenous but she is
concerned that the entry in the working life is not, i.e. smart individuals might
defer the entry into the labour market until conditions have improved. Therefore,
she instruments the entry into the labour market with the individual’s birth year.
While this strategy is taking care of some aspects of identification concerns, it is
still problematic to draw any causal conclusions from this analysis. The problem
being that such an analysis is already selecting on outcomes, i.e. we only observe
individuals conditional he made it to a CEO position. Section 3.5.1 is addressing
this problem in detail and provides a very simple example why an analysis based on
that identification strategy fails to estimate a causal effect. I also suggest a definition
of a different population at risk that does not suffer from this biased and allows me
to identify the effect of changes in the economic environment (such as recessions)
on executive careers.
3.4.3 CEO Turnover
In the next step of my analysis, I am interested in CEO turnovers. First, I am
going to analyse where new CEOs are coming from. I investigate this question with
respect to internal/external firm hires, industry insiders/outsiders as well to the last
position new CEOs had before their promotion. This analysis might also lead to
a definition of a well-defined population at risk for the position of a CEO which is
necessary for doing some analyses on the factors that impacts future CEO career
paths.
Turnovers As a first step, I am interested in the distributions of turnovers in this
sample. Overall, I observe 1,187 turnovers between 2001 and 2008. Table 33 shows
the distribution of these turnovers across industries and time.
(Table 33 about here)
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The turnovers are relatively even allocated across time (between about 8%-18%).
However, there is huge variation across industries which can be partly explained by
the distribution of the firms across these different sectors.
Where do CEOs come from? A turnover is classified as ’internal’ if the in-
coming CEO had already a position within the firm with a starting date before the
CEO appointment date. The remaining turnovers are classified ’external’. I also
differentiate between CEOs who had ED or NED positions within the firm as well
as between different levels of tenure.
Table 34 shows the distribution of internal and external hires across industries
and time. About 75% of CEO successions are internal when considering both ED
and NED positions. The number drops to about 70% if I only consider ED positions.
The distribution stays quite stable over time and ranges from 62%-72% over 2001 to
2008. The numbers are quite similar to results by Murphy and Zabojnik (2006) who
find that the fraction of externally hired CEOs is about 26.5% 1990-2000. Cremers
and Grinstein (2011) report a fraction of 32% external CEO turnovers for 1993-2005.
However, they do consider internal promotions of CEOs who are less than 2 years
with the company as external hires as well. As I discuss in table 9 there is actually a
substantial fraction of only recently hired CEOs. If I treat them as externally hired
as well, the number of external hires increases and exceed Cremer and Grinstein’s
32%. Together with the earlier period of Murphy and Zabojnik (2007), the results
suggest that there is a trend towards more externally hired CEOs in the long run.
(Table 34 about here)
Panel B shows that the variation across industries is large, reaching from about
67% insiders in telecommunication sector to about 84% in energy. Considering only
ED positions, this picture does not change qualitatively; the numbers are slightly
smaller though ranging from 59% to 81% of insiders.
One interesting question to ask is when the CEOs, who are promoted internally,
joined the company at first. The majority of research conducted in this area con-
siders a turnover be external if the new CEO did not have a position in the firm in
the last 1-2 years before the turnover (e.g. Parrino (1997) or Cremers and Grinstein
(2011)). Table 35 presents the descriptive statistics on the whole distribution of firm
tenure.
(Table 35 about here)
Columns (1) and (2) show the results for CEOs who had an ED positions in the
firm before becoming CEO, while in columns (3) and (4) the equivalent results of
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NED insiders are shown. Interestingly, about 16% of the insiders with an executive
positions where hired within the last 2 years before the succession (and about 37%
within the last 5 years). The average tenure of insider CEOs is almost 11 year for
EDs and almost 5 years for NED insiders. This number is smaller than the 14.1
years reported by Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) for 1990-2000 but it is well in line
with the declining trend which is documented by the same authors (1970-1979: 18.2
years, 1980-1989: 17.2 years, 1990-2000: 14.1 years).
This is very interesting as the common view on internal CEO turnovers is that
these CEOs are have generally been with the company for most time of their ca-
reer, having gone through several positions. From a theoretical as well as from an
empirical point of view, it is not clear where to make the cut and existing empirical
results are likely to depend on whether CEOs with 1-2 years of tenure are considered
internal hires or not (for instance). For future research, it might be interesting to
analyse which type of companies and under which circumstances hire a potential
future CEOs some years in advance.
In the next step, I analyse the last position of the incoming CEOs. Table 36
presents the results. Column (1) shows the fraction of CEOs that had a board
position within the BoardEx sample. Almost 70% of the newly hired CEOs had an
ED position. Including also NED positions this number increases to almost 80%.
This is an important observation as this sample might actually represent a promising
population at risk for analysing executive careers. I return to this question in section
5 in more detail. If I consider all ED and NED positions in ExecuComp companies
(including also non-board positions as well as companies that are not covered in the
main BoardEx about 90% had an executive position (going up to 93% if including
non-executive positions as well).
(Table 36 about here)
In table 37, I am differentiating between internal hires (i.e. CEOs who had an
ED position within the same firm before being promoted to CEO) and external hires
(completely external and managers who had a NED position within the same firm ).
Note that many executives hold several positions at the same time (e.g. being COO
and president). Internal CEOs are usually recruited from COO/Presidents (about
48%), from COO (about 12%), President (about 16%); this means that about 75%
of the internal recruited CEOs were either COO or President before being promoted.
In a large number of external turnovers the new CEO is directly hired from a CEO
position in another company (about 33%) or from a President position (about 24%).
Interestingly, the COO position does not seem to play a huge role for external hires.
(Table 37 about here)
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Focussing on the external turnovers, I also analyse the movements across different
industries. Here I am concentrating on incoming CEOs who are coming from a
different company and have an ED position within that company. Table 38 presents
the results. A first observation is that a large fraction of the external new CEOs are
actually coming from the same industry. Secondly, all industries hire from different
industries too; they also send executives to different industries.
(Table 38 about here)
Table 39 analyses the sender/receiver behaviour of the different industries in
more detail. As discussed before, all industries receive CEOs from outside the
own industry but they also send executives to CEO positions in other industries.
In order to understand whether some industries are primary sending or primary
receiving CEOs from other industries, I define net sender as the difference between
the number of executives sent to other industries and the number of executives
hired as CEO coming from other industries. Apparently, for most industries the
two quantities are almost cancelling out. Net sender as a fraction of all movements
in a certain industry is about 15% on average across all industries, i.e. streams
are cancelling out. Interestingly, the likelihood but also the propensity of exchange
of executives between certain industries seems to be quite symmetric , i.e. two
industries producing and receiving CEOs for/from each other. For instance, there
does not seem to be much evidence that industry A is producing CEOs for industry
B but receiving CEOs from industry C. The results are rather suggesting that the
acquired and required skills of an ED or CEO are similar between certain industries
and hence CEOs from these different industries might be considered as substitutes.
(Table 39 about here)
Table 38 is already indicating that firms have the tendency to hire within their
own industry when appointing a new CEO externally. This finding might speak in
favour of the presence of some industry-specific skills that cannot easily be trans-
ferred across industries. Indeed, Custodio and Metzger (2011 a,b) show direct evi-
dence of the presence of industry-specific skills by analysing the impact of industry-
specific experience on merger outcomes. They show that industry-experts add more
shareholder value by negotiating better terms. However, Custodio and Metzger
(2011a) do not only consider the last position but they also show that industry-
specific experience that was accumulated throughout their career (e.g. in other top
management positions) is beneficial when negotiating with the targets.
Therefore, I analyse the industry-specific experience of new CEOs in more de-
tail in table 40. Column (2) summarizes the fraction of new CEOs who’s highest
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ED position before becoming CEO in the new firm was in the same industry. This
includes internally recruited CEOs as well as executives from other firms in the
same industry. On average, about 81% of the incoming CEOs had their highest
position within the same industry. There is considerable variation across industries
though. While only about 68% of the new CEOs come from inside the industry in
the Durables sector, more than 93% are within-industry hires in the Energy sector.
As some executives have several positions at the time just before being hired as
a CEO, I am considering all positions that an incoming CEO possessed before he
was recruited in column (3). This broader definition of industry experience does
not change the results qualitatively. However, the fraction of industry-insiders goes
slightly up though (3% on average). In the last column (4) I consider all past ED
positions (not only positions that were hold just before the manager was promoted
CEO). This measure of industry experience is similar to the one used in Custodio
and Metzger (2011a). Using this broader classification of industry experience in-
creases the average industry experience by more than 8% to almost 90% on average
suggesting including past ED industry experience makes a substantial difference.
Moreover, the standard variation of the insider fractions goes down quite some bit,
suggesting that industries -after correcting for past experience- do not look that
differently anymore.
(Table 40 about here)
Where do CEOs go to? Though there has been some evidence in the literature
where CEOs are coming from (as discussed in the last section), we know only very
little about what CEOs who leave their position do afterwards. In this part I
analyse where former CEOs move to after they are replaced by somebody else. The
first observation is that about 90% still stay in the sample, i.e. they move to a
different ED and NED board position within this set of companies which allows me
to continue following their careers. The set of CEOs who leaves the sample are of
lower age on average. This is interesting as some of the former CEOs who disappear
might actually retire from all their positions. However, the younger ones are also
more likely to move to ED positions outside this firm sample which might lead to a
lower average age.
In panel A of table 41 also investigates the effect of the turnover on the number
outside NED appointments by the leaving CEO. As expected, the average number of
NED appointments increases (CEOs retiring accepting NED positions for instance).
(Table 41 about here)
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In the next step, I analyse the kind of positions leaving CEOs are able to get
after the turnover, i.e. I am only considering positions that the former CEO starts
after he steps down as a CEO. Panel B of table 41 shows that almost 96% (out of
the former CEOs who are still in my sample) are able to secure any type of new ED
or NED position after stepping down as a CEO. Most of the leaving CEOs get a
new position (either as an ED or NED) within the same firm (about 82%) and more
than half of them are able to generate a new external ED or NED position (56%).
The third column only includes new positions that are started within 2 years after
the turnover . As expected, this criterion does not affect the internal positions very
much as leaving CEOs are likely to get a new position immediately afterwards in
the same company. The picture is very different for external positions. The fraction
of CEOs who are able to get a new external position drops sharply by almost 45%
(going down to 32% from 56%) and the drops are similar for ED and NED positions.
This pattern can be explained be either some search frictions (it needs time to find
a new position) plus some former CEO might actually not allowed to start working
immediately for a different company as part of their severance agreements.
In the next step, I analyse the type of external ED positions in more detail in
terms of industries and positions. Panel C shows that about 40% of the former
CEOs stay in the same Fama-French industry. Almost half of the leaving CEOs
who find another ED position move to a new CEO position. This number is large in
comparison to findings by Peters and Wagner (2009) who find that only 11 out of the
639 fired CEOs subsequently regain a CEO post within the same universe of firms
(S&P 1500). However, employing the BoardEx dataset allows me to track CEO
positions in non-public and companies outside (S&P 1500) as well which explains a
large fraction of the difference. However, I observe that about 4.9% of the forced
turnover-CEOs find a position within S&P1500 (compared to 1.7% in Peters and
Wagner). Moreover, including companies outside S&P1500 increases the fraction of
fired CEOs that are able to get an new CEO position from 4.5% to 26.2%.
About 46% get the position of a Chairman and 33% of a President. Note that
managers can have several positions at the same time. Less than 10% become
COO, CFO, and Vice President in the new firm. Considering only positions that
the leaving CEO gets within the first 2 year of his departure, the picture does not
change much for the CEO position. If a leaving CEO finds a new CEO position he
does it within the first two years. The picture is different for non-ECO executive
positions: Between one third to one half of the remaining executive positions are
only found later than 2 years after the turnover.
Forced vs. Voluntary Turnovers In the last step of my analysis, I investigate
potential differences between forced and voluntary turnovers. I use a similar classi-
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fication as Parrino (1997) of voluntary / forced turnovers56 which I match with my
sample. I can match 185 (or about 15%) of my turnover events.57
Table 42 shows descriptive statistics. The first observation is that CEOs who
are classified as voluntary turnovers are 5 years younger than CEOs leaving after
classified forced turnovers. This is intuitive as a large fraction of voluntary takeovers
is likely due to retirement. In Panel A, I analyse the effect of the turnovers on the
CEO’s NED positions. CEOs with turnovers classified as voluntary hold more (0.5)
positions on average before the turnover. They are generate more additional NED
positions in the year after the takeovers; the difference between the increase of NED
positions of CEOs after voluntary and forced turnovers is about 0.2 on average.
(Table 42 about here)
In panel B, I am interested in ED positions that the former CEO gets after the
turnover. First, CEOs classified as fired are more likely to find a new ED position
outside the former firm (43% vs. 31%). Second, they are also more likely to become
CEO again (26% vs. 14%). The evidence for other external ED positions is similar.
These results appear very surprising to me. There are two potential explanations
for these findings. First, the classification does not work well. Indeed, Kaplan
and Minton (2008) find that turnover to performance sensitivities to be similar for
turnovers classified as forced/voluntary and conclude that this result is likely due
to misclassification of voluntary turnovers. Jenter and Lewellen (2011) find that
voluntary turnovers are more likely to happen after bad performance. They also
explain this puzzling finding by misclassification. Secondly, the market is not really
punishing forced turnovers. The second alternative is interesting as many scholars
(e.g. Peters and Wagner (2009, p.1)) argue that ”forced turnover typically implies
a drastic deterioration of future employment and earnings opportunities.”
3.5 Business Conditions and Executive Careers
3.5.1 The Identification Problem
One important concern is that the treatment (e.g. starting in a recession) is likely
to change the composition of people who make it to a CEO position at first. In
other words, the proposed identification strategy is already selecting on outcomes.
Table 43 illustrates the problem using recession as an example for a treatment and
’years to CEO’ as an example for an outcome (following Schoar and Zuo (2011)):
(Table 43 about here)
56I thank Yuhai Xuan for providing his data.
57This rather small fraction is due to the fact that the samples are only partly overlapping. This
also means that the observed turnovers are from the earlier period of my sample.
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Suppose we are interested in the causal effect of a recession on the time to
become CEO. Suppose that a recession increases the time by 2 years for good CEO
candidates (observation 1-3 in panel A) and the weak candidates (observation 4
and 5) are never making it to a CEO position if they have to start their career
in a recession. The causal effect of a recession (using the correct counterfactual) is
negative. However, if we try to estimate the causal effect of a recession by comparing
”normal year” cohorts to ”recession” cohorts (otherwise they are assumed to be
equal), we would actually estimate a positive effect (i.e. a time decreasing effect)
of a recession on the average number of years to a CEO position. Indeed, table 5
shows that the average time to CEO is 25 years for a ”normal year” cohort and
22 years of a ”recession” cohort despite the negative (i.e. time increasing) causal
effect of a recession. The problem is that the proposed regression analysis is already
conditional on managers becoming CEO at first which might well depend on whether
potential candidates start in a recession or not. The correct ”population at risk”
includes all potential candidates at the time of the recession which we do not observe.
This example translates to other questions using the same identification strategy as
well.
3.5.2 Exogenous Shocks and Executive Careers
As illustrated in the previous section, it is problematic to exploit exogenous shocks
to the career of CEOs relying on a sample of individuals who already made it to
a CEO position. Therefore, I propose a similar but slightly adjusted identification
strategy, allowing me to estimate a causal effect of business conditions on the careers
of executives. However, one caveat is that I am not able to analyse shocks that
happen very early in the career.
My proposed strategy consists of the following steps:
1. For each year I define a cohort of newly appointed executive directors, i.e. of
individuals who are just appointed to be executive directors on the board of
directors.
2. I construct measures of exogenous variation across industries (such as reduced
form industry-wide shocks measured by the stock market of an industry).
3. Following the careers of these individuals, I analyse how these (positive/negative)
shocks affect the career progression of the EDs within these cohorts. This
means that I am exploiting variation across industries.
(Table 44 about here)
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Table 44 presents summary statistics of executive and non-executive directors
between 2001 and 2007. In Panel A, columns (1) and (2) show details on all board
members (non-executive directors NEDs and executive directors EDs). Column (3)
provides equivalent details for the subsample of executive directors who just joined
the board of directors. Age denotes the age of the directors in years, tenure is the
tenure of the directors in the firm (in years). Director, Chairman,etc. are position
dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the role of the directors corresponds to these
positions. We observe 10,459 first year executive directors overall. The statistics on
the difference between first-year executive directors and all executive directors are
as expected. Newly appointed executive directors are younger on average compared
to all executive directors (48.7 years vs. 52.5 years). They also have lower positions
on average. They have also been with the company for a shorter time (6.7 years vs.
12.1 years).
Panel B shows detailed statistic of the first year cohorts, i.e. of the individuals
who just joined the board as executive directors. Column (1) shows the distribution
of the cohort size over time. Columns (2) to (4) provides information on the number
of individuals who become promoted to CEO between 2001 and 2007. Column (2)
considers all CEO positions, while columns (3) and (4) differentiate between inter-
nal and external CEO position. An internal promotion corresponds to a promotion
within the company where the individual became executive director first. I observe
between about 1400 and 1900 executives being newly appointed in the years between
2001 and 2007 (see column (1)). In column (2) I document how many of these ex-
ecutive directors obtain a CEO position in the following years after appointment.
Please note that I am able to observe the 2001 cohort for 7 years, the 2002 cohort
for 6 years, etc. This explains why the fraction of CEO promotions declines over
the year. In the cohort I am able to follow the longest (2001 cohort), 8% of the
executives made it to a CEO position. Differentiating between internal and external
promotions, I observe that about 77% of the promotions are within the same firm.
There is no obvious trend over time.
Next, I am interested in how the performance of the industry affects the career
progression of the CEO.
For each individual of my first-year cohorts, I observe whether he gets promoted
to a CEO position in the following years. I define my dependent variable ’Becoming
CEO’ as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the individual is promoted to a CEO
position between 2001 and 2007. I am interested in measures for luck / bad luck, i.e.
something that is arguably not under the control of the individuals and exogenous to
his individual performance. As a first step, I am using the performance if the whole
industry as a proxy. Then, I am comparing the careers of individuals who ended up
in lucky industries (as defined by the industry performance) with individuals who
3 THE LABOUR MARKET FOR EXECUTIVES 127
were lucky. I am exploiting variation in luck across different industries within the
same cohort and variation across time within the same industries.
I define quintile 1 - 5 as dummy variables that indicate to which performance
quintiles the industry of the directors’ firms belong to. The performance is mea-
sured every year and aggregated over the whole period. Similarly, I define half 1,
2 are dummy variables that indicate to which performance half the industry of the
directors’ firms belong to. The performance is measured every year and aggregated
over the whole period. Last I define cumulative (average) return as the cumulative
(average) return of the industry of the firm aggregated over the years.
I control for age, tenure, and the position of the individuals. Age denotes the
age of the directors (in years), tenure is the tenure of the directors in the firm (in
years). Director, Chairman, etc. are position dummy variables that are equal to 1
if the role of the directors corresponds to these positions.
The null hypothesis is that luck / bad luck does not have an impact on the career
of an executive.
(Table 45 about here)
Table 45 shows the results. Columns (1) - (4) estimate a linear probability model,
while columns (5) - (8) assume a logistic distribution. The results are qualitatively
similar. The likelihood of becoming a CEO increases concavely with age and is
negatively associated with firm tenure. Being President, Executive Vice President
or COO is positively related with a CEO promotion (consistent with findings in the
previous chapters). CEOs are less likely to be recruited from CFO positions.
Investigating the effect of luck on promotion, we find evidence for luck / bad
luck being a significant determinant of career success. If the individual works at a
firm in a sector that belongs to the worst performing quintile (half), the likelihood of
becoming CEO decreases (columns (1) and (2)). Consistently, I document a positive
correlation between good luck and the likelihood of becoming CEO. Columns (3)
and (4) show that being in an industry that is performing well (as measure by
the cumulative / average performance) the likelihood of becoming CEO increases.
This is consistent with findings by Bender et al. (2006, 2011) who also document
negative and long-lasting effects of negative shocks to the career of workers. Overall,
my findings suggest that being in the right place at the right time is important for
executives becoming CEO. This means that luck / bad luck does not only play a
role for CEO compensation as documented by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)
but also for executives becoming CEOs at first.
In the next step, I redo my analysis differentiating between internal and external
promotions. A CEO promotion is considered to be internal if the executive become
CEO in the firm whose board he joined first.
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(Table 46 about here)
Table 46 presents the results. While most of the controls have similar effects
for internal and external promotions, there are a few notable differences. First, age
seems to be important for external promotions but not for internal ones. Secondly,
external firms do not seem to recruit COOs of other companies but it is an important
position for internal promotions. Interesting, luck seems only be playing a role for
internal promotions.
This is interesting as it suggests certain within-firm dynamics. There are (at
least) two intuitive stories that would support my findings:
1. The likelihood of a voluntary CEO turnover increases with good luck. For
instance, a CEO might want to retire at the peak of his career or he might
be hired by somebody else after a good performance (which is wrongly partly
attributed to his skills rather than to the performance of the industry). In both
scenarios the CEO position within the firm becomes vacant which potentially
increases the likelihood of the lower ranked executives within the same firm.
2. Jenter et al. (2011) show that the likelihood a forced turnover does not only
increase with bad relative performance but also with a bad industry perfor-
mance. Moreover, Kuhnen et al. (2011) also show that the likelihood of an
external CEO turnover increases after bad industry performance as the com-
pany might need a CEO with a different set of skills. This is consistent with
my finding of observing a lower likelihood of being promoted after negative
industry performance; it is also consistent with the finding that this effect is
more prominent for potential internal promotions.
Overall, my findings suggest that luck play a significant role for executives be-
coming CEO or not. They are consistent with within-firm dynamics where luck has
a top-down effect across the ranks of executives.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter provides an empirical analysis of careers of executives in general (and
CEOs in particular). Using a sample of board members of the largest US compa-
nies, I provide exhaustive descriptive statistics on several dimensions of their careers.
For instance, I am analyzing the career paths of CEOs with respect to their indus-
try experience and their promotion within and between firms. Investigating CEO
turnovers in detail, I report several new findings that raise potential questions for
future research. For instance, how should we incorporate the full employment his-
tory (compared to the last position only) of newly hired CEOs in our models and
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empirical work? Why do some firms hire future CEOs several years before pro-
moting them? Moreover, I document that a much larger fraction (as suggested by
earlier research) of CEOs is able to get another CEO position after turnover. This
finding raises questions on how effectively the thread of a CEO dismissal works as a
governance mechanism. Moreover, recent work seems to suggest that part of CEO
compensation is the premium for turnover risk. These questions remain unanswered
for future research.
In the second part of this chapter, I am making a first attempt to estimate a
causal effect of the economic environment on the careers of executives. I show that
exogenous shocks (such as industry performance) affect the careers of executives. I
follow cohorts who enter the board of companies as executive directors over time.
I observe whether the industries of these individuals are hit by negative shocks. I
show that individuals whose industries are performing badly are less likely to be
promoted to a CEO position. My finding suggests that luck is not only affecting
CEO pay (see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)) but also who is promoted to
a CEO position at first. A promising route for future research might be a more
rigorous analysis of the within-firm dynamics of executive careers. My findings are
consistent with explanations where shocks to the firm affect the careers of executives
from top-to-down, i.e. the careers of lower ranked executives are affected by the
career progression and decisions of the higher ranked ones (e.g. due to vacancies).
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A Appendix
A.1 Tables
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Table 28: Fama-French 12 industries
This table shows information on the industry classification as well as the distribution of companies across these
industries.
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Table 29: CEO Demographics
This table shows basic information on the demographics of the CEO. MBA is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
CEO has done a MBA in his career. Age become CEO is the age of the executive when he was appointed CEO in
the current company. Years to CEO is the number of years between the CEO’s first position and his current CEO
position. Male is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is male.
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Table 30: Past Positions (Firms and Industries)
This table provides information of the past career of the CEOs. Number of firms is the number of different firms a
CEO was working in before becoming CEO. Listed and unlisted further sub-classify these experiences and they are
referring to the public status of these firms. The number of industries corresponds to the number of Fama-French
48 (12) industries a CEO has worked in. Finance Experience, Auditing Experience, Consulting Experience are
dummy variables equal to 1 if a CEO has prior experience in financial services, auditing or consulting respectively.
Column (1) is considering all positions, while columns (2) and (3) only consider executive or non-executive positions
respectively.
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Table 31: Past Positions (Tenure)
This table presents summary statistics on the tenure of the CEO in previous firms and positions. Panel A shows the
tenure of a CEO at firm (differentiating between total tenure in executive positions and non-executive positions).
Panel B shows the corresponding statistics for positions. A CEO can have several positions within a firm (e.g. when
being promoted). Only positions with non-missing start- and end dates are included.
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Table 32: First position
This table shows the first position of future CEOs. Age of first job is the age of the CEO at his first recorded
position. Start in a recession is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the first job was in a year that is defined as
a recession according to the NBER classification. ’Listed,’ ’Unlisted’, and ’Other’ correspond to the public status
of the firm where the CEO started his career. Founder is a dummy variable if the CEO started his career as
an entrepreneur. Finance, Auditing, and Consulting are dummy variable that are equal to 1 of the CEO started
his career in the financial sector, auditing or consulting respectively. The first column includes the first recorded
position (i.e. the position with the earliest start date) as well as all positions with a missing start date. The second
column only includes CEOs where the employment history has complete start dates, i.e. where all of his previous
roles have a valid starting date.
Table 33: Turnovers across industries and time
This table shows the number of CEO turnovers across time and industries.
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Table 34: Internal vs. External Turnovers
This table shows statistics on internal vs. External turnovers. A CEO is considered to be an insider if he had a
position within the firm before becoming CEO. Columns (1)-(3) consider a CEO to be an outsider if he did not
have any position within the firm, while in columns (4)-(6) only executive positions are considered. Panel A shows
variation across industries and panel B shows variation over time.
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Table 35: Tenure of CEOs (Internal Turnovers)
This table shows the tenure within the firm of a CEO who was hired internally, i.e. who had a position within the
firm before being promoted to CEO. The variable ’0-5 months’,...,’¿10 yeas’ are dummy variables that are equal to
1 if the CEO has been for the corresponding period within the firm. The last row ’Years in Company’ is the number
of years that a CEO has been with the company.
Table 36: Last positions of hired CEO (dataset)
This table shows the origin (in terms of data universe) of new CEOs. Column (1) shows whether the new CEO
had a board position within the BoardEx sample before becoming CEO in the current company. Column (2) shows
the equivalent statistic for the whole ExecuComp Sample. The main difference is that also non-board positions are
considered in column (2). Both columns differentiate between executive and non-executive positions.
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Table 37: Last positions of hired CEO
This table shows the last position of a newly hired CEO. Same FF48 (FF12) are dummy variables that are equal
to one of the CEO is coming from the same FF48 (FF12) industry. CEO, ..., VP are dummy variables that are
equal to 1 of the last position of the new CEO was a CEO, ..., VP position. Column (1) shows statistics for
CEO who were hired internally, i.e. he had an executive position within the firm before. . Column (2) shows the
corresponding statistics for CEO who were recruited externally, i.e. who did not have an internal executive position
before. Remark: internal non-executive positions are considered to be external hires.
Table 38: Industry ED changes after external turnover - Transition Matrix
The table shows the transition matrix between different industries in the event of an external turnover. ’Industry
from’ indicates the industry of the previous executive position the CEO had before becoming CEO in the current
company. ’Industry to’ stands for the industry of the firm the executive was just promoted CEO.
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Table 39: Industry ED changes after external turnover
The table shows the in- and out-flows of executives of different industries. Column (1) ’sending’ indicates the
number of CEOs that had their previous position in the corresponding industry, while column (2) ’receiving’ tells
the number of externally hired CEOs in that industry. While columns (1) and (2) also include hires within the same
industry, column (3) and (4) only consider movements between different industries. The last column calculates the
net position for each industry.
Table 40: Fraction of inside industry hires
This table analyses the industry expertise of newly hired CEOs. Column (1) considers a turnover to be a within-
industry hire if the highest position just before becoming CEO was in the same industry as the industry of the
current firm. Column (2) considers all positions that the executive had just before he became CEO. In column
(3) all executive positions are considered (not only the last position). Column (4) counts the number of turnovers
within the corresponding industry.
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Table 41: Future Positions after CEO Turnover
This table analyses the future careers of CEOs after a turnover. Panel A shows whether CEOs are staying still in
the sample after the turnover (keeping old non-CEO positions and/or getting new positions). Age is the age of the
CEO at the date of the turnover. NEDs in the year before (after) the turnover counts the number of non-executive
positions a CEO has in the year before (after) the turnover. Delta NEDs computes the difference between these
two numbers. Panel B analyses potential new positions (i.e. positions that start after the turnover) of the former
CEOs. ’New position’ is a dummy that is equal to one if the former CEO gets any new position after the turnover.
Given that the former CEOs are getting an external executive position, panel C shows the position they obtain.
Column (1) includes all future positions and column (2) only considers positions that were obtained within 2 years
after the turnover.
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Table 42: Forced vs. Voluntary Turnover
This table shows is comparing the effect of voluntary and forced turnovers on the future careers of former CEOs.
Age is the age of the CEO at the date of the turnover. NEDs in the year before (after) the turnover counts the
number of non-executive positions a CEO has in the year before (after) the turnover. Delta NEDs computes the
difference between these two numbers. Panel B analyses potential new positions (i.e. positions that start after the
turnover) of the former CEOs. ’Find any external ED’ is a dummy that is equal to one if the former CEO gets any
new external executive position after the turnover. G iven that the former CEOs are getting an external executive
position, panel B also shows the position they obtain. Columns (1) and (3) include all future positions and columns
(2) and (4) only consider positions that were obtained within 2 years after the turnover.
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Table 43: Identification Concern
This table illustrates an identification concern when already selecting on the outcome, i.e. the individual already
being CEO.
Table 44: Cohort Statistics
This table shows summary statistics of executive and non-executive directors between 2001 and 2007. In Panel
A, columns (1) and (2) show details on all board members (non-executive directors NEDs and executive directors
EDs). Column (3) provides equivalent details for the subsample of executive directors who just joined the board of
directors. Age denotes the age of the directors in years, tenure is the tenure of the directors in the firm (in years).
Director, Chairman, etc. are position dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the role of the directors corresponds
to these positions. Panel B shows detailed statistic of the first year cohorts, i.e. of the individuals who just joined
the board as executive directors. Column (1) shows the distribution of the cohort size over time. Columns (2)
to (4) provides information on the number of individuals who become promoted to CEO between 2001 and 2003.
Column (2) considers all CEO positions, while columns (3) and (4) differentiate between internal and external CEO
position. An internal promotion corresponds to a promotion within the company where the individual became
executive director first.
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Table 45: Cohort Analysis: CEO Promotions
This table analyses determinants of CEO careers. The dependent variable ’Becoming CEO’ is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 if the individual is promoted to a CEO position between 2001 and 2007. Age denotes the age
of the directors in years, tenure is the tenure of the directors in the firm (in years). Director, Chairman, etc. are
position dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the role of the directors corresponds to these positions. Quintile
1 - 5 are dummy variables that indicate to which performance quintiles the industry of the directors’ firms belong
to. The performance is measured every year and aggregated over the whole period. Half 1, 2 are dummy variables
that indicate to which performance half the industry of the directors’ firms belong to. The performance is measured
every year and aggregated over the whole period. Cumulative return is the cumulative return of the industry of the
firm aggregated over the years. Average return is the average return of the industry of the firm aggregated over the
years.
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Table 46: Cohort Analysis: Internal vs. External
This table analyses determinants of CEO careers. The dependent variable ’Becoming CEO’ is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 if the individual is promoted to a CEO position between 2001 and 2007. Age denotes the age
of the directors in years, tenure is the tenure of the directors in the firm (in years). Director, Chairman, etc. are
position dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the role of the directors corresponds to these positions. Quintile
1 - 5 are dummy variables that indicate to which performance quintiles the industry of the directors’ firms belong
to. The performance is measured every year and aggregated over the whole period. Half 1, 2 are dummy variables
that indicate to which performance half the industry of the directors’ firms belong to. The performance is measured
every year and aggregated over the whole period. Average return is the average return of the industry of the firm
aggregated over the years.
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